


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CONTENTS

12 April 1991

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Human Rights Infringement by Decrees [Yu. Feofanov; IZVESTIYA, 3 Apr 91]	1
Sobchak Urges Military Prosecutor's Ouster [A. Sobchak; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 13, 3 Apr 91]	4
Liberal Democratic Party Secretary Views Relations With CPSU, Army [A. Khalitov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Apr 91]	5
Communist Party's Viability, Role Viewed [L. Shevtsova; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 Mar 91]	6

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Baltics

Estonian Election Results Analyzed [T. Alatalu; VECHERNIY TALLINN, 5 Mar 91]	10
Role of Opposition in Estonian Politics [I. Kannik; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 20 Mar 91]	11
Estonian Press on Republic Political Situation [V. Ivanov; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 12 Mar 91]	12
Latvian Parliament's Vacancies Filled [L. Semenov; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 8 Feb 91]	13
'Equality' Leader Views Faction's Role in Latvian Parliament [S. Dimanis; LAUKU AVIZE, 1 Feb 91]	13
Documentary Recounts 20 Jan Attack [Moscow TV, 5 Mar 91]	14
Prunskiene Assesses European Trip, Return to Lithuania [K. Prunskiene; EKHO LITVY, 23 Feb 91]	14
USSR Deputy Doubts Yazov Report on Vilnius [Y. Shchekochikhin; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 2, 16 Jan 91]	15
Landsbergis' Bodyguards Allegedly Linked to Shootings [V. Roshchin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Mar 91]	16
Lithuanian CP's Jermalavicius Rejects Criminal Charges [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 6, Feb 91]	17

RSFSR

Moscow's Prokofyev Views Referendum Results [Yu. Prokofyev; MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 19 Mar 91]	17
RSFSR Rights Secretary on Agreement With Estonia [S. Shustov; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 27 Feb 91]	18
Dual Positions of Belgorod's Ponomarev Criticized [N. Utkin; PRAVDA, 28 Mar 91]	20
Kemerovo May Become 'Guerrilla Country' [Moscow Radio, 30 Mar 91]	21

Western Republics

Belorussia Announces Council of Ministers Changes [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 2 Mar 91]	21
Belorussian Deputy Cites Political Priorities [Y. Novikov; ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, 21 Mar 91]	23
Belorussia Passes Militia Protection Law [Moscow Radio, 26 Feb 91]	24
Belorussian Supreme Soviet Paper Criticized for One-Sidedness [G. Kapanik; SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 2 Mar 91]	24
Ukraine To Establish Banking System [Kiev International, 28 Feb 91]	26
Ukrainian Oblasts Reject 'Galicia' Regional Concept [S. Troyan; IZVESTIYA, 19 Feb 91]	27

Caucasus

Armenian First Secretary on Role of Communist Party [S. Pogosyan; GOLOS ARMENIA, 21 Mar 91]	27
Georgian Jurists Address Gorbachev To Protest Procurator's Tbilisi Report [VESTNIK GRUZII, 15 Mar 91]	30
Role of Abkhazia Viewed in Georgian Independence	32
Gamsakhurdia Asks for Support of Independence [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 13, 30 Mar 91]	32
Abkhaz ASSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Responds [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 13, 30 Mar 91]	33

Central Asia

Kazakh People's Deputy Scores Democrats, Explains 'Soyuz' Group	35
Petrushenko Interview, Correspondent's Commentary [N.S. Petrushenko; LENINSKAYA SMENA, 5 Mar 91]	35
Reaction to Interview [O. Kvyatkovskiy; TRUD, 19 Mar 91]	37
Chairman Outlines Zheltoksan Party Program [Kh. Kozhakhmetov; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 2 Feb 91]	37
'Adolat' Leader Gives Own Account of Osh Tragedy [R. Mirakhmedov; SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 7 Feb 91]	42

LAW AND ORDER

KGB Not Responsible for Explosive Found on Miners' Bus [N. Lisovenko; IZVESTIYA, 29 Mar 91]	46
IZVESTIYA on Citizenship, Pardons in USSR [TASS, 2 Apr 91]	46
Responses to Readers' Queries on Crime Situation [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 26 Mar 91]	46

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

New Kiev News Agency to Focus on Economic News [Moscow Radio, 1 Apr 91]	49
Kyrgyz Paper Changes Name [SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA, 26 Feb 91]	49
Cinematographers Press Conference Previewed [M. Murzina; IZVESTIYA, 26 Mar 91]	49
Editors' Roundtable Discusses Present Campaign Against Free Press [MOSCOW NEWS No 10, 10-17 Mar 91]	49
Problems in Gauging Newspapers' Popularity Viewed [V. Prokopenko; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 26 Mar 91]	54

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

World Scholars on Lenin's Role in History [N. Morozova; PRAVDA, 30 Mar 91]	55
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ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Pollution Control Bottlenecks Discussed [A. Lãñe; PAEVALEHT, 26 Feb 91]	57
Saiga Herds Seen Endangered by Government Policies, Export Efforts [A. Shamenov; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 28 Mar 91]	59
Kiev Water Supply Dioxin Content Investigated [V. Smaga; KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, 5 Mar 91]	60
Academy of Sciences Official on Probability of Siberian River Diversion Project [S. Ziyadullayev; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 9 Feb 91]	61
Georgian Greens Council Chairman Outlines Program, Accomplishments [Z. Zhvaniya; VESTNIK GRUZII, 7 Mar 91]	62
Mission of Uzbek Environmental Protection Committee Outlined [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 5 Feb 91]	64
Official Responds to Criticism of 'Aral' Consortium [B. Tursumbayev; PRAVDA, 28 Feb 91]	65
Chairman Outlines Tasks of Kazakhstan's Ecology Committee [M.M. Nurtazin; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 Jan 91]	66

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

USSR Health Officials on State Medical Care System Restructuring [I. Denisov, A. Pavlyutkin; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 28 Mar 91]	69
Academician Updates AIDS Measures [V. Pokrovskiy; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 28 Mar 91]	71
Ivashko, CPSU Secretariat on Women's Issues [PRAVDA, 29 Mar 91]	72
CPSU's Semenova Attends Ivanovo Women's Conference [PRAVDA, 26 Mar 91]	73
RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Goryacheva on Women's Role in Politics	73
'Ukranianization' Said To Depend on Independence [A. Mokrenko; LITERATURNAYA UKRAYINA, 21 Mar 91]	75
Orthodox Diocese in Far East Divided [Y. Vitrishchak; TASS, 3 Apr 91]	77
New Approach to Social Sciences in Tajik SSR Examined [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 20 Feb 91]	77

Human Rights Infringement by Decrees

91UN1224A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "In the Vise of Justice: "Experience of Justification of Unpopular Decisions"]

[Text] From IZVESTIYA's windows we watched with mixed feelings the maneuvers of the regiments and divisions in Pushkin Square on 28 March. The most well-balanced of us said:

"What's all the fuss about, everything will be all right."

True, the mass meetings subsided, the Army left, and on 15 April, let us hope, the cabinet's ban on public expression will expire. Everything "will be all right," but one question remains: Is there anyone in this country who respects the law? On 13 September of last year, the Constitutional Oversight Committee rendered its findings concerning the presidential edict on the Sadovoye Ring. You will recall that the center of the capital was at that time transferred to government jurisdiction when it came to the holding of mass meetings and demonstrations there. The committee considered that the head of state had exceeded his authority. How in the light of this should we view the cabinet act, albeit temporary and brought about by the demand of a group of deputies for order to be brought to bear?

Nowadays everyone is ardently swearing fealty to the law and even expressing a readiness to submit to the "diktat of the law." "Left" and "right," the authorities and subjects. Only everyone "writes down the two and carries the three" here. Devotion to the law does not extend further than current advantage—beyond this boundary the law begins to impede, and the old, but formidable weapon of "special circumstances" is dragged to the surface.

And what in fact is to be done in these circumstances? Abiding by the law even in ordinary circumstances is incredibly difficult, for a law cannot in principle be popular with everyone. There can only be one justification for such a law—legal irreproachability.

A Soviet-American conference on the subject "The Economy and the Law" was held last year in Moscow. An attorney from America cited the following legal episode. U.S. steel industry plants went on strike during the Korean War; they were demanding pay raises. President Truman—he was simultaneously commander in chief—issued an act outlawing the strike in view of a special situation—war! But the U.S. Supreme Court declared this act of the president unconstitutional. According to the attorney, the argument of the "custodians of the Constitution" was this: "A state of emergency does not abrogate the law."

This opinion of legal experts did not, most likely, delight the patriots, and it is highly possible that the Supreme Court was accused of throwing a "wrench in the works." And, I believe, it was difficult for the judges themselves

in such circumstances—they were Americans, after all. Nonetheless, they rendered this opinion—they were backed by the law, which is higher than "patriotism."

We have no war as yet, thank God, unless you count the "war of laws," leaders' clashes, and the confrontations of parliaments, but the situation is, frankly, a combat one. And under these conditions the as yet young (not yet a year old!) Constitutional Oversight Committee is having to render opinions (as its basic legal acts are called) which are condemned to unpopularity. But such is the foredoom of the law.

Russia has never had a constitutional court inasmuch as it has lacked the constitutions themselves. The Soviet constitutions were not, as we know, written for execution. Just two years ago, with the start of the functioning of representative legislative institutions, we turned to articles of the country's basic law and saw at once for ourselves that many of them have nothing in common with the law. For the law means not political advocacy journalism but provisions effected by procedures. It was not fortuitous that the Constitutional Oversight Act and the forming of the committee were so arduous: First, opponents said, let us adopt a constitution, and then we will exercise supervision of its execution. Another viewpoint prevailed: The law has been enacted, a committee has been created, and we should be talking not about what could be but about what is.

However high-handedly the authorities might treat public opinion, they cannot ignore it altogether. The more so in that this applies to a "third authority," which has neither finances nor army nor administrative system, and all that it has is this unsteady "Soviet law" and Constitution, which is being patched up and repatched as we go along. Under these conditions it is very important that the acts of constitutional oversight encounter at least understanding. But what does popularity mean today? If you are "for the authorities," you are hooted down; if you are "against," you are greeted with applause. Such are the times, and I live in them. And I say honestly that I am very impatient for an act of constitutional oversight to "step up a plank." Not legal thinking, I realize, but I can't help it... At the time of the epic concerning our celebrated investigators, a neighbor was all the while asking me: "Who will win?" One day I inquired: "What is it to you, why are you so interested?" She charmingly replied: "I very much want to see some people from the government go to jail." And I also, I confess, was waiting for some presidential edict to be declared unconstitutional... But we have had this also, and I will return to the edicts. Meanwhile, about something else...

IZVESTIYA recently published, as I have said, "in accordance with the wishes of people's deputies of the USSR," the opinion of the Constitutional Oversight Committee "The Prohibition on a Pluralism of Offices by Leaders of Official Organs of Power and Administration Determined in Legislation of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]." This opinion was

at odds with my populist expectations even when it was rendered, and, describing the committee's work in the newspaper, I diplomatically skirted around this act. It seemed to me that the opinion had been rendered exclusively "to please the center." I did not wholeheartedly accept the words of my interlocutors from constitutional oversight to the effect that there could be no deviation from the law under any circumstances. I believed that they were trying to use the law to impede the democratic enthusiasms of the Russian Parliament.

Let us lay bare the essence of the problem. In its decree "Mechanism of the Power of the People in the RSFSR," the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR recorded: "Combination of the office of leader of an official organ of power or administration and ANY other office, in political and social and political organizations included (the word "any" is my emphasis—Yu.F.), is prohibited." But, after all, what is said is one thing, what is implied is quite another: For the formation of democratic authorities it is essential to separate a pernicious symbiosis—the combination in one person of an authoritative state office with the just as authoritative office of head of a party structure, the chairman of an oblast soviet, say, and first secretary of an oblast party committee. This is the meaning of the decree. Nothing more. Russia's people's deputies would hardly have been particularly disturbed had it been a question of the chairmen of soviets being in addition presidents of flower-growing societies or leaders of movements for saving rivers and lakes.

But what prevented this being said plainly? Fear, I believe, of unduly politicizing a legal document and aiming it directly against the apparatus structures of the Communist Party and of outlawing this party, as it were. But, it seems to me, the Russian deputies were for no good reason too shy to say plainly: **The combination in one person of two authoritative apparatus positions is incompatible.** After all, a secretary of a CPSU oblast committee is not a leader of party masses making policy by his authority and influence, which in world civilized practice is quite prevalent. He is the direct leader of an authoritative structure to whom a powerful and obedient apparatus is subordinate, who controls press organs, monetary resources, and considerable property and who leads not by word but by command. And who, incidentally, in accordance with the staff list, is paid extra wages that are by no means symbolic—that he does not receive them, let us assume, is immaterial—it is a paid office.

Just as unacceptable, in my view, is the combination of the offices of head of a rural soviet and collective farm chairman—no one is capable of taking on such a monster.

So the idea contained in the decree of the Russian Congress "The Mechanism of the Power of the People" seems to me personally fruitful and democratic. But it has one "slight" flaw—it is not legally drawn up the way it should be. It is not fortuitous that the word "slight" is in quotation marks: "correctly" or "wrongly" "drawn

up"—this means law or antilaw. In terms of "intent," the decree of the Russian Congress is aimed against the concentration in some hands of unlimited power, but, according to the "letter," the leader of a state body may not be the chairman of a scientific society, editor of a journal or president of a dog breeders' club.

An idea which is illiterately, even uncouthly expressed, but which is close to the masses, could be accepted by them "by acclamation," as they say, without any clarifying wording. An idea which is embedded in a legal document is required to be entered in all its articles and letters, up to and including the last comma (we would recall once again the celebrated resolution on an appeal for clemency: "Execution cannot be pardoned").

But to speak of the pluralism of offices, I was shown an ordinance of the USSR Council of Ministers adopted "before democracy"—on 22 November 1988. It says plainly: "The holding of two executive positions is prohibited." And explains: "Pertaining to executive positions are those connected with the leadership of outfits." I would not say that this is a legally consummate document. Legal experts even interpret it variously: It pertains only to labor law, not constitutional law; elective positions have a special status; the ordinance concerns "pluralism of positions," not "doubling up"; and so forth.

"But these are interpretations," it was explained to me. "A prosecutor could put a varying construction on this."

"In your ruling you should have suggested not only the legal flaws in the decree of the Russian Congress but also legal approaches since the very practice of combining two executive apparatus positions is unlawful," I told my partners.

"First," they replied, "our ruling says directly that it 'does not prevent the establishment in legislation of restrictions on the combination of paid offices by leaders of state organs of power and administration....' But these restrictions should have a legal grounding. Second, the Constitutional Oversight Committee does not have the right to create rules of law; to 'suggest,' as you put it—our 'suggestion' being possible in one version—indicating the incompatibility of a document with the law if such incompatibility exists. And no more."

But this in itself is a good deal. And this is not liked and is not popular and cannot be popular with those who "make the law," guided by a good purpose and heedless of the ways and means of progress toward it. Legal oversight is like a controller directing the flow of transport vehicles on a detour which is inconvenient from the drivers' viewpoint, but which thereby guards against the vehicle falling over a precipice. It is not, after all, the precipice, which cannot be seen from behind the bend, but the adamant controller, who prevents the destination being reached as quickly as possible, who is abused.

True, this comparison would be far more successful were legal oversight to really perform the role of controller—

currently it has been assigned the role of crash crew, not that well equipped, what is more. And the "drivers" also are slipping through on the shoulders and saying: "Get out of the way, we ourselves know it all."

The dramatic nature of the formation of our law-based statehood consists, I believe, of the fact that it is in fact not what anyone desires. The chaos of the mass meeting is in our country preferable to the regularity of the law. Is it for this reason, perhaps, that we are falling down the precipices? In issuing the nations a self-determination bill of exchange did the creators of the "state of the new type" really imagine that some people would present it for payment? And could those who wrote the constitutions of 1936 and 1977 have thought in recording the republics' right to separation from the Union that attempts would ever be made to realize this right? Had they imagined and thought thus, they would simultaneously have created the mechanisms for the realization of this. The law, apparently, is insidious, like nature: It also is capable of avenging violence done to it. Just as Russia's proclamation of the sovereign nature of all its parts, up to and including the rural soviets, is avenging its integrity...

But closer to the subject. While not having heeded the opinion concerning a pluralism of positions, the Russian parliament did not, thank God, reject the very idea of constitutional oversight at the Union level. It was the RSFSR Supreme Soviet which appealed to it when the now celebrated "order of two ministers"—defense and the interior—concerning patrolling was issued. As you know, the president had by his edict provided the departmental act with a legitimate basis.

I was present at the preliminary discussion, which was attended by representatives of the Army, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the KGB, prosecutors and legal scholars. No one was against the use of the Army for this purpose in principle. The legal formalization, however, left much to be desired. "Formalization" is not simply legal casuistry—behind it lies a violation of human rights and infringement of the authority of sovereign republics. The Constitutional Committee rendered an opinion, which was published in the press, pointing out certain defects. In the Militia Act, which was adopted quite recently, the USSR Supreme Soviet supplemented and corrected many of the provisions of the edict. But the edict itself is as yet in its original form, with legal flaws, and the committee intends, observing the necessary procedures, to return to it.

The weakness of our constitutional oversight, as, incidentally, of our justice generally, is that it lacks a dependable and precise mechanism of the execution of decisions. I am not hereby maintaining that it is necessary in the literal sense to create a mechanism in the form of yet another state structure—we have enough of them as it is. In a state based on the rule of law everyone—from the police to the government—"rushes" to comply with the ruling of a court of law, for example.

In any event, no one even thinks of evading an unpopular, but legal judgment—neither the citizens nor the authorities. A judicial ruling is the law, and, consequently, ignoring it is criminal.

But here we have a most fundamental opinion, I believe, being rendered: All laws, government ordinances, and departmental acts affecting human rights in one way or another may not be secret; the current ones should either be revoked or published prior to 1 March of this year.

And? The "secret" stamps have been removed from documents. But where and how may the citizen familiarize himself with them? And have all these acts in fact been declassified? After all, there are on the order of 10,000-15,000 such government ordinances alone, and how many are there of the MVD, KGB, customs... I am not saying that the committee's opinion has been ignored. "The Council of Ministers has instructed the Ministry of Justice..." "Voronin (deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers) has stamped the resolution 'for execution'..." In addition, argument is under way: What pertains to "human rights," and what regulates the tactics of those same special militia detachments; what is really "for official use only," and what is being concealed from people by this stamp? In a word, we have had the usual long drawn-out apparatus proceedings, in which everything could drown and be dissolved.

So I believe that parliament, with its numerous committees and commissions, should take this act of constitutional oversight under strict supervision and especially discuss the progress of compliance therewith—in a word, impart to it the necessary state significance. Yet this act has not been published in full in the general press even. I suspect that it is not all that popular with the authorities—government or parliamentary; and our public and the media have remained indifferent to it, as Zoshchenko's heroes would say. But one way or another, the ant hill has been knocked over—a legitimate basis has been knocked out from beneath all the "stamps"—"secret," "top secret," "for official use only."

As far as I know, the committee's immediate plans include study of what is for us an even more global question—concerning the limits of the authority of the country's president. This does not mean that there will be an opinion tomorrow. This is only a "statement of intent" which I have overheard. Approaching this problem is difficult. The legal aspect itself is complex.

Last September the USSR Supreme Soviet endowed the head of the executive authority with legislative functions, provisionally—until 1 March 1992. Did it have the right to do so? May legislative authority be so easily transferred to one person? And what will ensue from this?

The president issues an edict on economic sabotage. The goals are noble, the means, effective, parliament's authority, delegated. Now, per an edict of the president, the militia and state security may carry out searches and seizures, break into residences and warehouses and the

secrets of bank documents without compliance with the rules of due process stipulated by law—without the necessary institution of criminal proceedings. But it is not simply a rule of law that has been supplemented hereby or corrected for the sake of a noble purpose. The president's edict has intruded upon procedural law itself protecting the individual against the arbitrary action of repressive authorities. It has in fact given the authority for any of us to be "taken" without sufficient grounds—merely "on suspicion," that is, on a whim. Aimed against thieves, swindlers, and speculators, unlawful measures will sooner or later hit human rights. This, at least, is how this act was evaluated by legal experts at the preliminary discussion of the presidential edict. A right has been violated which no one—not even the Congress of People's Deputies—should violate. The American Constitution (First Amendment), incidentally, contains very effective formulas: for example, "The Congress shall make no law...abridging freedom of speech or of the press." Congress is prohibited! This is what they call "the compulsory limitation of a coercive authority." Which makes the legal regime inexorable.

I am not, naturally, trying to predetermine what constitutional oversight's opinion should be in respect to the powers of the president; I do not know whether there will be such at all. I simply wanted to mention the conditions under which, no, not the committee, but the law itself has to operate. The people have their historical and social concept of justice—the law proceeds from this. But there is, after all, the justice of the day, the mass meeting, the crowd. At the time of a break with the old and the coming into being of the new, the legislator all too often falls into the vise thereof. But however hard it is for the law and its "custodians," they cannot waive their principles, otherwise the law will simply disappear. Dmitriy Ivanovich Pisarev was not, I believe, an expert in state craft but he evaluated very accurately the role of the law in a significant event of world history. "The spirit of the cold formalism of the law," he wrote, "spared Rome the calamities of internecine war—the conflict of the plebs and patricians was long and arduous in resolution, but peaceful."

You will agree, however, how difficult it is to maintain this very legal "spirit of cold formalism" in our tumultuous times. But such is the destiny and mission of the law—to be unpopular at a given moment in order to prevent the dramatic events and tragedy of many subsequent moments.

Sobchak Urges Military Prosecutor's Ouster

91UN1218A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 13, 3 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy A. Sobchak by Ye. Domnysheva; date and place not given: "The Generals Violated the Order"]

[Text] Last week Moscow had to live through a hard day, and it reminded me of the 8-9 April 1989 events in Tbilisi.

The same nervousness "at the top" and in the streets... This is where my conversation with USSR People's Deputy A. Sobchak started.

[Sobchak] Unfortunately, the Cabinet of Ministers decision to ban rallies and demonstrations in Moscow for the duration of the session of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia created a very tense—I would even say explosive—situation. This decision directly contradicts the existing legislation, according to which such a ban could only be imposed together with the imposition of a state of emergency.

[Domnysheva] Here is, literally, what Deputy Opolinskiy said at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the day the congress opened: "If it is necessary to break the law in the name of the well-being of the people, it needs to be done, and then such a law should be changed."

[Sobchak] This deputy is ignorant in the field of jurisprudence. He has no notion that 50 years before him Comrade Vychinskiy had even produced theoretical justification for it. It is something else that is abnormal. Where is the Committee for Constitutional Oversight—the organ whose task is to guarantee observance of the law and the citizens' rights?

[Domnysheva] Well, not too long ago the committee chairman published an article in which he was trying to prove that the committee is not able to do many things because of certain circumstances, including its own status...

[Sobchak] This is true, there are many things it cannot do, but it certainly can declare illegal unconstitutional decrees issued from the top. In this particular case it had to be done quickly, since the government's decision endangered the lives of the people who were going to a demonstration knowing firmly that they were within the law, and that they had the decision of the Moscow City Soviet and of the Russian parliament on their side. While at the same time there was a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers to stop the rally. What if a confrontation did take place? Who would be responsible?

[Domnysheva] Are you saying that you do not agree with the interpretation of the USSR Procuracy's information memorandum on the results of the investigation of the 9 April events in Tbilisi?

[Sobchak] This is more a political than legal document, and its purpose is to justify the necessity of using force. It puts the blame on the rally organizers and those who perished. However, the parliament commission on Tbilisi established beyond any doubt that General Rodionov, General Yefimov, and Lieutenant Colonel Baklanov directly violated the order given to them by their superiors. The people were used not to protect objects, as was the order, but to disperse the rally. There is an instruction, and an order had been issued, not to use truncheons against women and children; nevertheless, they were used.

[Domnysheva] Does the parliament commission have documents that prove these violations?

[Sobchak] We also have the testimony of those in charge—the same Lieutenant Colonel Baklanov—let alone the testimony of the victims. But, most importantly, the memo is further proof of the extent to which the reality differs from the facts quoted by the procuracy today, and from the statements of Chief Military Procurator Katusev at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, where he directly accused the rally participants, and almost the entire Georgian people, of organizing a bitter confrontation and resistance, and of forming commando teams from specially trained people, although no commando was identified by name. There were scary phrases about the realistic danger of physical elimination of the republic leadership and the communists. But we have established, absolutely beyond doubt, that before 8-9 April there was not a single case of a politically motivated attack or criminal act committed against military personnel or against the communists, let alone against the republic leadership. By the admission of the military themselves, the demonstration of military equipment provoked the people into a confrontation, and by the time the troops arrived at the square there were over 10,000 people there instead of the expected 200-300. Then the square, with so many people in it, was cleared in eight minutes. In the name of what was there such a rush—even if we agree with the conclusion that the majority of the victims were simply crushed and trampled in the crowd? Who created this crush?

I want to especially point out that the information memo does not confirm what the chief military procurator said at the congress—that home-made explosives and flammables had been used at the square. At that time Katusev said that he had absolutely reliable information on that; now, not a word. The procuracy still has not explained what they mean by the word "commando." This is not a legal definition—the criminal code does not contain such a thing.

When the Tbilisi events were discussed at the second congress, deputies were especially incensed by the chief military procurator's words alleging that Georgian men hid behind women for self-protection, that they pushed women at the lines of soldiers, and that is why they died. This statement was insulting to Georgians. Judging by the USSR Procuracy memo (we knew it all along), this statement may today be characterized as slander against the Georgian people, as it has no foundation whatsoever. I think the time has come to say that Chief Military Procurator Katusev, who deceived the Congress of People's Deputies and made false statements before the highest organ of the country, should bear responsibility for his actions and be removed from his post. I believe that people's deputies should bring this issue up at the Supreme Soviet.

When we remember Tbilisi, we need to think of Moscow now. To remember what so far has been only a threat.

But it seems to be a real threat. That is why I am worried today. I am worried about us, the people, and the future of our democracy.

Liberal Democratic Party Secretary Views Relations With CPSU, Army

*91UN1216A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 91 First Edition p 4*

[Interview with A. Khalitov, member of the Supreme Council and secretary of the Central Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union for organizational questions, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major S. Knyazkov; place and date not given; published under the rubric: "Who Is Who: A Party of a Centrist Tendency"]

[Text] More than a year ago the first constituent congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSS) took place in Moscow. For the first time since 1917 the congress of a political party other than the CPSU took place legally in this country. In this fashion the right of public institutions to have their own political parties as protected by the USSR Constitution was exercised.

Major S. Knyazkov, our correspondent, met with A.Kh. Khalitov, member of the Supreme Council and secretary of the Central Committee of the LDPSS for organizational questions.

*From the files of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Akhmet Khari-
sovich Khalitov was born in 1929 in Yelabuga. He is
Tatar. He graduated from Timiryazevskiy Agricultural
Academy and finished postgraduate study. He worked as
the chief agronomist of an MTS [vehicle and tractor
station], chairman of a kolkhoz in the Moscow region,
head of a laboratory, and chief specialist in the USSR
Ministry of Agriculture. From 1954 to 1981 he was a
member of the CPSU. He has more than 100 scientific
and other publications, two monographs, and five patents
on inventions.*

[Khalitov] A year has passed since the constituent congress. I consider that event to be a momentous landmark in the political life of our state.

I recall that the Statute of the LDPSS was adopted and the governing organs of the party were elected at the congress. Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy, a figure with a rightist orientation, became the chairman. He stands for the natural and historical path of development and for the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state.

[Knyazkov] Does this mean that the liberal democrats support the conservative views that are generally called "rightist" views among the people?

[Khalitov] Our party is of a centrist tendency: It shares neither the extreme right nor the extreme left views which undermine the state. In other words, we do not

support those extremist forces in the democratic movement that wish to destroy our entire house solely to remove the Communists from power.

[Knyazkov] You are in favor of territorial integrity of the Union. Please explain why.

[Khalitov] Yes, I repeat: The basic provisions of the Program of the liberal democrats include preservation of the Union and territorial integrity of the state—the concept of sovereignty extends to the whole country and not to its components; recognition of the equality of the rights of private property ownership alongside other forms; and resolution of ethnic issues only within the framework of the Constitution and the law.

[Knyazkov] How many members does the party now have?

[Khalitov] According to our information there are approximately 15,000-20,000 members of the party in the country. Large organizations of the LDPSS exist in Moscow, the Moscow region, Odessa, Rostov, Stavropol, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. But quantity is not the main thing for us. Practical work and the ability of members of the party to win the hearts and minds of people is important to us. In the end we are interested in having people learn about us and, when the next elections arrive, vote for our representatives.

[Knyazkov] In what fashion do you propagandize your views? Like other parties with a democratic orientation, using rallies, demonstrations, and mass meetings?

[Khalitov] If the liberals were to adhere to such tactics, like pseudodemocrats, then we too would probably resort to rallies and other forceful forms of expressing one's opinion. But we do not do this because the outcry from rallies does not produce an additional kilogram of bread or liter of milk.

We are first and foremost analysts, and we believe that the hero in the eyes of the people today should not be the fighter or the destroyer but the creator. So we propagandize our views using our own newspaper LIBERAL, of which I am the editor, and through the interviews of our leaders in the various mass media. In addition, party congresses will take place annually and conferences—regularly: All-Union, national, and regional conferences. We invite representatives of other parties and of broad circles of society to them. Incidentally, the second congress of the LDPSS will take place on 13 April in Moscow at the Palace of Culture imeni Rusakov.

[Knyazkov] How are relations between the LDPSS and the CPSU?

[Khalitov] On the whole we support the CPSU as the ruling party and seek areas of agreement with it. Of course, the Communists have made many mistakes. Their half-measures are costing the country very dearly and exasperating the people. One cannot make half a cut or do half of a surgical operation. You have to carry the matter through to the end quickly and decisively.

Why do we seek agreement with the Communists? Because there are many liberal-minded, wise, and intelligent people among them. They are no longer yesterday's sailor-Bolsheviks who decided everything by force. Among them there are very many professional workers who know their job well. There are also laborers, peasants, scholars, servicemen, diplomats, etc. In addition, on the whole they are loyal to the Fatherland.

[Knyazkov] You are quite different from other parties of a democratic orientation with such an approach to the CPSU.

[Khalitov] Yes, we are against anarchy and for supremacy of the law. But it cannot be emphasized enough that we have many disagreements with the Communists. However, we are genuinely against any actions directed at the forcible removal of the CPSU from power. We believe that there is no problem that cannot be decided at the negotiating table through legal means. The Communists have expressed their agreement with this.

[Knyazkov] A final question. What is the opinion of the liberal democrats on the military and its role in society?

[Khalitov] In our view, today the military is the only institution of the state in which demoralization has not cropped up on a destructive scale. Yes, in some ways it is sick, but we hope for its recovery and not its end, as some do.

We need to restore normal, conscientious operations as quickly as possible and avoid a mass rebellion. Only in this fashion can we endure and restore to the Fatherland its former greatness.

Communist Party's Viability, Role Viewed

91UN1213A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by L. Shevtsova, political scientist: "Only the Ghost of Communism Remains"]

[Text] Few would have to think very long if asked: "What will mankind actually remember from the final years of the past decade?" I think it will be the collapse of the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe. I would add: "And the failure of the communist experiment." This is my own personal opinion and I am by no means a fervent anticommunist. But even some leaders of yesterday's communist parties are saying the same thing.

Practically all the ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe paid the price for the failure of the futile experiment when they lost their power. And it was not the result of machinations and intrigues. The communist parties were swept away by a wave of mass dissatisfaction. Some of them, like the Romanian Communist Party, have disappeared altogether. The successors of others are still there, but they are dragging out a miserable existence.

But what is the situation in the world communist movement as a whole? It has actually ceased to exist. The downfall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe only reinforced the collapse, the splitting, and the narrowing of the social base of Western communist parties. Although there were internal causes of this as well. The basic premise for their activity—belief in the imminent death of capitalism—turned out to be false.

But what happened to the vanguard of the communist movement? We have no figures on how many people have left the ranks of the CPSU. But is hardly worth proving the obvious—there has been a sharp decline in party positions among the broad masses of society, including the working class. Last year only eight percent of those questioned expressed complete faith in the CPSU. This tells of the extremely profound loss of credibility. But is this a sign of a final collapse?

No, it seems that it is too soon to say the last rites for our party structures. And at the beginning of 1990 it seemed that the party-statist structures were coming apart at the seams before our eyes. The more so since they even created a presidency on top while the Central Committee and the Politburo receded into the background.

But nonetheless, at least in the Union, the system based on party structures held up and preserved the main instruments of power. Today we can see how they are recovering from the initial shock and are gradually trying to regain their lost positions.

One can also sense that the president is paying more attention to the CPSU. He is now more active as general secretary, and at the same time he is asserting that the CPSU is the only stabilizing force in the country. And this at a time when a society torn apart by conflicts is so much in need of a power that is free of unilateral party affiliations and acts as a dispassionate arbitrator!

"This is a higher-up process," one might object. "The CPSU has lost its influence in the local areas." In certain regions and republics this is apparently true. But take Central Asia, the heart of Russia, and a number of autonomous regions—there the party and state structures are still the main concentrations of power. In spite of all the shocks, the CPSU, unlike its East European analogs, continues to be the largest party in the Soviet society.

But do all of them either remain in the CPSU or enter it purely because of ideological-political motives? Not at all—there are many who do this because of basic conformism, a lack of confidence, and fear of the future. I know people who, after a year of wavering, have begun to pay their party dues again. But the motivation for their return was certainly not the conviction that the party had been transformed. "After all, you can see where things are leading," they say, justifying their actions. "It is better to have a guarantee of security."

And so the CPSU is trying to get out of its crisis. What is important, however, is the basis on which it is doing

this—through renewal or regression? Let us recall that we placed certain hopes in the 28th CPSU Congress. But there was no radical party restructuring. By now the right flank in the CPSU has become so strong that it is trying to get rid of even those few provisions of the 28th congress which hint of liberality.

You will see this for yourself if you look at the materials of the latest plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the Russian CP Central Committee. It would seem that the leaders of the largest party in the country should have been concerned about how to avert the deepening split in society and how to provide for harmony. But judging by the combative terminology of the participants in the party plenums, they were overwhelmed by another desire—"to give political battle" "to ideological opponents and all the Judases out there." And where did they see the country's way out of the crisis? It is fairly simple and does not require unintelligible concepts: "Tighten the screws."

But now about how party figures see a new role for the party under the new conditions. For we have rejected the provision about the leading role of the Constitution and Article 6. So, although the CPSU does not have the leading role, its leaders think that even so it "bears full responsibility for the development of the society." This means that it will not get out of anywhere voluntarily—not out of the enterprises nor the Army nor the KGB—and in general it will not leave the state organs unsupervised.

Let us note also that certain leaders of our Communist Party have turned out to be far more stable than their colleagues in Eastern Europe. The latter caved in rather quickly and resorted to dialogue with the opposition, but they also lost their power. Ours will not give up so easily.

A confirmation of this is the separatist tendency of the leaders of the Russian Communist Party. No, they intend to fight for restoration of nomenklatura power until the end. Just read the materials of the March combined plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party and, of course, the speech of I.K. Polozkov. It gives a whole set of "How to" recommendations—from purging the entire CPSU of "rightist forces" to creating a movement "for a great and unified Russia." The entire package of actions proposed is such that, I think, it should simply shock people.

But wait, is it necessary today to devote so much attention to the theatrical characters, the blatant demagoguery, and the meaningful fuss of certain clearly extremist forces? Their voices are loud now, drowning out all the rest. The leaders and ideologists of the Russian Communist Party are trying especially conscientiously to demonstrate the touching unity of the party ranks. But facts of which I am aware tell me the opposite. No matter how many Communists I meet, they all try to distance themselves from the fundamentalists. "Yes, I am a Communist but not a 'Polozkovian,'"—this is a typical

explanation. So it would be a mistake to reduce the entire CPSU to a "monolith"—there are various orientations in it.

There are also clear signs that at least the party structures have now managed to lead a counterreformation—this is clear from their last victory. But its result, incidentally, is questionable. Our pioneers of party renewal could change directions at any time, and there the army has already dispersed. Or other forces could arise, ones which need neither party protection nor communist doctrines. They have developed their own. Reader, take a more careful look at what is being done in the right-wing camp and you will see that significant changes are taking place there.

But we must not think that the domestic fundamentalists have now been left by themselves. They have been given reinforcement from the French Communist Party headed by G. Marchais. One can consider the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of France, the last one, to be an attempt to restore neo-Stalinism in its pure form. The unbending G. Marchais and his followers are trying to give the communist movement a "second wind."

But now, before our eyes, we are seeing changes in the platforms of a number of communist parties. In their search for ways to regain their positions they are resorting to the national idea. In a number of cases it was this change that enabled the Communists to retain power. An example of this is provided not only by our Central Asian republics but also by the victory of the Communists in Serbia and Montenegro. In multinational societies today a situation is arising in which frequently the Communist Party can find a common language with its own opposition sooner than with its colleagues from the other party organizations.

There is nothing wrong with using the national idea. It all depends in whose name it is used: in the name of the movement for a civil society or for purposes of restoring the oppressive regime. One gets the impression that there is much more frequent unification of the ideas of "bar-racks communism" and the most overt nationalism or chauvinism. And here the soil is ready for a dictatorship of one individual or organization.

And so, will the Communist Party get a "second wind?" If we are speaking about whether or not these parties will be able to head up a movement toward democracy and create an effective policy, historical practice shows that this has not happened in a single country yet. Will the communist parties be able to update themselves radically and regain their authority among the masses? In any case, the experience of Eastern Europe shows that as soon as the Communists entered onto that path, they discovered that democratic transformations within the framework of a party of the Bolshevik type were impossible. In order to begin a new life, it is necessary to

sacrifice the old one. This is why almost all the communist parties in the neighboring countries have ceased to exist.

But let us return to our own life. It is difficult to perceive the rejuvenation of party structures today, especially under the mask of the Russian Communist Party, as anything other than running in place. And do the leaders themselves believe in the possibility of a communist renaissance? That would make them simply idealists. Even the possibility of the establishment of an authoritarian regime in the country—toward which the fundamentalists are striving—would certainly not mean the restoration of a party state. This has been ruled out. In any case a new reality would arise. Yes, that is the way it works out: Some people begin it and others reap the advantage.

But still it is perhaps too early to sing a requiem to the structures, which continue to be much more than a marginal force. Let us return to this question in a year. The logic of social development cannot be deceived. It will come through sooner or later. Our society is no exception. Whatever is destined to leave the scene will leave...

Does this mean that social democracy presents the only successful left-wing alternative? Theoretically, yes. But the fact is that its formation is complicated, at least in the USSR. In the first place, it is impossible for any all-Union party to appear in our country now. The national-republic barriers are too strong. In the second place, the idea of party membership is increasingly being rejected by the masses who are disenchanted with all parties.

I think that today only a mass antitotalitarian movement can become a barrier on the path to the right-wing offensive. We learn this, incidentally, from the experience of all the neighboring countries without exception.

The main task is to win the broad masses of workers over to our side. How can we do this? It is not enough for the people's front to include only the best known and most respected people. We need a program. But not a set of abstract slogans, which do not excite many people any more. Some people, pointing to the republics, think it is possible to consolidate the society on the basis of the national factor alone. But if this pertains to Russia, everything turns out to be much more complicated. The Russian national idea is a factor that can consolidate some but drive others away. It works in the interest of progress in only one case: if it can be linked to the democratic alternative and the idea of freedom—of both individuals and entire peoples.

But what should be the goal of this movement—a fight to the death with the CPSU and the president? That would be a civil war. The people's front must use peaceful means to oppose the growing adventurism of power and stabilize the situation, but on a broad democratic basis.

The democrats need a great deal to begin from zero today. And under unfavorable conditions. You automatically start to think: Are there people who will take up the difficult organizational work and go "to the people?" Or perhaps we are not able to leave our comfortable desks?

Or the podiums in parliament from which we speak so easily about democracy (executive power, as you know, does whatever it wishes)? Or our periodic spontaneous outbreaks at rallies? Or the role of opposition to the system, even if it is not strong?...

Baltics

Estonian Election Results Analyzed

91UN1185A Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN
in Russian 5 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Toomas Alatalu: "The Vote of People Living in the Countryside Was Vital"]

[Text] When he learned of the election results, the chairman of the republic electoral commission, Eerik Truuväli, was ready to embrace everyone who had voted "Yes" that day. His words were particularly to the liking of older Estonians, who had already decided that it was necessary to cast their votes for an independent Estonia. Some 90 percent of the population from the 15 uyezds in the republic took part in the referendum. Of these, 93 percent voted in favor of a sovereign Estonia. And here, it is not so much a matter of percentages, but rather that of the 440,000-strong rural population with the right to vote, some 412,000 voted "Yes."

The electorate of Estonia can be divided into three large groups: the rural population, Tallinn, and the inhabitants of the other cities. Since Narva, Kohtla-Järve, and Sillamae equal out Tartu and Pärnu, it is quite clear that all the decisive votes are to be found in rural localities and Tallinn. The activeness of the population was decisive, that is, how many of the voters expressed their opinion.

The only signpost for prediction was the result of a poll conducted on 9 February in Lithuania: 84 percent participated and 90 percent voted in favor of independence. But in multinational Vilnius, which was the center of the tragic events in January, only 73 percent of voters turned out. It should not be forgotten, however, that in Lithuania, preparations for the vote were made in a hurry (the referendum was announced on 16 January, that is, at the time when the Committee for National Salvation was being formed, and the question of "Who's Who?" was being asked point blank). In Estonia and Latvia there was more time, and preparations were more substantial.

Of course, the people were expecting a different attitude from the government and the Supreme Soviet, but during the final week before the referendum, the authorities, contrary to expectations, set about redistributing the "state pie" (true, it did not quite succeed in doing this). But before this there was a hunt for money that brought so much grief to the people that some even decided not to take part in the referendum. It is suggested that this may explain the low level of activeness among the people of Tallinn in the voting (80 percent). Fortunately the rural population remained aloof from the confusion in the parliament and government, and it was precisely thanks to it that our prestige rose in the eyes of the world public.

The other rescuer of the capital's prestige was the Interdvizheniye people [Intery] and their decision to conduct a so-called parallel poll in three cities, starting on 24

February. To judge from everything, the latest disobedience by the government of Estonia and the attempt to establish its laws on republic territory (thanks to the fine propaganda on Estonian radio and television) acted like a magnet in attracting the rural inhabitants to the voting booths: Once again someone was trying to steer the laws of Estonia! Everyone to the elections!

The activeness of the rural population could have been countered with other activeness, but those sponsoring the opposition campaign found themselves in a difficult situation. The events in January had shown that the Interdvizheniye people had made their preparations well: A wave of strikes rolled from Tallinn to the northeast.

They used various tactics. Before the referendum, a poll was conducted in the northeast. It would have been very complicated to conduct a poll in Tallinn. But starting on 18 February a struggle developed between Gorbachev and Yeltsin and all the cards were put on the table. The tense battle forced corrections (as is known, on 23 February there was to have been a meeting in support of Gorbachev).

Those who live outside Russia understood the main issue: There was no longer anyone on whom to depend: Gorbachev was in no condition to offer support, while Yeltsin was still not ready, and it had become unclear who was capable of what. As a result, provincial pro-empire forces felt impotent. At the same time, in Estonia the seven concessions made in January by the Savisaar government to the nonindigenous population (postponing introduction of the law on language, Russian-speaking representatives to be included in the delegation for the negotiations, and so forth) played their part, even though attempts to achieve those concessions last year had been unsuccessful. As a result, in Tallinn 80 percent of the electorate voted, of whom 66 percent said "Yes" and only 33 percent "No." For the rayons of the city the respective indicators were as follows: Leninskiy Rayon, 82 percent, 80 percent, and 19 percent; in Oktyabrskiy Rayon, 83, 74, and 26 percent; in Kalininskiy Rayon, 79, 58, and 41 percent; in Morskoy Rayon, 76, 56, and 42 percent. Indicators for the cities were as follows: Narva, 70, 26, and 73 percent; Kohtla-Järve, 70, 46, and 52 percent. It is not difficult to see that in places where the Russian-speaking population lives in compact areas, voter activeness was lower than where mainly Estonians live. Let us cite the absolute figures for Tallinn: of 376,000 voters, almost 200,000 gave a positive response and 100,000 gave a negative response, while the remainder did not take part in the voting.

Percentages are percentages, but in interethnic relations the minority never voluntarily subordinates itself to the majority. Attitudes revealed in the referendum results must be taken as a basis for normalizing interethnic relations in the Estonian Republic.

Role of Opposition in Estonian Politics

91UN1201A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 20 Mar 91 p 2

[Reprint of article in SIRP No 11 by Indrek Kannik:
"The Opposition in Estonia"]

[Text] The role of the opposition in the political structures of democratic societies is common knowledge. Even more important, in all probability, is the significance of the opposition in a young democracy, when firm mechanisms for monitoring the actions of the authorities have yet to be perfected.

Let us examine from this viewpoint groupings of the Estonian political opposition, confining ourselves to those which in principle recognize the restoration of state independence, for it is the future of these forces which is of interest to us.

The opposition forces have traditionally been divided into "Vaba Eesti" on the one hand and the Congress of Estonia on the other. But today such a subdivision is no longer precise, evidently.

The position of "Vaba Eesti" and the so-called independent Communist Party of Estonia in coalition with it is quite complex. Their past is clear, but their future, murky. The politicians of this grouping simply cannot be considered ideological associates, but rather traveling companions. They were once in power, now they are deprived of it. This cannot fail to be reflected in their attitude toward the present authorities. Were they once again to find themselves at the helm, their policy would probably be similar to that of the present government. It is difficult to imagine "Vaba Eesti" as an actively operating political grouping in the future. Sooner or later elections will become the election not of specific individuals but of ideologies and schools. With whatever name and with whatever ideology "Vaba Eesti" joins the election campaign, its figures will be called shady Communists all the same. It is for this reason, incidentally, that they prefer the concept of the election of personalities, not voting for a list.

Proceeding from this, I do not even allow of the possibility of "Vaba Eesti's" formation as a party. This would be suicidal.

The political forces connected with the Estonia Committee are faced with the choice of continuing to exert pressure as an ideological grouping or attempting to become integrated in real politics. I believe that the die is already cast. The Estonian National Independence Party [PNNE], of which former dissidents constitute the nucleus, cannot and does not wish to change, and for this reason it will continue the uncompromising struggle. The Christian Democrats and Republicans, among whom comparatively young politicians enjoy great influence, will opt for a more flexible version.

The PNNE's further influence on our society will be inversely proportionate to the development of democracy. If there are noticeable reverses, whether under the influence of forces from within or from outside is immaterial, such a principled, unbending opposition will be very useful. The PNNE and its influence may be seen as a mirror of our society.

As distinct from the PNNE, the Republicans and Christian Democrats (bloc of the right) believe that under the present conditions it is easier to influence society by remaining within the political structures. This essentially means a readiness, if need be, to assume responsibility and, consequently, power also in today's political situation even. Participation in real politics also means a daily struggle for popularity. But the right-wing bloc's popularity rating is not high currently. For an enhancement of its prestige it will be necessary for it to distance itself from forces and ideologies that are less popular still. Primarily from the Estonia Committee, in which the PNNE is predominant and whose decisions are on many issues naive, to put it mildly. Kaydo Kama's proposal concerning a suspension of the Estonia Committee's activity is perfectly acceptable to the bloc of the right. The right needs to shift the emphases in its program propositions also. The motto "right" and, with it, "freedom of the individual," "well-to-do citizen" and so forth should be heard more distinctly. In order to get back on its feet Estonian society should undoubtedly opt as quickly as possible for a development program of a right-wing orientation. Although, of course, speaking of a right-wing program today, when Estonia is deprived any economic independence whatsoever, is to a certain extent demagoguery. Nonetheless, for the next decade, of all the parties and movements that have emerged, it is the right-wing bloc that would seem the most suitable for a cardinal change of society.

The bloc of the right is, apparently, prepared to cooperate with groupings that are a part of the Popular Front. At the same time, however, the circles close to Prime Minister Savisaar (the center faction and the liberals) are not particularly disposed toward cooperation. But a new grand coalition, which would include part of the present Popular Front (the Social Democrats and the rural Center Party) and part of the present opposition (the bloc of the right), is, on the other hand, seen as perfectly likely in the future. In any event, it would be more useful and ethical for society than an alliance of the right-wing bloc and "Vaba Eesti" or a continuation of the present authoritarian government.

We further have what I would call the populist opposition. These people have concentrated around Tiit Made and represent mainly businessmen and "greens," but not a general movement but the "Green" Party. Although by the logic of things the "greens" should be in opposition to the businessmen. There is an avowedly populist opposition in developed societies also, the Progress Party in Denmark and Norway, for example, and there is

such in Finland too. It may, therefore, be assumed that something of the sort will persist in the future with us also.

Aside from a political opposition, in a healthy society there is also unfailingly an intellectual opposition. After all, the conflict of the spirit and authority is eternal. The abnormality of our society is confirmed most, perhaps, by the weakness of intellectual opposition. Considerable numbers of the Estonian intelligentsia belong to the current political structures, that is, to the power structures. And the rest of the intellectuals are friends of the first. And demanding opposition of them is inappropriate. However, I would very much hope that the energy of the powers that be and their immediate associates not be expended exclusively on criticism of those criticizing the government. Whoever is in power should dispose in his defense of more impressive arguments than the assertion that criticism of him is unintelligent.

Estonian Press on Republic Political Situation

*91UN1214A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 12 Mar 91 p 2*

[Article by Vyacheslav Ivanov: "Will 'Yesterday's People' Be Taken Into the Bright Tomorrow?"]

[Text] At the end of last week, the newspaper PAEVALEHT published an extensive article in several issues under the general heading: "Maneuvering in Estonian Politics in 1990," and it was signed this way: "Edgar Savisaar comments." Coming out in this way as a private individual, the author devotes an appreciable part of the newspaper that was made available to him to an investigation into the activity of the democratic association Vaba Eesti ("Free Estonia"), and he comes to an unusual conclusion about the rapprochement of this association with the ERSP (Estonian National Independence Party).

On one of those days, the republic's prime minister, but now as a "member of the leadership of the People's Front," published in another newspaper, RAHVA HAAL, no less than an extensive essay "Congress of the People's Front Plans..." where an even more paradoxical treatment is presented to the reader: "PROCOMMUNIST VE Declares Itself to the Right of the Social-Democrats..." (my emphasis—V.I).

The reader, especially if he is in the habit of reading both newspapers, has a wonderful opportunity to rack his brains: What kind of a monstrosity is this—the enigmatic Vaba Eesti was able to merge so cleverly both with orthodox Communists and with their direct opposites from the ERSP?

By the way, there is one more reason for bewilderment: Why suddenly would some inoffensive "golf club" (the name Edgar Savisaar personally gave to the association "Free Estonia" about a year ago, not without caustic sarcasm) be subjected to such a massive "carpet bombing" on the evening of likely elections to the new highest legislative organ of the Estonian Republic? But the need

to institute such an organ—whether in the form of a supreme soviet or a state дума—is continuously talked about by the leaders of the NFE [Estonian People's Front]...

Perhaps this is where the riddle lies? Because a golf club, "not in our" tradition, is more than just a place where it is pleasant for the cream of society to spend time. As a rule, "over there" reputable businessmen, politicians, and financiers meet, and between two rounds and swallows of refreshments they make decisions that are important not only for their fat purses...

Members of Vaba Eesti, according to a determination of some columnists-analysts, are "yesterday's people" (politicians, scientists, and economic managers notable on the scale of republics), who possess not only a lot of experience in their fields, but many of them have solid ties in today's structures, and also creditability among foreign partners. It is sufficient to mention such influential activists of associations as Rein Otsason, Yevgeniy Golikov, Indrek Toome, Toomas Alatalu, Kaipo Pollicinski, and Mikk Titma (who lectures regularly in foreign universities), and this list can be extended...

Owing to the previously declared COMPLETE POLITICAL TOLERANCE [all capitals as published] (that is, indulgence), and by no means owing to a position of "to the right of social-democrats," "Free Estonia" is integrated in practically all movements, parties, and economic structures of the republic. And from this standpoint, the author of the commentaries in PAEVALEHT and RAHVA HAAL perhaps, is right: VE really is capable of constituting a real opposition to any other force. So that attempts to disavow a "dialogue partner" are more than justified.

There was a conversation about all of this at the regular meeting of the VABA EESTI association last Saturday.. Perhaps the discussion of daily problems did carry a somewhat irritated character. If that is so, then the reason for this is specifically the appearance (whether accidental) of the aforementioned articles on the evening and during the day of the meeting. However, the main attention of the meeting participants was still devoted to more essential issues. Among these—the clear signals of a political crisis noted in the republic in recent days.

It was evident to those assembled that there was a confrontation between the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Estonian Republic. Moreover, yielding to pressure on the part of the cabinet, the VS [Supreme Soviet] continues to turn over its functions to the government. However, contradictions are being aggravated inside the latter as well. This is reflected both in the departure of several ministers (who resigned as a sign of protest against the actions of the premier) and in the rather harsh opposition of some of those who remain (Jaak Tamm, Endel Lippmaa)...

For a certainty, in today's transition period any cabinet of ministers would call forth the criticism of the opposition for their actions. But there is criticism and there is

criticism. In the opinion of a majority of the participants at the VABA EESTI meeting, the practice of today's government is not directed so much at reforms as it is at impeding them in both economics and in politics. Instead of creating a system of INTERESTS [as published] that would stimulate entrepreneurial activity, there remains the method of ORDERED [as published] introduction of innovation—be this reform of the banking system, privatization of property, or other reorganizations.

At the same time, matters are far from going the way they should in the political area. Moreover, as many of those present recognized, this was also the fault of some of the member politicians of VE who were in attendance... It is no secret that proposals that are fully acceptable, and even useful for the common cause, are frequently blocked in parliament only because they come from deputies who are not Estonians... All of this taken together led, as was said at the meeting, to an actual failure of the 3 March referendum in which many fewer Estonian residents voted for a free Estonia than could be expected. One can argue with such a categorical negative assessment of the results of the poll (as with the unjustified optimistic one also). Especially because politics, like history, does not recognize the subjunctive mood. The poll showed what it showed, and in this sense its results are completely objective. But it is difficult not to agree with the fact that a lot of mistakes were made.

The meeting participants came to the only true conclusion: It is necessary to convene once more within a month, in order by that time to work up a constructive program for the future. For, in the words of one of the speakers, "If we are here to condemn the mistakes of the People's Front, then I see no sense in this: In the first place, there are too many mistakes, and, secondly, we have too little time..." ...At one time, in the vein of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, it was fashionable to say that we will not take the bearers of remnants of the past with us into the bright communist "tomorrow." Will those find a place they will like in the future whom many today contemptuously call "yesterday's people?" Time will give the best answer to this. And they themselves, of course.

Latvian Parliament's Vacancies Filled

91P50150A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
8 Feb 91 p 1

[Report by L. Semenov: "The Parliament Has 201 Deputies"]

[Text] The mandate of the 201st deputy of the Latvian Republic has found its owner. It is Professor I. Strazdins, who represents the People's Front of Latvia and teaches at the Riga Technical University.

Strazdins, the spouse of Ita Kozakevic, the deputy of the republic's Supreme Council who died tragically, beat his

rivals by a wide margin. He received 67.5 percent of the votes. The voting took place in the 129th Jekabpils election okrug.

Low voter activity and miscalculations in the pre-election canvassing brought about the defeat of V. Lietavietis, the candidate of the leftist forces. He received only 29.8 percent of the votes.

The third contender, D. Lasis, the representative from the Democratic Labor Party of Latvia, could not get even the minimum votes needed for registering as a candidate.

And so, almost 12 months after last year's spring elections, all the vacancies in the republic's parliament have been filled.

'Equality' Leader Views Faction's Role in Latvian Parliament

91UN1045A Riga LAUKU AVIZE in Latvian 1 Feb 91
p 3

[Interview with Sergejs Dimanis, leader of the "Equality" faction, by E. Licitis, LAUKU AVIZE correspondent to the parliament: "S. [Dimanis] 'We Are Not Asking for Specific Posts in the Government'"]

[Text] I posited three questions to S. Dimanis, leader of the "Equality" faction:

[Correspondent] Mr. Dimanis, when your faction speaks of "a coalition government that will enjoy the loyalty of the entire populace," do you have any concrete suggestions for changing the composition of the government? Are you asking for any corresponding portfolios and naming any candidates acceptable to you?

[Dimanis] There has to be a coalition executive power so that both opposing social camps—including the one represented in parliament by our faction—have collective responsibility at the executive level. We are not talking about specific posts. Yes, the Declaration of 4 May supposedly stands in the way of forming this coalition government, but we must come to an accord at the executive level anyway. And our first demand will be the resignation of Vaznis. We consider him to be one of the guilty in the events that took place in Riga. Secondly, we have grave doubts as to whether Bisers, as a member of the government, is carrying out the functions that he is supposed to be able to cope with.

[Correspondent] Would you be so good as to name the composition of the "committee for public salvation?" Is it really such a great secret?

[Dimanis] Without a doubt I cannot. This committee has been declared outside the law, and people's emotions are running high. Let us not forget the events in Lithuania...

[Correspondent] You do not even know its composition?

[Dimanis] I am the leader of "Equality," and this faction is an integral part of the legally elected representation of the people. We will work in this arena. Because the committee for salvation was elected two months ago, it includes a few members of our faction, in the same way that many deputies of the other faction are at the same time in the ranks of the Citizens' Congress.

[Correspondent] If I understand you correctly, the unconstitutional pretensions for power by the All-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation—which has not been elected by anyone—are unacceptable to you, as well.

[Dimanis] If you want to dot the "i," you will not be able to by assessing legality or illegality. The camps stand opposed to one another not because of ethnic or social opposition, but in their attitudes toward the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitution on the one hand, and the Latvian Republic Constitution on the other. This loyalty toward one or the other Constitution is dividing society. We support the principle of a union of sovereign republics. The committee for salvation is without a doubt illegal if you go by the laws of the Latvian Republic, but if you go by the old Latvian SSR Constitution, then it is the parliament and government of the Latvian Republic that are illegal. I wish to say that I am categorically opposed to the further polarization of opposing forces, which will lead ever closer to confrontation. Upon returning to parliament, we should form together into a strong political center. It is here that our Latvian People's Front parliamentary centrists must go the whole nine yards and part from those in the faction who speak with such extreme radicalism. This also applies to our camp. With the establishment of such a center, both the one radical wing—in the form of the People's Congress—and the other radicals, who represent various newly formed structures in the other wing, would be discarded. The move toward the center would also allow necessary changes to be made in the government, which just recently made such a mess of things.

Documentary Recounts 20 Jan Attack

LD0503132291

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 0600 GMT on 5 March broadcasts a 14-minute documentary on the 20 January unrest in Riga, entitled "Shadow Over the City", produced by the "Alternative Video Center", and hosted by an unidentified announcer.

The documentary opens with footage of the 20 January attack on the Latvian Internal Affairs Ministry building, showing gunfire, cars ablaze, and people running through the streets, while the announcer says: "There are already several versions of the beginning and development of this battle at the Latvian Internal Affairs Ministry building on 20 January, with the exception of the version based upon expert study and the results of the investigation. Five film crews turned up in the very thick of the battle, allegedly completely by accident, at the very

same time, in the very same spot, in the huge city of almost 1 million people. The same night, the culprits were named on television and radio: the fighters of the special-purpose militia detachment. Their commander, (Cheslav Molnik), is on the screen for the first time. Look at his face; listen to him."

"(Molnik)" is shown, wearing casual clothes and sitting in an office, describing his force's moves on 20 January and detailing the events with the help of a building floorplan. He claims his forces were responding to an "out-and-out provocation."

Video then cuts to "Supernews" footage of the aftermath of the 20 January attack, showing people standing around bloodstained sidewalks and attending a candle-light memorial service, while the announcer says: "Neither we nor these people yet know the actual names of those who inspired and orchestrated the tragedy of that historic night. Republican television, having turned serious events into a nightmare-like spectacle, has already named the guilty, namely the special-purpose militia detachment. All those prepared to cast blame and whip up hysteria without waiting for the results of the investigation and analysis were too hastily given the floor. In the awareness of the frightened man in the street, after lengthy preparations by the press, the barricades erected around the supreme soviet building, the Council of Ministers building, and the television studios are almost justified. For the sake of their own political interests, someone, as yet still in the shadows, exposed real lives to bullets. It is unlikely that any of those who participated in the battle imagined that the burnt-out remains of vehicles, the bullet-scarred buildings and bodies, and the anger and pain of those drawn into that drama would, with the mathematical precision of sniper fire, set in motion a political mechanism where the film was shot, on the bloodstained sidewalks. What we are left with are the real sufferings of those who have lost those near and dear, no less real confrontations which have been given fresh stimulus, and our people's blood on the pavement."

At 0614 GMT, the program ends by rolling the following credits: Aleksandr Vasiliyev, Aleksandr Genin, Aleksandr Romanov, Larisa Timofeyeva, and the main editorial office of Central Television Sociopolitical Programs.

Prunskiene Assesses European Trip, Return to Lithuania

91UN1181A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
23 Feb 91 p 2

[L. Filipaviciene report on news conference given by K. Prunskiene, deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Council; place and date not given: "I Am Beginning a New Stage..."]

[Text] As is known, following a lengthy tour of East Europe, Kazimiera Prunskiene, deputy of the Supreme Council, has returned to Lithuania. She held a meeting

with journalists. Remembering her last news conference prior to her departure, it was interesting to observe the change of mood, position, and thinking of this politician. As is known, this woman always had sufficient resolve and an aspiration to assertive political activity. She has now been inspired by new ideas aimed at a strengthening of Lithuania's positions in the world and a broadening of its relations with other countries.

K. Prunskiene emphasized that she was beginning a new stage in her political activity, the basis of which were practical steps toward the realization and recognition of Lithuania's independence. She refuted the rebukes which were leveled at her in a TASS report and which are currently being made much of in parliament concerning her alleged statement that recognition of independence was not necessary for Lithuania.

"All my actions," she said, "have been geared to the actual realization of this aspiration to independence. Numerous meetings and discussions with members of governments and representatives of various parties, particularly in the place I visited last—Germany—were subordinated to the practical realization of the policy of independence and its recognition. But I concluded here that this policy had to be on a realistic basis. It should be shaped both from our understanding of domestic tasks and with regard for states' foreign relations."

As of the present, K. Prunskiene believes, the reality is such: The representatives of the highest political spheres, parliaments, and parties are guarded in their choice of positions in respect of Lithuania's conflict with the Soviet Union. Everything in the world is interconnected, and no country can today ignore the Union's existence in deference to support even for such a sacred cause as Lithuania's independence. As swift and unconditional a recognition of Lithuania's independence as that of Iceland could hardly be demanded of America, for example, or Germany, which have their own particular interests. Granted all the sympathies for a free Lithuania and its aspirations on the part of the peoples of these countries, the actual alignment of forces dictates its own approaches. And illusions in politics are, as is known, dangerous.

Our tasks at this stage are for ourselves to look for ways out of the situation and address to the parliaments and the leaders of parties of individual states specific conclusions, decisions, and proposals pertaining to the formation of possible ties and relations. Everyone should ascertain for himself the limits of the possibilities and anticipated results in foreign policy activity. This is what K. Prunskiene believes.

She expressed her satisfaction with the contacts established with figures of Catholic organizations in Poland and Germany.

"I became acquainted in earnest with the activity of the church and the Caritas organization and visited infant and invalid homes and maternity centers. The work of these organizations in the social sphere has been

arranged at a high level and without an unnecessary show of humanity. They are prepared to come to the assistance of Lithuania, but for this we need to analyze the situation as soon as possible and draw up a cooperation action program."

K. Prunskiene, she emphasized this specially, was not representing overseas either the government or the deputies of Lithuania. She was acting as a politician and public figure.

"I did not have to be introduced," she noted, "in Western countries the participation of nonstate structures in state affairs is a customary proceeding. No one was interested in whether I was a deputy or former prime minister, it was other things that were important: ascertaining and deciding problems for which a person is competent and his desire for and possibility of engaging in public activity."

Such is today's K. Prunskiene. She is not ignoring work in the Lithuanian parliament nor is she declining it, but she believes that sitting in place in order over a period of several hours to express some thought on a law which is being discussed is an impermissible luxury at this difficult time.

"I myself initiated discussion in Brussels," she said, "on the topic of decentralization of assistance to the Soviet Union. We had hitherto been of the opinion that, following the tragic events in Lithuania, it was essential to refuse it assistance. But this is, after all, assistance not to the 'center' but to the people of the Union. Following the discussions, a new form of assistance—to specific addresses and individual republics—was born."

As we can see, K. Prunskiene has determined upon a considerable program of activity for herself. It includes, aside from all else, possibly, an intention to create a new party (she did not confirm this rumor but did not refute it either), pursue her own policy in parliament and establish cooperation with the foreign policy association organized in Moscow by E. Shevardnadze. How these plans will be realized and how K. Prunskiene's intra-republic activity and her relations with her deputy colleagues will shape up, time will tell.

USSR Deputy Doubts Yazov Report on Vilnius

91UN0725C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 2, 16 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by USSR People's Deputy Y. Shchekochikhin under the rubric: "The View From The Parliament: An Uncontrolled Army?"]

[Text] I would like to believe that Marshal Yazov told a lie to the deputies. Otherwise, tanks could appear on any street in any city. And for any reason.

B.K. Pugo, not yet approved as the USSR minister of internal affairs, could not clearly explain to the deputies

what kind of all-powerful "committee of national salvation" it was that succeeded in leading tanks out onto the streets of Vilnius, and the explanation of D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, gave rise to nothing but confusion.

Insisting that he himself did not know all the details (inasmuch as, in his words, "I was not at the scene of the events") and that he did not give any order for a tank assault, he offered his version of the Vilnius tragedy. It consists of the following: Members of the "committee of national salvation" were beaten up near the parliament, and when they arrived at the location of the commander of the Vilnius garrison their appearance so incensed the general that he gave the order to seize the television center, which had been constantly broadcasting "anti-Soviet programs."

That is to say, according to the explanation of Marshal Yazov, the bloody tragedy at the television center was the result of an emotional outburst of one lone general! And what might not some other general "get angry" at! In another city! At a newspaper article about the dachas of marshals? At a boring television film? At teenagers fighting in a public garden? And—forward! Hurrah! Firing on unarmed passers-by, making murderers out of the young soldiers carrying out the order?..

I am probably not the only one at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet last Monday who wished to believe that Marshal Yazov was fooling us. Otherwise—and it is terrible to imagine—there is no guarantee that tomorrow morning we will not see the barrel of a tank aimed at our windows.

I am convinced that sooner or later all those guilty of the Vilnius tragedy will be named. We will be talking for a long time to come about the political preface to the January events of 1991 and searching for the mistakes committed by all Lithuania's political forces. But today we again—as in Tbilisi and Baku—have to bear responsibility for the senseless deaths of people.

And if the tragedy in Vilnius was the result of the actions of one general, then they can be viewed as an independent mutiny for which—as in any civilized society—the military commander should be punished by law. But if the general is again only a pawn in the latest political game, then we have the right to demand an answer: Who ordered these tanks onto the square in Vilnius that night? We wish to know of everyone involved.

Landsbergis' Bodyguards Allegedly Linked to Shootings

*PM2203160191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Mar 91 First Edition p 4*

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Roshchin reply to reader's letter under the rubric: "Briefing for Readers"; first paragraph is reader's letter: "One Million... for Fists?"]

[Text] "I read in your newspaper that, in addition to the territorial protection department, a Supreme Soviet security section also exists in Lithuania. What does it do? Captain A. Tarasov. Novosibirsk."

Three special services now exist in Lithuania: the territorial protection department, the state security department, and the Supreme Soviet security section. Very little information about the latter percolates to the pages of the press. It is known that the section is directed by a certain Skucas, an architect by training.

Whereas the territorial protection department and the state security department are under the jurisdiction of the republic Council of Ministers, the purview of Skucas' "realm" is not immediately clear. If it boils down to protection, why, when the budget was approved, did the Supreme Soviet allocate approximately 1 million rubles [R] for the maintenance of the security section? I have tried to establish just how many people Skucas has. It did not prove easy to do so. The size of the parliament's security section is kept top-secret. I have spoken with many people about this. My interlocutors named various figures, but they all agreed, in general, on the figure of approximately 200 people.

Then I made some calculations. The entire state security department, which has considerably more employees, received R1.3 million for the year. But here there are 200 people, and straightaway R1 million. Why such generosity for the security section?

"But what is not clear here?" a staffer of the territorial protection department whom I cannot name at present for certain reasons said to me. "Skucas' team is a creation of Landsbergis. And it will fulfill any order from him..."

My interlocutor's words are also confirmed by the few facts which, despite the veil of secrecy, still filter out from the walls of the "most democratic" parliament.

A pistol went missing from the guard. What then?

"...They took me to Vaisvila's former office and charged me, without evidence, with appropriating a TT pistol. I denied it. They punched me a couple of times in the stomach and once between the legs. They held a pistol to my throat and promised to kill me. Then they tied my hands behind my back and put a gas mask over my face. They promised to use gases"—this was the explanatory note which H. Stur, a staffer of the territorial protection department, wrote to K. Motieka, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, before his meeting with the prosecutor's office investigator. This was reported by the Vilnius newspaper RESPUBLIKA. Skucas' people beat a confession out of Henrikas.

There are many eyewitness testimonies that on the tragic night of 13 January people were fired upon from the upper floors of the television tower. Identity cards of employees of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet security section were later found to have been hidden there,

among the apparatus. What were Landsbergis' personal bodyguards doing in the television tower at 0200 hours?

Lithuanian CP's Jermalavicius Rejects Criminal Charges

91UN0861A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 6, Feb 91 p 5

["INTERFAX Reports"—ARGUMENTY I FAKTY headline]

[Text] Juozas Jermalavicius, member of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee, stated in Vilnius that he is not afraid of criminal proceedings instituted against him by the Procuracy of Lithuania. He stressed that similar criminal proceedings have been instituted previously against V. Shved and A. Naudziunas—secretaries of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee, and it cannot be ruled out that such persecution of the communists of Lithuania will go on. J. Jermalavicius called this "a psychological attack." He also said that the criminal proceedings instituted against him did not come as a surprise, and that he was prepared for worse. In his opinion, such facts go to prove once again that the situation in Lithuania is out of control, and that no laws apply here.

J. Jermalavicius stated in an interview to BBC TV, which is shooting a documentary on events in Lithuania, that he personally called the deputy commander of the Vilnius garrison for political affairs and asked the army to "assist the working people in order to take the TV station."

RSFSR

Moscow's Prokofyev Views Referendum Results

91UN1223A MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
19 Mar 91 p 1

[Interview with Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee, by unidentified correspondents of the TV program "Good Evening, Moscow!" and MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA; place and date not given: "Yuriy Prokofyev: 'The Referendum Results Will Make Political Speculation on Behalf of the People More Difficult'"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Yuriy Anatolyevich, how might you evaluate the preliminary results of the referendum in Moscow?

[Prokofyev] Primarily as the high politicization of the population and Muscovites' interest in the referendum: Over 67 percent of the electorate—the most ever—took part. For example, last year we were unable to conduct local elections either to the Moscow City Soviet or the rayon soviets inasmuch as activity then was in the 30-40 percent range. Yesterday, according to the preliminary figures, 50.02 percent voted for the Union, 46.13 percent

against the Union, and approximately four percent of ballots were deemed invalid.

I am convinced that the results of the ballot were affected by the situation that exists in Moscow and in the country at this time: empty store shelves, social tension, declining living standards. And people were thinking not about the Union that is to come but were protesting that which we have now.

Of course, I would have liked people to have made their decisions more intelligently. But this is how the situation has shaped up, and we were prepared for this inasmuch as a certain idea had been afforded by preliminary sociological surveys. Specifically, 70 percent of those polled declared that their decision would be influenced by the political situation that is taking shape in the country.

[Correspondent] Do the referendum results pertain only to Moscow or do they also pertain to other regions of our country, specifically Russia?

[Prokofyev] I believe that what happened in Moscow (I mean the results) is generally characteristic of the big cities, where many political movements and their mass media are concentrated, that is, where the flow of information is very intensive, and for this reason people's moral and psychological tension is higher at ordinary times, but all the more so now. I believe that the results will be approximately the same in Leningrad, Kiev and, perhaps, Sverdlovsk and a number of other big cities. But in Russia as a whole I am convinced that the results of the ballot in favor of preservation of the Union will be considerably higher than here, in the big cities.

[Correspondent] Muscovites, as you know, also answered a questionnaire in the course of the referendum: to elect a mayor of the city by direct, public ballot? How would you comment on Muscovites' statements and opinions on this question?

[Prokofyev] Approximately 81 percent of voters supported the election of a mayor by direct, public ballot. And what is interesting is this: Both prior to the referendum and during the referendum, when people were polled, two streams came together, as it were—those who support the present leadership of the Moscow City Soviet and those who are opposed—believing that, were it elected, more deserving people would be chosen. Generally, that same situation: people's dissatisfaction with the situation in which Moscow has now found itself and an endeavor to strengthen executive authority.

I also believe that the executive authority in Moscow should be strengthened. But here (I have already spoken about this) the cart has been put before the horse. We need to know first what is meant by mayor of Moscow: either a person who will enjoy unlimited rights and be accountable to no one or a leader of the executive elected by the whole people, but accountable to the soviet and controlled by it. Before, therefore, deciding the question of a mayor and how to elect him, it is first necessary, I

believe, to enact a law on the status of Moscow and to determine the functions of the mayor or other leader of the executive, whatever he is called.

[Correspondent] If a person went to the polling station and failed to cross out either the "yes" or "no," could these ballots not be used by some people for falsification purposes. Was there any control here?

[Prokofyev] First, control was exercised by the precinct commissions, and there were representatives of many political movements and representatives of the corps of deputies also. So I do not think that there was any deliberate falsification. But the fact that a large number of ballots was deemed invalid raises certain doubts: Did a sufficient number of people realize what was to be struck out, and what to be left in. Both the fact that there were three ballots and the fact that the questions were quite cumbersome evidently gave rise to considerable difficulties for the electorate, for all that.

[Correspondent] Some party officials have expressed the opinion that without the active participation of the city party organization in the preparation of the referendum it could not have been conducted in Moscow at all. What in reality was the extent of Moscow communists' participation in the preparation and organization of the referendum?

[Prokofyev] The party organizations did, indeed, join actively in the preparation and organization of this most important activity. Particularly at the first stage, before Russia had determined its position on the holding of the Union referendum and when neither the Moscow City Soviet nor the rayon soviets were taking any energetic steps toward preparation of the referendum. But subsequently also the Communists rendered considerable assistance here. This contributed to a certain extent to the success of the referendum in Moscow, it being held, as you know, calmly, without any disruptions.

The party organizations concentrated their efforts, in the main, on explanatory work among the public. And it has to be said that on this occasion they operated considerably more actively than at the last elections. Mistakes evidently teach something, for all that, and the Communists are beginning to gain experience in political work.

But to speak about what the Communists were unable to do, it evidently needs to be said first and foremost that they were unable to reach each individual. Not in the sense of persuading people or changing their minds in some respect or other: Many people simply did not know the purposes and tasks of the referendum, and many people, for example, unduly personified it—for Yeltsin or for Gorbachev. But this was not what it was about. Hence things should have been explained better, more intelligibly.

[Correspondent] How and to what extent, in your opinion, might the referendum results influence the further development of events in our state and society?

[Prokofyev] I am prepared to support the opinion of the legal experts who believe that the results of the referendum will have no direct legal consequences. But, it seems to me, there will be very appreciable influence elsewhere. If, say, in Russia as a whole approximately 70 percent of those who took part in the referendum advocate a single Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics (Soviet and Socialist, we would emphasize), this will afford political leaders perfectly definite reference points and, in addition, make more difficult all possible political speculation on behalf of the people.

I hope also that the results of the referendum will accelerate the signing of a treaty on a union of sovereign republics. Of course, not all of them will sign it immediately. But if we take as a guide the preliminary data on the referendum voting results, they show that all nine republics that took part in the referendum supported preservation of the Union. In places the percentage "for" was more, in places, less, of course. But as a whole the majority is "for"! Consequently, there is reason to believe that this will accelerate the process of signing of the treaty and, hence, regulate relations between the center and the republics and between themselves also. I hope that this will lead to a diminution in interethnic tension.

[Correspondent] And, finally, to what would you care to call attention particularly in connection with the referendum?

[Prokofyev] I believe we should all pay attention to an increase in our political, and not only political, culture. Many members of our society have a very remiss attitude toward this at times. Such deplorable facts as those of people not even knowing the history of their own nation are encountered frequently. Yet the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and the democratic foundations of society mean primarily an enhancement of its culture. Without this, we can do nothing. We will create nothing worthwhile without this.

RSFSR Rights Secretary on Agreement With Estonia

*91UN1122A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 27 Feb 91 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with People's Deputy Stanislav Shustov, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and secretary of the RSFSR Human Rights Committee, conducted by Andrey Birov, press attache of the Estonia Permanent Mission in Moscow; place and date not given: "Russia and Estonia: Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] [Birov] Stanislav Pavlovich, first permit me to ask you about the fate of the document which was signed in this RSFSR Supreme Soviet building and which is of direct concern to Russia and Estonia. As you know, the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet has ratified the bilateral treaty "Principles of Interstate Relations of the RSFSR and the Republic of Estonia" signed by the

chairmen of the Russian and Estonian Supreme Soviets, Boris Yeltsin and Arnold Ruutel. What is preventing the Russian parliament from doing likewise today, and will it be ratified in the near future at all?

[Shustov] If you have been closely following what is now happening in the Russian and Union parliaments, the answer should be clear to you: Losing power, the center, seeing the results of the referendum in Lithuania (and I personally consider this referendum legitimate), is now, out of a fear of conclusively losing power locally and seeing no other solution for itself, subjecting to the strongest attack democratic forces in the Russian parliament, as also the leaders of these democratic forces. Therefore saying today that it is possible practically to implement some decisions in a planned fashion is extremely complicated. I realize that the Union leadership is doing this specially: The crisis in the country, the food crisis included, is growing, and the people are unhappy with the current state of affairs.... And at the same time the people are absolutely not being provided with information about what is actually happening.

[Birov] For example?

[Shustov] For example, if you listened to I. Silayev's speech on 22 February in the Russian parliament, in which he responded to the attempt to dismiss his government and the proposal of Voronin, member of the "Communists of Russia" group of deputies, that the Russian premier resign, he gave figures that should have made the deputies' hair stand on end, but not that of the Communists. The level of import purchases of raw material and intermediate products undertaken by the USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations in the first quarter of the present year is, compared with the analogous period of last year, catastrophically low! The figures speak for themselves. Food purchases overseas have been reduced a hundredfold! Thus vegetable oil has been purchased in an amount of 1.77 percent of last year's level, and raw material and intermediate products for light industry, of 0.67 percent....

[Birov] Yes, but there is a catastrophic shortage of hard currency at this time....

[Shustov] True. Both the Union government and Russia are short of currency. But at the same time the RSFSR Council of Ministers has only to attempt to do something or other to increase import supplies and to obtain this currency itself and we are immediately rapped on the knuckles. You yourself understand that this is the quickest way of depriving us of food. And of heaping everything onto us, which is already being done. The question of the 140 billion, and 300 billion now, is being dredged up. I am sure that all this is being played by "provocation grand masters." I believe also that not only people on our side but foreign partners have been "exposed" also.

[Birov] This is an attempt to compromise Yeltsin, Silayev, and the Russian parliament directly?

[Shustov] It is in fact a struggle to the death. The struggle has today reached a peak. While realizing that the position of the population is extremely difficult and that it might not participate in either a referendum or elections, the results of this referendum, this has been shown particularly by Lithuania, are greatly feared. It was for this reason that reactionary forces have attempted to conduct a Russian congress at the start of March. And what will we bring to the congress if for a whole month we have been involved in a slanging match instead of enacting laws, ratification of Russia's treaty with Estonia included. We are currently faced with a task on whose accomplishment our existence depends. I therefore apologize on behalf of the democratic deputies and groups to the people of Estonia and the Estonian parliament for the fact that we have not yet ratified this treaty. As soon as an "opening" or "window" appears, we will undoubtedly ratify it.

[Birov] As secretary of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Human Rights Committee, can you, for your part, reassure and set at rest the minds of the inhabitants of Estonia who have been intimidated by the fact that this treaty will violate the rights and interests of the Russian-speaking part of the republic population?

[Shustov] I have no specific information to the effect that human rights will be violated in Estonia. The treaty, just the opposite, provides for protection of the interests of the Russian-speaking population of your republic. Although I understand that there are excesses in Estonia too, most likely. But this is not only occurring with you but everywhere.

[Birov] "Do you wish for the restoration of state independence and the independence of the Republic of Estonia?"—such is the question being put to the referendum which will be held in Estonia on 3 March. In the event of a positive result, how, in your view, will the relations of Russia and Estonia develop and will it be possible here to safeguard all the civil rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Republic of Estonia guaranteed by the bilateral treaty?

[Shustov] I do not believe that Estonia will be worse than any European countries, in respect of which we have no questions concerning the population.

[Birov] Manifestly conservative and reactionary trends have, in my opinion, emerged currently. Evidence of this is the alignment of forces in the Union parliament and the stimulation of forces of the right in the Russian parliament also. So there is no reason to be a great optimist today. But, nonetheless, does it not seem to you that truly practicable democratic transformations are possible more in an independent and self-sufficient Republic of Estonia, as in a sovereign Russia, come to that, than within the framework of the present Union as a whole?

[Shustov] Were we not impeded by the center, we could live considerably more prosperously, not only as republics, but each citizen individually included. And not only

more prosperously but also more freely and happily. Today many questions are not being solved and are insoluble at the Union level.

[Birov] Stanislav Pavlovich, let us, for all that, try to end on an optimistic note and implant in people at least some hope and faith.

[Shustov] I believe in reason, although making optimistic forecasts in the current situation is extremely difficult.... I believe that the truth will prevail.

[Birov] Let us hope so.

Dual Positions of Belgorod's Ponomarev Criticized
 91UN1204A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 91
 Second Edition p 2

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent N. Utkin: "Like Two Wings"]

[Text] Belgorod—*Here and there of late obstructions are being placed before those who hold the two positions of chairman of a soviet and first secretary of a party committee. This problem is also critical for Belgorod Oblast, where A. Ponomarev holds dual positions.*

At a recent session of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, Deputy I. Ivanov asked for permission to take the floor:

"We have been unable for more than half a year to resolve the question of the impermissibility of simultaneously holding positions of chairmen of oblast and rayon soviets and leadership positions in the CPSU, or rather in political organizations. As you will recall, our respected chairman A. Ponomarev promised to take a stand by the end of last year. However, the violation has not been eliminated."

The session engaged in a discussion of this statement. However, A. Ponomarev also insisted upon this himself:

"I believe," he said, "that now, when the party is no longer managing as it previously did, and the soviets have not yet taken the reins of government into their own hands, a division will only do harm. I ask the deputies to express themselves. I ask those who insist on a division of positions to tell me frankly: What does not please them in my handling of the job, and to point out its shortcomings."

No one could remain indifferent to this open challenge. Deputies came to the microphone one after the other. Deputy N. Sokolov, the chairman of the trade union of the Borisovskiy bridge metal construction plant, also took the floor.

"My name is among those 14 deputies who signed a statement addressed to the present session condemning the holding of dual positions. Now, after becoming acquainted with the finding of the USSR Constitutional

Oversight Committee, I am recalling my signature. It appears that there is nothing illegal in holding two positions simultaneously."

As we see, one of the authors of the statement, which was made in categorical tones, has dissociated himself from the text. The rest did not cite any specific examples that would indicate that A. Ponomarev's simultaneous holding of dual positions had a bad effect on the work of the soviet. And, indeed, what kind of rebukes can there be when Aleksey Filippovich, whom I have observed at work for 12 years now, first in the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] and afterwards in the oblast party committee, has given his all without a letup. He thinks and he acts in a statesmanlike manner in every way. It is not without reason that Belgorod Oblast is considered one of the best in the country.

Let us take as an example the agrarian system which wins first place everywhere. Here, in the last five years the volume of gross output grew by 21 percent, meat in the public sector by 45 percent, and milk by 23 percent. Plans were fulfilled for the purchase and delivery of basic products of agriculture and cattle breeding in the Union-republic fund. For this period, the state was sold, above that prescribed, 100,000 tons of grain, almost 2.5 million tons of sugar beets, 155,000 tons of cattle and poultry, 277,000 tons of milk, and 141 million eggs. The annual profit that was received from the sale of kolkhoz and sovkhoz products was in excess of half a billion rubles [R].

All of this is due basically to the skill of the farmers, the high level of specialization and concentration of production, and the introduction of new and progressive forms of organization and labor pay. Such as team contract, leasing, and others. What the Belgorod residents have achieved amazes and delights many.

Not very long ago, the kolkhozes imeni Dzerzhinskiy of Yakovlevskiy Rayon and Zarya of Shebekinskiy Rayon were visited by a former farmer and now a prominent banker from the state of Iowa. He looked at the fattened and glossy bull calves, heard that each farm had a clear profit of about R10 million and that people work in two shifts, visited the settlements where apartments had all of the public conveniences, and, on leaving his hosts, said:

"I have visited many countries, and I am acquainted with dozens of prosperous farmers, but I have not seen such a level of production and such efficiency anywhere."

And does not this fact deserve attention: R140 million is invested annually in the construction of housing, schools, hospitals, and children's preschool establishments. For comparison, for example: The RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food has appropriated...R390,000 for these purposes.

That is Belgorod reality. Behind it is the enormous conscientious labor of the villagers and the just as

enormous assistance given them in the resolution of all questions by the residents of Belgorod, Staryy Oskol, Gubkin, Shebekino, Alekseyevka, and other cities and worker settlements. Their annual investment in satisfying the needs of the agrarian complex is more than R60 million. Underlying all of this is the creative attitude of the local soviets and party organizations toward work. Of course, this includes the oblast soviet and the CPSU party committee headed by A. Ponomarev.

True, for the local "democrats," who are not many in number, but who are very active, all of this, including the relative well-being in foodstuffs, is not an argument for able management by the oblast. Still, they come out to rallies with placards such as "Aleksey, you will not shut our mouths with sausage." For them—even if you knock yourself out—they will bring up the same thing in every way. The dual positions are a convenient reason for attacks and accusations of opposition of the partocracy to the leaders of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. Which, in particular, was clearly confirmed in the aforementioned statement of the 14 deputies of the oblast.

People, to put it bluntly, who have gotten involved in the campaign against the simultaneous holding of dual positions, again and again exaggerate this issue, using various methods. So, at this session, with which I began my report, one more attempt was made to take an approach from another direction.

Thus, N. Sostina, the editor of the oblast youth newspaper LENINSKAYA SMENA, prefaced her speech with a reservation and sympathy. She says that she personally has no claims against Aleksey Filippovich. But she came to the microphone, because she was troubled by the loss of prestige of the party and the activity of the primary party organizations. She says that it is necessary to pay more attention to these lower cells, which are closest of all to the people and to production. But Ponomarev, who occupies two positions, does not have the time for them. The deputies were not persuaded by her argument.

The drop in the activity of the Communists, which was observed for some time after the sixth article of the USSR Constitution was revoked, has now been overcome. This was confirmed, in particular, at a recent meeting of the bureau of the oblast party committee in a discussion of the practice of the work of the party committee of the Belgorod agricultural institute on the implementation of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress. Noted among the positive aspects were the changes in the structure of the election organ. Here, party groups in the department of social disciplines and basic sectors of training administration that had been groundlessly eliminated were restored. A soviet of secretaries was established to coordinate the activity of shop party organizations and to increase their role in the training-educational process. The stream of fresh forces was also intensified. After the 28th CPSU Congress, 13 Communists were added to the party organization, and

of these, four were teachers and scientific employees and nine were students. Many such examples can be cited.

But we will return to the problem of dual positions. I remember how my colleague, a Communist with a reputable length of service, became indignant over the oblast newspaper:

"Look at what is happening," he said excitedly, "a mass departure of first secretaries of rayon party committees to chairmen of soviets. This is treachery. And when? When it is especially difficult for the party..."

After calming down a little, as if thinking out loud, he explained: Intelligent and creditable people are leaving. But who, one asks, will restore the creditability of the primary organizations? Spiteful critics of every stripe are attacking us and are uniting their ranks on the basis of hatred for the CPSU. But the former party bosses—are aloof... Let someone else, they say, straighten out this mess.

Well, the soviets also need mature and creditable people. Because different outspoken demagogues and populists have succeeded in messing things up there.

And so, a lot has been lost because of the opposition, which nobody needs, of the party organs and of the soviets. A. Ponomarev continuously tries to make this point, and he is making it. To him, the soviets and the party are like the wings of a bird.

Kemerovo May Become 'Guerrilla Country'

*LD3003172691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Mar 91*

[Text] Kemerovo may become a guerrilla country. Aleksandr Grishchenko, member of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee and secretary of the Ilykayevskiy State Farm Party Committee, speaking on local television, stated that he—and I quote—took advice from the peasants and that he came to the conclusion that it was necessary to get away to the Tayga and become partisans to win back Soviet power. NASHA GAZETA, Kemerovo, reports this.

Commenting on what he said, the paper noted that Grishchenko is not talking through his hat: his state farm owns the rayon's sole modern small-bore range, and has won numerous awards for accurate shooting. This was reported by the Russian Information Agency.

Western Republics

Belorussia Announces Council of Ministers Changes

*91UN1179A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 2 Mar 91 p 3*

[Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet decree: "Partial Change in Structure of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To make the following changes to the structure of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers confirmed by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on 11 July 1990:

1. To convert:

The Ministry of Industry of the Belorussian SSR into the republic State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Industry and Intersectoral Processes;

The State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Construction Affairs into the Union-republic State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Architecture and Construction;

The State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Agriculture and Food into the republic Ministry of Agriculture and Food of the Belorussian SSR.

2. To abolish the Ministry of Timber Industry of the Belorussian SSR.

3. To introduce to the structure of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers the office of deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers in charge of questions of agriculture and food, having excluded the office of deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Agriculture and Food.

4. To exclude from the structure of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers the office of minister of the Belorussian SSR for relations with public and religious organizations.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 20 February 1991.

Release of Comrade V.G. Tikhinya From the Office of Minister of Justice of the Belorussian SSR

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To release Comrade Valeriy Gurevich Tikhinya from the office of minister of justice of the Belorussian SSR in connection with his transfer to other work.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 21 February 1991.

Appointment of Minister of Justice of the Belorussian SSR

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To appoint Comrade Leonid Andreyevich Dashuk minister of justice of the Belorussian SSR.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 21 February 1991.

Appointment of Minister of Agriculture and Food of the Belorussian SSR

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To appoint Comrade Fedor Vladimirovich Mirochitskiy minister of agriculture and food of the Belorussian SSR, having released him from the office of minister of the Belorussian SSR.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 21 February 1991.

Appointment of Minister of Construction and Operation of Highways of the Belorussian SSR

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To appoint Comrade Stanislav Pavlovich Yatsuta minister of construction and operation of highways of the Belorussian SSR.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 21 February 1991.

Appointment of First Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To appoint Comrade Mikhail Vladimirovich Myasnikov first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, having released him from the office of deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Economics and Planning.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 21 February 1991.

Appointment of Chairman of the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Architecture and Construction

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To appoint Comrade Yuriy Aleksandrovich Puplikov chairman of the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Architecture and Construction.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 21 February 1991.

Appointment of Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Economics and Planning

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To appoint Comrade Sergey Stepanovich Ling deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee of the Belorussian SSR for Economics and Planning.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Minsk, 21 February 1991.

Belorussian Deputy Cites Political Priorities

91UN1196A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
21 Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Yevgeniy Novikov, Belorussian SSR people's deputy and secretary of Commission on Legislation, by Natalya Gurovskaya; place and date not given: "The People Must Not Be Left Out of the Game"]

[Text] The situation in the republic and the tasks of the parliament are discussed by Yevgeniy Novikov, Belorussian SSR people's deputy and secretary of the Commission on Legislation.

[Gurovskaya] Yevgeniy Viktorovich, in your opinion, what should the people's deputies and republic leaders be focusing their attention on now?

[Novikov] Alas, many of the laws adopted as a result of the lengthy, fairly intense debates, in my opinion, do not correspond to economic realities. Once again we are trying to juggle these realities! I do not think the laws on Chernobyl, the land, or leasing will work. And consequently the level of production will drop even lower. Hence the political and social tension. The basic and major questions in the area of privatization are practically unchanged, and this is the reason for our crisis.

[Gurovskaya] In your view, what would help to get us out of it?

[Novikov] In economics—recognition of the right to private ownership, including of the land. Allowing private ownership under the conditions of a mixed economy is the only possible basis for the restoration of Belorussia. The restoration of the nation can proceed only through the advancement of the economy. I emphasize: private ownership in a mixed economy and not a monopoly of private property, which would be another extreme just like the monopoly of state property. The party group in the Supreme Soviet, following the decisions of the 31st Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia, consistently defends the viewpoint that rejects private ownership of the land. This, in my opinion, is a short-sighted position.

In the economic sphere the basis for the consolidation of all forces, in our view, could be the recognition of the right of political parties to act only on the basis of the law. And also realization in practice of the basic democratic principle—separation of powers.

[Gurovskaya] During the last days of the last session in parliament there were stormy debates related precisely to political problems. They had to do with removal of party influence from law enforcement organs, the draft law on authority, and so forth. As a lawyer, what do you have to say about this?

[Novikov] Just one thing. We have proclaimed a policy of construction of a rule-of-law state—and for me that is not simply a slogan. In a rule-of-law state, the minute we begin to proceed toward it, the withdrawal of the party is

a normal phenomenon, and this in no way contradicts international norms, as our party elite, including former Justice Minister V.G. Tikhinya, assert. The whole problem is that the participation of the militia, Army, KGB, procuracy organs, and courts in the interparty struggle only increases the social antagonism. If we had wanted the law to grant the militia worker the right to leave the party (not force him to, but give him the right!), then let him decide for himself whether he will withdraw or not. And from any party, not just the Communist Party. Why should Communists perceive this so one-sidedly and project it only on themselves? The same thing can be said about the Belorussian People's Front and the other new parties. For if this right is not granted, a confrontation will begin in the militia. It is already in progress, incidentally... But today we must already deal with withdrawal of the party from public education organizations as well. For when our children are three years old, as soon as they get into day nurseries, they begin to hear the drum beat and the babble of slogans that are incomprehensible to the child's mind...

But why does the majority so solidly back obsolete principles? The answer is extremely simple: Behind each concept, canon, and slogan there are the material interests of specific people. And now the nomenklatura majority is defending its specific material interests.

[Gurovskaya] Why are they so strongly against removal of party influence from the militia?

[Novikov] Because then the party would get out from under the thumb of the party apparatus. Initially the opposition suggested that the militia worker be forced to cancel his membership in the party to which he belonged, but then, with the familiar alignment of political forces, we made a concession and suggested: Let us not force him but grant him this right and then protect this right with the law. But all that was rejected.

I think there is a double game going on both in politics and in economics. In particular, the question of changing over to the market is being dragged out, but at the same time party committees are opening up small enterprises and creating other commercial structures. In my view, the nomenklatura is now especially dragging out the transition to the market in order to have time for initial accumulation of capital for themselves. And then when they really have their hands on the property the market will be introduced. And we will end up in servitude, with just the shirts on our backs. In other words, I do not think this is a matter of the name of the party or even of parties.

[Gurovskaya] What, then?

[Novikov] It is a matter of classes. Perhaps not everyone likes this—they will say we are back to Marxism again. This is not Marxism, it was not Marx who said this, this was said long before Marx. I repeat, it is a matter of classes, that is, the relationship to the means of production. The essence of socialization consists in that those who produce the material or spiritual goods—the

worker, the peasant, the scholar, or the engineer—they must be the property owners. But here the only ones who can become property owners are those same “elect,” but in a new role...

[Gurovskaya] They voted for you in the 13th district of Minsk. How do you evaluate your work? What can you tell your constituents?

[Novikov] I can say only one thing, in the first place, that my voters must decide for themselves what is most important to them: sausage, tights, higher wages, or something else. In my view, we all must demand our share of property today. Each peasant and each worker, engineer, teacher, and physician must demand his share of the property. Only then will we have sausage and tights and an apartment. Otherwise we will be deceived once again. And I also wish to say that actually during all of last year not once did I go against my conscience in dealing with the voters. I am serious. And here is something else. I still wish to plant a little optimism in the hearts of my constituents. In what sense? You understand that today as the situation deteriorates—and it will continue to deteriorate—all the objective preconditions are being created for the unification of democratic forces. We are doing this work today. We have already created a republic deputy democratic club in which we have tried to unite all progress-minded deputies of all levels, including rural soviets and village soviets of Belorussia, for coordination of actions, development of common directions, and exchange of information. Actually, all of us already recognize that the existing power structures will disappear sooner or later and they will be replaced by new ones. But the question is posed like this: Are we prepared today to realize our approaches and ideas, do we have a good record, what do we have to offer the people? There is also the question of the creation of expert groups, and they have actually already begun to develop conceptual, strategic, and tactical approaches to changing the situation both in economics and in politics. We are trying to invite economists, political scientists, and legal experts to our country. Even with the alignment of political forces we have in the republic today, we are hoping for real progress and we are counting on our intelligentsia—for they are still silent. We appeal to them to cooperate if they value truth. In my view, in our situation everything will ultimately be decided not by the Army and not by the KGB but by the intelligentsia. Dogmas must be replaced by free, creative thought.

Belorussia Passes Militia Protection Law

LD2602231591 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] The right to justified professional risk has been given to the Belorussian guardians of law and order. This primarily new proposal is contained in a law on militia adopted by the Republic's supreme soviet.

According to the law, militia workers in Belorussia are not obligated by decision of political parties and mass

public movements, and cannot be involved in sociopolitical activities while on duty. It is prohibited to use the militia and its resources for achieving political goals. Militia workers can be members of professional associations. Drawing them into the fulfillment of tasks outside the Republic can be carried out only on a decision of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic on a voluntary basis.

In the social sphere, the law envisages compulsory life insurance for militia workers, and large financial compensation to families in case of death, and to the member personally for any injuries and bodily harm he may sustain.

The document clearly expresses the system of the militia structure itself—the criminal militia, the militia for public order and the special militia. The procedure for using special means, physical force and weapons has been set out in detail. A total of R100 million will be spent on the implementation of the law.

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Paper Criticized for One-Sidedness

91UN1179B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by G. Kapanik, controller at the V.I. Lenin MPO, member of the Belorussian CP Central Committee: “Personal Ambitions, Not Arguments or How NARODNAYA GAZETA Takes Criticism”]

[Text] A Union law whose power has been perceived most palpably by all of us is the Press Law. An uncensored press has literally burst into every home. This has gladdened some people, frightened others, and shocked yet others. But life has so disposed matters that it is the press which has become the most “popular” instrument of our infant democracy. The palette of print publications which is revealed to us today at each “Soyuzpechat” stand testifies that an ancient profession—journalism—is experiencing a second birth. But together with the positive features connected with the press which provides food for thought, negative phenomena have been manifested also. I mean that it is journalists who are frequently contributing to the far from constructive processes in society.

Everyone wants many good and varied newspapers.

NARODNAYA GAZETA has taken its place among the new publications also. And since it has become the organ of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, the general interest in the activity of deputies elected on a democratic basis has entailed close attention to this publication also. I am not in a position and do not have the right to go deeper into the professional aspects of newspaper work. But the content aspect of the publications is disturbing. And A.A. Malofeyev, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, had only at a joint plenum of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and

Control Commission to express his attitude in connection with the position of NARODNAYA GAZETA and the relations with it of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet party group for editor I. Seredich and members of the editorial board to write a lengthy letter to A.A. Malofeyev, entitling it "Why Draw Swords?" (No 35 for 19 February 1991). It seems to me, however, that no "drawing" or, even less, duels had crossed the mind of the Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary.

But it would be better to take things in order.

The newspaper has repeatedly published articles whose authors have primordially set themselves the goal of stinging the Belorussian Communist Party as painfully as possible and molding in the public a negative opinion of it. What, for example, is the value of the "works" of Z. Poznyak, who calls for the disbandment of the CPSU, declares that the Communists are the "stupefier" of the people, insults veterans, and writes in respect of V.I. Lenin: "Compared with the vicious personality of this man Stalin was a petty epigone." Well, so be it, we all know where Poznyak stands. But a dislike of the Communists, the socialist idea, and the past of our country and republic is distinctly noticeable in other material also. There is in respect of the party at every step the categorical statement: "The Belorussian CP Central Committee is the organization to blame for all the misfortunes of the Belorussian people and all the perfidious talentlessness of our government policy."

But how, pray, has the Belorussian Communist Party so greatly sinned? Was it not under its leadership that our people survived as a nation at the time of the Great Patriotic War and had restored industrial potential by the start of the 1960's? In this same period the people left the adobe cottages and, by the start of the 1970's, the wooden huts. All inhabitants of the republic connect the rapid pace of restoration of industry and agriculture and the growth of the well-being of the Belorussian people with the names of P.K. Ponomarenko, K.T. Mazurov, and P.M. Masherov.

Thousands of Communists were in the front ranks of the defenders of our motherland and toiled selflessly for the restoration of the economy. Many of them did not live to see our times and gave their strength and health for the country.

The Belorussian Communist Party was able in the difficult political storms to preserve a human face and not besmirch itself with a variety of base acts and unattractive conduct. And in the years of perestroika people have linked the relative stability in the republic with the position of the Communist Party, not with the actions of the organizers of mass meetings and fashionable plans for the rearrangement of society smacking more of the plans for diverting the northern rivers. It is a great pity that our ill-wishers are unwilling to see this point-blank. We Communists have nothing over which to repent, and if there is anything at all, it is only the fact that we have been unable to inculcate in the new generation living

essentially under hothouse conditions a sense of reality and gratitude to its fathers and grandfathers.

In an "open letter" the newspaper declares that "We have printed and will continue to print material which reflects different views of social and political processes and what is happening in our republic and the country." A praiseworthy aspiration, no doubt. But while recognizing the fact that the newspaper does not always share the boundless radicalism and coordinates of evidence which are contained in certain publications of the parliamentary opposition, the chief editor and the members of the editorial board who signed the letter have themselves essentially never opposed them. The more so in that Communists are in the majority in the editorial office staff. A situation where the insinuations of those who are calling the Communists names in every possible way are being accommodated in the issue by people carrying a party card in their pockets appears quite strange.

Paraphrasing the well-known saying, we would say: Any party is viable when it knows how to defend itself. And there is nothing surprising about the fact that at a meeting of an elective body a party leader expresses his attitude toward the position of this newspaper or the other on which members of this party work. Had this not been the case, such silence would have seemed simply strange to us Central Committee members. The more so in that I know Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Malofeyev to be a man of principle with his own personal view of various questions of political and social life. And this does not strike me as being any kind of shortcoming. On the contrary, we are all worried by the fact that real party fighters are not being formed quickly enough in the republic party organization and that some Communists are, as before, remaining silent when direct threats and various fabrications are showered in their direction.

NARODNAYA GAZETA maintains: "It is not for secretaries or even plenums of the Central Committee to point out to journalists of nonparty publications what they should write, and to the readers, what they should read." It is possible to both agree and disagree with this proposition. Yes, the times of direct instructions, diktat, and scorn for the press are gone. Forever, let us hope. But the times of dialogue and counsel are here. And why should a plenum of the Central Committee, to which we were elected by the party's highest body—the congress—not call the attention of communist journalists of the organ of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet to individual aspects of their work?

The aspiration of the journalist milieu to become an influential force in a society of glasnost and democracy is laudable, on the whole, but it presupposes the highest responsibility for the printed word and an aspiration to create, not destroy.

Only a dimwit may take undue pride in his independence. Thus, for example, one of our journalist dissidents, living in the "free capitalist paradise," said that

complete freedom for the journalist in the capitalist countries comes with the first million in the bank.

The question of "nonparty" publications pertains to this category also. It seems to me that this is quite a contentious concept. Excuse the banality, but to live in society and be independent is simply impossible. A newspaper will, for all that, be forced to reflect someone's position. But what about an organ representing parliament? After all, it is no secret that more than a dozen different groups have already been formed there. A newspaper cannot cover everything all at once.

In the West such a situation is a stage that has been negotiated. Quite a wise decision has been adopted there—neither the European parliaments nor the U.S. Congress have their own newspapers and confine themselves merely to the publication of news sheets. This is done, evidently, in order not to needlessly reignite political passions and to allow those elected to parliament an opportunity to engage calmly in their principal activity—law-making. But with us a communist editor is helping opponents from the opposition in every possible way hurl names at a party of which he himself is a member, but if party comrades have permitted themselves to express to the editorial office quite innocuous observations, he immediately hurls himself into the fray and "unsheathes his sword." Strange indeed.... Is there not concealed here the formula known to all: "Offense is the best defense." Behind the verbal tightrope-walking an attempt is being made to seek protection against criticism both currently and in the future. Zones closed to criticism are thus being formed also, evidently.

But what should be done? One version is maximum observance of objectivity: fair shares for all, that is, a column for the Communists, a column for the opposition, a column for the "independents." So that no one should harbor a grudge. Perhaps also the structural subdivisions of the editorial office could be configured in conformity with the deputies' political predilections. There would then be competition, and pluralism would be observed. But there are doubts here. A newspaper can hardly be cut from ill-assorted opinions. This attire would be too extravagant. And the designers say that every man has his own style. A newspaper also, most likely. Thought needs to be given here, it seems to us. And we, as members of the Central Committee of the party which is in the majority in the Supreme Soviet, could give some thought to this together with the editorial staff. Incidentally, although the "open letter" maintains that many communist deputies maintain close ties to the newspaper, this is barely noticeable in its pages. Just as there are no profound, striking, and memorable articles from the electorate either. The newspaper's journalists should be helping people express themselves, perhaps. It is a popular newspaper, after all....

And one further point. Belorussian radio has of late ceased direct broadcasts of meetings of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet session. Why could the newspaper not carry a stenographic account? After all, even

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, organ of Russia's Communists, did so, although, as we know, the newspaper is not on the best of terms with the RSFSR parliament.

I would also like to see more material in NARODNAYA GAZETA on the domestic "kitchen" of the work of the Supreme Soviet and the activity of the Presidium and standing commissions. And why not an account of how the soviets of lower levels of power "feel"?

We believe that readers would be interested in an analysis of the reasons for deputies' continued vacant seats. Why have elections already been conducted four or five times? The deputy's work in his constituency, improvement of the electoral system, delineation of the functions of legislature, executive, and judiciary—these topics also are crying out for coverage in the paper. Just as long as the editorial office does not take our wishes for some directives. We believe that advice does intelligent people no harm.

I embarked on this letter not because the position of the first secretary of the Central Committee has been affected. No. It is not a question of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. We have come to understand recently that we need to defend both our party comrades and ourselves personally. The time for passive contemplation of criticism is past. The time for action is here. And we will act. And all that we consider constructive in the editorial board's letter we will try to take account of in our work. Without personal ambitions and without grudges. The main thing is that this prove useful.

Ukraine To Establish Banking System

*LD0103010191 Kiev International Service in English
0000 GMT 28 Feb 91*

[Excerpts] The session of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet continued its work in Kiev today [27 February]. [passage omitted]

The deputies began examining the next issue on the agenda: the draft law on banks and banking transactions in the Ukrainian SSR. The need to adopt this document arose from the declarations on state sovereignty and law on economic independence.

According to the law on banking, the republic will independently set up a banking system, organize the monetary turnover, and form its own credit resources. It is envisaged to organize a National Bank of the Ukraine, which would fulfil the role of an emissive center of the Ukraine. The bank enjoys a monopoly on the circulation of currency. This will make it possible to create a monetary system for the republic, avoid inflation and fully manage credits and currency being introduced on the territory of the republic and independently enter the foreign market. [sentence as heard] The deputies adopted the draft law in the first hearing and forwarded it over for updating. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Oblasts Reject 'Galicia' Regional Concept

PM2602122791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[S. Troyan report under the "Events and Comments" rubric: "They Are Uniting in Order To Survive"]

[Text] Lvov —A joint session of three oblast soviets—Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov, and Ternopol—has been held in Lvov.

Those present included representatives from Rovno, Volyn, Chernovitsy, Transcarpathia, Zhitomir, Cherkassy, and other oblasts, USSR and Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, scientists, and clergymen.

In the opera and ballet theater where the extraordinary deputies' forum was being held it was made clear from the very outset that the attempt to elaborate an overall idea of economic cooperation in the western region cannot be a reason for declaring a so-called Galician autonomous entity within the Ukraine. Amid general economic chaos and declining productivity, the desire of local authorities to protect the interests of a rayon, oblast, or group of oblasts seems natural.

Unifying the efforts of three oblasts will improve the prospects for the region's population in their struggle for survival, the speakers believe. This unity is based on old historical, economic, and cultural ties and traditions which have lately started to be destroyed.

The participants in the session stressed the particular importance of mutual commitments in pursuing a common structural, investment, financial, and nature conservation policy and in elaborating and implementing a mechanism for the oblasts' social development which would be balanced with the whole region's opportunities. Joint enterprises with foreign partners are fine. But joint plants, factories, and associations created using our own hands alone are no less good.

Direct economic and other ties—and I stress this in particular—should be made on the basis of existing legislation. It was decided that a coordination council with a working organ in Lvov should be created to organize business partnership. Machine-building, electronics, chemicals, and light industry should be the nucleus for developing the region's economy, S. Davymuka, chairman of Lvov Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee], believes. Large associations and concerns are obliged to coexist with the system of small enterprises that will collaborate on a cooperative basis with these giants. So that these good plans would not just remain as good intentions, the deputies from the three oblast soviets signed an agreement on the basic principles of collaboration. A special coordination council has started operating.

It is no secret that until recently the situation has been tense in the republic's western oblasts. The fact that the majority of participants in the discussion of the second

question—the political situation and the union referendum—called for national accord, general peace, and the need to observe a sense of restraint in resolving the most complex conflicts is more pleasing.

"It seems," I. Plyushch, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, who came specially to this joint session, said in conversation with me, "that this measure has been successful. The best things we have heard and seen today are worth repeating in other regions in the republic. Concrete matters are far more important for us than political chatter, which we are thoroughly sick of. Let me take this opportunity to reject the accusations recently voiced against the Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov, and Ternopol Oblast leaders alleging that things are completely terrible here. In practice the results of economic activity are no worse, indeed according to some indicators they are actually better than in other oblasts in the Ukraine.

The joint session has shown once again how much difficult work we have ahead of us. And we should get down to it without the slightest delay.

Caucasus

Armenian First Secretary on Role of Communist Party

91US0408A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
2 Mar 91 p 1

[AYASTAN interview with Stepan Pogosyan, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, 28 February 1991: "Point of Departure—The Interests of the People"]

[Text] [AYASTAN] Comrade Pogosyan, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia has adopted the law: "On Sociopolitical Organizations." What do you think of this law?

[Pogosyan] If I say I do not like it you could get the wrong impression and think that this is because the law is essentially aimed mainly at the Communist Party. This was stated specifically in the speeches of certain Supreme Soviet deputies. And these deputies would not stop at threatening the existence of several other parties in order to "put an end" to the Communist Party. This is an incorrect and short-sighted approach. I am of the opinion that, in the present crisis situation, a law on parties and sociopolitical organizations should not be so confrontational.

We can say quite definitely that of all the political forces operating in Armenia today, the Communist Party is the most constructive. As proof I can note that the Communist Party of Armenia has not done the slightest thing to exacerbate the situation in the republic or to cause a confrontation. While I personally disagree with certain steps by the present authorities and a number of their decisions, the Communist Party has not mentioned this

in public, recognizing that both the Supreme Soviet and the organs of power are operating in a difficult situation and are in the process of learning to lead. And there is no point in responding directly to everything they do, thus complicating the process.

Finally, the Communist Party has stated clearly that it does not try to gain power and never will try to gain power by unconstitutional, undemocratic means. Incidentally, let me note that Armenia today is in such a difficult socioeconomic and political position, at such an impasse, and the organs of power are faced with so many diversely complicated and confused problems that their solution requires extraordinary strain on the nerves and extraordinary mobilization of forces and capacities. Under these conditions, the only ones who would strive for power are short-sighted forces who have lost the ability to objectively perceive and evaluate what is going on. And over the decades the Communist Party has accumulated experience in leadership and is well aware that to try to force its way through to the helm of power under present conditions would entail more failures than successes. We have only one path to power—our own program, our mode of operation, and our fundamental position, which is to prove to the people that the point of departure for the actions of communists is the interests of the people.

Individual statements against certain points of this law are being used to convince some people that this is the result of a duplicitous game by the Communist Party of Armenia: on the one hand it proclaims itself to be independent and on the other it continues to be a part of the CPSU, having representatives in its structure.

In the first place I can say that the activity of the Communist Party, if only in recent months, shows that the Communist Party of Armenia, having adopted its own program and rules, conducts an absolutely independent and separate policy. We believe that the basis of the party's activity should be mainly the interests of the people and there should be a clear cut national policy. Otherwise this party's existence becomes unthinkable and pointless. And then the question naturally arises: Why is the Communist Party against certain points of the law on sociopolitical organizations? The Republic of Armenia continues to be a part of the Soviet Union and, consequently, logic demands that it not make the Communist Party another means of confrontation with Moscow but take advantage of the possibilities of the Communist Party for the good of the republic.

A good deal is being said today about the property of the Communist Party, especially the buildings that belong to it, and certain organizations, like envious neighbors, have tried to take some and have even allowed illegal seizures of this property. But nobody is interested in knowing whose funds were used to build these buildings. Armenia's? No. Moscow's? Yes. Why should we be deprived of the opportunity to take advantage of this source? For whom were these buildings built and for whom are they being built now? To the great joy of our

opponents, I must say that even without their efforts, this source of construction and creation would have dried up in 1992, and no funds are on the horizon for this purpose or for the Communist Party of Armenia in general.

And those who think that the Communist Party could accelerate the intervention of foreign forces in the affairs of the republic and become a support point for these forces are profoundly mistaken. I am convinced that if there are attempts at intervention from outside, they will have to look elsewhere for forces to play the role of instruments in their hands. We should not be naive and we should understand well that if forces outside Armenia decide to undertake anything in the republic, they will always find advisers everywhere. So to accuse the Communist Party of nonexistent sins, to suspect it of conspiracies, and to draw conclusions from these fabricated facts means to go against logic and common sense.

Returning to the law adopted by the Supreme Soviet, I can say that it is extremely naive to imagine that the Communist Party might cease to exist and shut down its activity if the parliament adopts the corresponding decision. If parties could be abolished by decisions of parliaments, there would be no parties at all left in the world. So one should not foster illusions about the future of the Communist Party.

No, in general we do not ignore the decisions of the supreme organ of power. God forbid! The Communist Party of Armenia states quite definitely in its rules that it is guided only by its own program and rules and will operate within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, that is, its only goal is to serve the Republic of Armenia, and its activity will never provide grounds for accusations of unconstitutional behavior, and certainly not of being an instrument in the hands of alien forces.

The task, however, lies on a different plane. An analysis of the situation shows that in the republic today there are forces which are actually trying to play out the Lithuanian variant in Armenia, assuming that, if we are in a difficult position now and if they provoke outside intervention, society will rally around certain particular forces. But, I repeat, this is logical near-sightedness. Yes, under ordinary conditions such an undertaking might seem useful and effective. But in an exhausted republic that is on the verge of collapse, such intervention would aggravate the situation even more and lead to final collapse. One must have a sober understanding of this when taking such steps and take the realities into account.

Today people my age, who are over 60, are bothered by many issues. But I think that the main thing is that our generation has lived through its life for better or worse. But what will happen to our children and grandchildren. Yes, they are in jeopardy. Because of the lack of material support, social shocks, and political instability. And the question of questions in Armenia today is not to serve

the selfish interests of one party or another, one socio-political movement or another, but to unite all healthy forces of society which are capable of bringing the people out of this difficult, I dare say, fateful situation.

It is no secret that in the republic today people frequently speak about the threat of famine. A couple of days ago, when walking down the street, I overheard this conversation: A middle-aged woman was telling another person that her neighbor had left for America to save herself, and she was terrified about what might happen to us. Attitudes like these are very strong. It is simply impossible not to notice this. This is the question of questions. We are losing our gene pool, our people are losing their faith and hope, which no decision and no manifesto will be able to restore.

There are various causes of the tragic situation that has been created. And it would be wrong to look for them only in the policies of the republic today. First of all, this chaos has gripped the entire country. But it has an especially terrifying effect on our republic because the sources of life support for Armenia, especially food products, lie outside its borders—in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and so forth. Under no circumstances can I agree with the viewpoint and statements to the effect that the new powers have inherited a ruined, destroyed country.

It is a different matter that events of recent years have indeed placed the republic in a tragic position. We must be aware that in addition to objective factors there are also subjective ones. I think that playing with the lofty idea of independence for the republic, which certain people and political forces have more or less "adopted," claiming some kind of special right to it—this causes confusion among the people and aggravates the republic's condition, which is already complicated by numerous problems.

I agree with the correct statement of the problem in the declaration, that Armenia's independence is a process conditioned by numerous circumstances of an internal and external nature. But, to be honest, I cannot understand those people who manipulate the idea of independence so easily to serve particular political interests. Let us solve this problem immediately and tomorrow we will be completely independent. These ill-considered statements about accelerating the process of independence will have the gravest consequences for the republic, for each family, and for each Armenian. There are both political and economic ties that have been formed over the decades: It is not a simple matter to break them on the run. When entering into economic cooperation with the republic, countries and enterprises should be clearly aware: Each of us is a political system whether we are included in the all-Union market or not.

We must not forget that in our republic the volume of national income produced is 1.9 billion rubles [R] less than the national income used, and if we had complete independence, each year we would be forced to use

convertible currency to buy almost \$2 billion worth of fuel and energy resources and basic foodstuffs. And this is in a situation in which we import almost all the raw materials needed to produce the majority of products that are exported from the republic.

And another question: Will we be able to sell our uncompetitive products on the world market or not? In a word, there are more than enough problems. And one must not play with the fate of the people in order to satisfy political ambitions.

Next. Today let us at least superficially analyze what has happened in the life of Armenia. They say we are independent but today that is merely an illusion. In essence we have no independence. Parliamentary debates about it do not solve the problem. Nobody can deny that the people's standard of living has dropped sharply and their social and legal protection has decreased.

During past decades in the republic there has been widespread social injustice, bribery, protectionism, corruption, and speculation, which played the main role in the negative orientation of the broad masses of workers with respect to the Communist Party. But have any changes taken place in this area in past months? Almost none. And the attempts on the part of certain individuals to use indiscriminate criticism of the past to mask today's shortcomings and sad conditions and delude public opinion are simply dishonest.

There are many attacks on the Communist Party today, appropriate or not. People criticize it, demand that it be declared illegal, and even sue it. But who are these people? Except for brandishing their weapons and making high-flown speeches from the pulpits that have been granted to them, they have done nothing for the people; they have not done anything really constructive. And yet this republic was built under the leadership of the Communist Party. With shortcomings, yes; with mistakes and distortions, yes. But we cannot deny the immense amount of work that was done in all spheres of life without exception. And what was created is the wealth of our people, which has been inherited by today's powers, and will be passed on to future generations.

The democracy being formed at the present time belongs to the people as well. But I can say with confidence that the Communist Party will do everything possible to avoid creating problems for the new powers. But we note that certain individuals regard this as a sign of weakness. No, the Communist Party is not weak, that is an erroneous opinion, a mistaken interpretation. We have said and will repeat again that the Communist Party has one overriding task—to achieve national harmony, to eliminate confrontation, and to create conditions for bringing the people out of this condition. And these are not simply eloquent words. Incidentally, all the proposals from the Communist Party concerning the formation of

national unity are formally given approval, but not a step is being taken to achieve this harmony.

[AYASTAN] Recently there have been more attempts to desecrate monuments (to Lenin, St. Shaumyan, Al. Myasnikyan, U. Avetisyan). What is your opinion about this?

[Pogosyan] In my opinion, these are attempts to show once again that the forces that consider themselves to be opposition are experience a moral decline, they will stop at nothing to achieve their political goals, and they even urge people to commit vandalism and engage in immoral behavior, taking advantage of their naivete and their incorrect perception of many key political issues. Do Armenians really have the right—regardless of where they may be or what political views they may profess—to defile the memory of Stepan Shaumyan? Shaumyan represents one of the very highest points of sociopolitical thought; his thought makes him a national figure. Of the programs proposed at the beginning of the century for the salvation of the Armenian people, the most far-sighted and the most realistic was the program proposed by Shaumyan. Today certain individuals, even historians, unfortunately, fling to the right and left a phrase to the effect that in 1918, when the Armenian people entered the life-and-death battle against the Turkish Yataghan, Shaumyan, sitting in Baku, "supplied Russia with oil." Do such people consider how it happened that at that fatal moment for the Armenian people, it was in Baku and not in Armenia that many of the most outstanding representatives of the Dashnaks were operating, including such eminent figures of the national movement as Rostom. Why? Were they serving Russia as well?

Imagine what would have happened if the Musavat had been in power instead of the Baku Soviet. What would have happened to Armenia then if the Armenians who went into battle against the Turkish occupation forces had also been attacked from the east by Musavat troops? I will leave the answer to these "historians." Armenians, whether they be Bolsheviks or Dashnaks, fought in Baku and died so that Armenia would not be destroyed, at least on its present territory. And the desecration of the memory of these people, in my opinion, is a quite loathsome and immoral thing.

[AYASTAN] Comrade Pogosyan, the attacks on the Communist Party of Armenia not only are not abating, it would seem that they are becoming fiercer. Under these conditions is it possible to conclude from what you have said that the Communist Party is proceeding toward a confrontation?

[Pogosyan] No. The Communist Party has not moved toward a confrontation and it will not. And in general what good has confrontation ever done under any conditions for any people? Popular wisdom tells us that they do not hand out candy in a fist fight. The wise person is not the one who looks for confrontation but the one who even in an explosive situation is able to find the points in

common and the possibilities of cooperation. I think that on the basis of democracy and full equal rights we must take all possible measures to consolidate our forces and move from words to deeds in this area and work together to think of a process for creating mechanisms for consolidation and cooperation around the cherished national ideal of all segments of society, parties, and organizations.

The Communist Party has declared and does declare that we are not against the forces that are in power or any of their actions that have been dictated by the needs of the people. As for the continuing attacks on the Communist Party, I wish to state with complete certainty that there is no need to make a tragedy out of this. But along with a tolerant attitude toward this, in the name of truth and in the name of correct formation of public opinion, we must resolutely repulse these attacks and tell the people clearly and precisely what goals the authors of these attacks are actually pursuing. This way of wording the question does not mean that the Communist Party is against having itself criticized in general. In reality the Communist Party has made and is making many mistakes and blunders. Let them criticize us, but not pursue the goal of discrediting us.

Georgian Jurists Address Gorbachev To Protest Procurator's Tbilisi Report

91US0409A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
15 Mar 91 p 1

[Open letter to President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev]

[Text] Mr. President!

Having familiarized itself with the memorandum of the procurator to the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Results of the Investigation of the Criminal Proceedings in Respect to Officials and Servicemen of the Internal Forces of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Soviet Army Who Took Part in the Curtailment of the Unscheduled Mass Meeting in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989," the legal community of Georgia expresses its profound indignation and protest against those who concocted this unique sample of unconcealed hypocrisy and subservience.

We are ashamed for our professional colleagues, representatives of the top justice hierarchy, who created this demagogic "treatise" at martinet level. It is surprising how the compilers of the memorandum could have so completely lost the magnificent legacy of legal thought of the founders of Russian classical criminal science—Tagantsev, Sergeyevskiy, Foinitskiy, Koni and others—and have forgotten about the high duty of service of the truth.

This immoral opus is a copy of the notorious report of the deputy chief military prosecutor to the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The investigation has not advanced a single step in study of the tragic

events and ascertainment of the guilt of the organizers and executants of the punitive action in Tbilisi.

And here we ask you, Mr. President, a question: How often are the decisions adopted by parliament the consequence of such legal "findings" and bare-faced lies? And how often do the top officials of the procuracy dare, ignoring the will of the congress, to engage in the concealment of persons who have committed serious crimes against the people?

The memorandum should be categorized not as a document of legal significance but a standard political idiosyncrasy wrought in the spirit of the party machinery and geared to people's lack of knowledgeability and the absence of civic spirit in professionals. But the authors of the memorandum failed to take account of one thing—the public at large has long been aware of such documents in Soviet legal practice, when monstrous illegalities perpetrated by the authorities against the people have been substantiated by underlying political causes.

The memorandum is wholly imbued by a desire to shift the moral and legal responsibility from the organizers of the bloody carnage on 9 April onto the leaders of Georgia's national liberation movement. But no leaders are capable of carrying the people with them and heading a national movement if its ideas have not matured in the heart of the people themselves. The entire course of the subsequent development of events in Georgia, when the cherished dream of the people, who at multiparty elections cast their vote for the forces which headed the national liberation movement in the name of the achievement of the nation's highest goal—restoration of its independent statehood—was realized, testifies to the significance and general nature of this nationwide aspiration.

The statement advances as the principal reason that allegedly brought about the inevitability of the use of military force to break up the peaceful meeting, which resulted in the deaths of totally innocent people, the political situation which had taken shape in Georgia at that time.

"The political situation in the Georgian SSR," the memorandum points out, "was largely being determined by the activity of a number of informal organizations whose program, purpose and activity were contrary to current legislation.

"Having opted for tactics of outpacing the authorities in formulating problems that had accumulated in the republic, the leaders of Georgia's opposition public formations took advantage of spontaneous manifestations of public energy evoked by the processes of democratization occurring in the country, transforming the awakening of national self-awareness into social and political currents of an extremist thrust.

"The active, purposive propaganda of nationalist ideas and the manipulation of the emotions of the masses made it possible to pull into the orbit of unlawful actions

mainly representatives of the intelligentsia, office workers, schoolchildren and practically the whole of the youth, which showed itself in the April events to be an active and numerous force." But surely even this quote is an argument bespeaking the bankruptcy of the current political and legal structures, and also confirmation of the mass nature of the movement? All that occurred at the peaceful meetings of 9 April was the summons of the heart of the people expressing the former's aspirations. How can a national movement crowning the people's age-old aspiration to acquire independence be equated with nationalist, chauvinist manifestations? Let us suppose all this occurred, as the memorandum stubbornly proclaims, was it permissible to resolve the political crisis situation with tanks and the use of military force, combat engineer's spades and war gas? Unfortunately, the former local leadership and the center, which blessed the criminal action, and the entire system of totalitarianism could find no solution other than to deal with the people by barbarous methods.

The procuracy discerns the causes of the serious consequences in the actions of the organizers of the meeting. But we declare once again for all to hear that all of Georgia, longing to achieve real freedom, took to the streets, demonstrating its true wishes. Evaluating the armed forces' operations in breaking up the meeting, however, the procuracy hypocritically cites merely tactical miscalculations, the command's lack of the requisite experience and an inability to foresee the possibility of extreme, crisis situations "inasmuch as such an operation," the memorandum points out, "was being mounted for the first time, and its leaders objectively lacked an opportunity to forecast all versions of the development of the situation."

The procuracy reduces the operations of the military merely to carelessness, finds no specific culprits in the deaths of people at the peaceful meeting, and deflects from criminals of all ranks just retribution. This knowingly distorted legal opinion is staggering in a "work" of the procurator. It is common knowledge that officials are criminally liable for carelessness entailing serious consequences. Cynicism reaches its high point when a colonel general, the leader of the punitive action, not only is not punished or called to account but even in the period of the investigation promoted, being appointed chief of a most prestigious military academy.

It is blasphemous and shameless writing in the memorandum about the leaders of the punitive action's lack of the requisite experience. Were Afghanistan and the slaughter perpetrated in Alma-Ata not an indicator of the availability of such experience? Baku, Vilnius—all these are a bloody continuation of the Tbilisi events. No one has succeeded in concealing the truth by degrees of lying!

A.A. Sobchak, an experienced legal scholar and practitioner, declared at the congress: "The commission was guided in its work by the brief of the congress—

investigate thoroughly and get to the very roots, whatever and whoever this might concern." But, alas, this did not happen, for as a result of the procuracy's unscrupulous disregard for the commission's incontestable material traces are skillfully covered up and the criminals cynically whitewashed.

In the wake of A. Sobchak, you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, observed that "the Tbilisi events are our common pain. We feel the tragic nature of those events and express sympathy to the Georgian people in connection with what happened..." It is now necessary "to think harder about the lessons we should learn and what we should do to ensure that such events never recur." The congress condemned the violence. But all this was just on paper. Lessons have not been learned. Lithuania was followed by Latvia.

A state based on the rule of law will obviously never exist under conditions of a socialist regime! Tumultuous, indignant Moscow is to come. Will there be shooting once again?

We believe that the memorandum of the procurator to the Supreme Soviet, which is an insult to the Georgian people, as to the civilized world, will be rejected, and the culprits punished. There is no other way!

[Signed] Z. Ratiani, chairman of the Independent Union of Lawyers of the Republic of Georgia; S. Dzhorbenadze, corresponding member of the Georgian Academy of Sciences and doctor of legal sciences; T. Shavgulidze, director of the Georgian Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law and doctor of legal sciences; G. Tkeshebadze, head of the Tbilisi State University Criminal Law and Criminology Department and doctor of legal sciences.

Role of Abkhazia Viewed in Georgian Independence

Gamsakhurdia Asks for Support of Independence

91US0419A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 13, 30 Mar 91 p 5

[Appeal by Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, to the Abkhaz people, published under the general heading: "The Positions Have Been Marked Out..."]

[Text] Today Georgia is definitely one of our "hot spots" and has become a common affliction for us... Each evening on the "Vremya" program information from South Ossetia is presented like a report from the front line. Our newspaper has also described this to readers. And now, another area of misfortune has started to smolder!...

Abkhazia... Refraining from commentary, we bring to your attention a reprint from the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ABKHAZIYA: an appeal from the chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, Z.K. Gamsakhurdia, to the Abkhaz people, and the response...

Appeal to the Abkhaz People

Dear Fellow Countrymen. The brotherhood of the Abkhaz and Georgians dates back to time beyond memory. Our common origin in Colchis, the genetic relationship between our peoples and our languages, our common history, and the common nature of our culture today oblige us to consider seriously the future destinies of our peoples. We have always lived on the same land, sharing each other's grief and joy. For centuries we have had a common domain, prayed in the same temples, and fought common enemies on the same field of battle.

Even today the representatives of the very ancient Abkhaz families do not distinguish between the Abkhaz and the Georgians. The Abkhaz princes of Shervashidze called themselves not only Abkhaz but also Georgian princes, and the Georgian language was on the same footing as Abkhaz, and was their native tongue, as it was for the Abkhaz writers of the time. We are bound together by the culture of the "Vepkhvistkaosani" and the very ancient Georgian temples, decorated with Georgian inscriptions, that today still stand in Abkhazia, impressing those who behold them with their beauty. We are joined by the Tsarina Tamar bridge on the Besleti River near Sukhumi, which still retains its ancient Georgian inscription. Bedia and Mokvi, Lykhny, Bichvinta, and many other memorials bear witness to our brotherhood, our unity.

In the consciousness of the Georgians the Abkhaz have always been a symbol of lofty, chivalrous nobility. This can be seen from the poem by Akakiy Tsereteli "The Preceptor" and many other masterpieces of Georgian literature. We take pride in the fact that it was the Georgian writer Konstantine Gamsakhurdia who made Abkhaz culture and everyday life and the prowess and strong spirit of the Abkhaz people known to the world in his novel "The Stolen Moon." The Georgian scholars Nikolay Marr, Arnold Chikobava, and Ketevan Lomtadze played a decisive role in the foundation of Abkhaz studies and the systematization of the Abkhaz language. And the Georgian historians Ivane Dzhavakishvili, Simon Dzhnashia, Niko Berdzenishvili and others studied the key problems in the history of Abkhazia. For the Abkhaz have always played a major role in strengthening our common domain and in the development of culture.

We have held out under the onslaught of many empires, and neither Romans nor Byzantines, nor Arabs nor Turks could shake our brotherhood and friendship, but then in the 19th and 20th centuries we came face to face with the most perfidious and the most cruel of empires—the Russian empire, which brought misfortunes without number to our peoples. The Russian empire sent most of the Abkhaz people into exile and abolished the principality of the Abkhaz and the realm of the Georgians, and it set itself the goal of totally assimilating and destroying our peoples. But after it had been convinced that it would not accomplish its designs with bloody repressions and genocides alone, it resorted to that tried and

true means used by any empire—"divide and rule"—and using all its strength tried to set the Abkhaz and the Georgian peoples one against the other. Notwithstanding, as Nestor Lakoba himself remarked, even tsarism could not sow dissension between the Abkhaz and the Georgians. But this present communist empire has unfortunately achieved with the help of its secret services what according to its plans is to be a Balkanization and Lebanonization of the Caucasus, thus preserving its own position and hegemony in the Caucasus.

We respect the national and cultural rights of the Abkhaz people—your statehood, your language and culture, the Abkhaz schools and theater—and we are making every effort to resolve controversial issues by way of negotiation. Unfortunately, however, the official leadership of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic is failing to show the proper readiness to talk and has set out on the road of confrontation with us, and is displaying separatist tendencies and threatening the peace on the territory of Abkhazia.

Today a great noise has been raised in connection with our appointment of a prefect in Gali. It is common knowledge that in accordance with our laws the leadership in an autonomous republic should be represented by the candidates for the post of prefect, and we confirm them. In line with the elucidation with respect to this law, if the leadership of an autonomous republic does not represent such nominee, the Georgian Supreme Soviet Presidium has the right to appoint a prefect itself. Despite our repeated requests, Mr. Ardzinba has not come to Tbilisi and has not attended the sessions of the Presidium, of which he is a member, and has not put forward any candidate for the post of prefect. We therefore appointed a prefect for Gali. At this time we have set a time period for the submission of other candidates, and again Mr. Ardzinba is displaying tardiness.

The reason why he has declared a boycott on our parliament and our policy with respect to the prefecture is that he wants to preserve in Abkhazia the outdated communist system and the communist system of management. We, however, must remind him that the communist system and the Soviet empire are doomed, and anyone who tries to turn back the wheel of history does so in vain. Sooner or later the enslaved peoples of the Soviet Union will throw off the yoke of communist dictatorship, and then Ardzinba and similar figures will be adjudged traitors to their peoples.

Today the whole world is condemning Gorbachev's policy of repression with respect to the enslaved peoples, and the barbaric bloodshed in Lithuania and Latvia. So let no one place his hopes in Soviet tanks.

The world community is also condemning attempts by the center to create Interfronts and "salvation committees" for the purpose of overthrowing governments elected by the people. And at this time an Interfront has been set up in Abkhazia, in a desire to repeat the Baltic model. And Ardzinba is constantly calling for the army

of the empire, which may result in bloodshed in Abkhazia. He has already achieved the insertion of Internal Troops into Babushara, but he must understand that the world is condemning his conduct just as it condemned the Baltic "salvation committee." Ardzinba is trying to draw the Abkhaz people into a dangerous adventure that will bring it only shame and unhappiness. Participation in the all-Union referendum on 17 March, which has as its aim kindling interethnic dissension in Abkhazia, setting Georgians, Abkhaz, Armenians, Russians and the representatives of other nationalities one against the other, and provoking bloodshed, also threatens danger for the population of Abkhazia. We therefore appeal to you: Do not succumb to the intrigues of the procommunists and the agents and provocateurs of our historical enemies; boycott the Soviet referendum and take part in the Republic of Georgia referendum on 31 March, which will be linked to the restoration of Georgia's independence. An independent Georgia will give much more than the modernization of the Soviet empire, whose goal is to assimilate all numerically small peoples and Russify them. A truly independent Abkhazia will exist in the original Georgia, an Abkhazia with real self-government, as it was for the many centuries when the domain of the Abkhaz and the Georgians was in existence.

Long live our historical brotherhood, unity, and independence!

Let love and truth rule over us!

With love and respect,

[signed] Z. Gamsakhurdia.

**Abkhaz ASSR Supreme Soviet Chairman
Responds**

*91US0419B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 13, 30 Mar 91 p 4*

[Response to Z.K. Gamsakhurdia appeal by V.G. Ardzinba, chairman of the Abkhaz ASSR Supreme Soviet, published under the general heading: "The Positions Have Been Marked Out..."]

[Text]

To the Chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, Z.K. Gamsakhurdia

Esteemed Zviad Konstantinovich. I fully and totally agree with that part of your appeal to the Abkhaz people that talks about the many centuries of good-neighbor relations between the Abkhaz and Georgian peoples and the close link between their original cultures and the closeness of their national traditions. I am absolutely sure that our peoples will in the future also resolve hand in hand the complex problems of their national development. As chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia I am doing everything I should to ensure that peace and agreement reign between Abkhazia and Georgia, based on firm treaty relations between equal republics, and I am ready to continue to do so in the future. Peace and

agreement can be achieved by giving due consideration to the interests of each people. They are needed today not only by the Abkhaz and Georgians, but also by the Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and representatives of the other nationalities living in the autonomous republic. We consider them full citizens of Abkhazia and we advocate the free development of all national cultures.

At the same time we would not be realists if we failed to take into account the situation prevailing in our republics.

The parliament of Georgia has declared that its goal is to create an autonomous and independent state outside the USSR. At the same time, the Supreme Soviet has not faced the issue of the immediate withdrawal of the republic from the Soviet Federation, but has announced a "transitional period." From which it follows that as before, Georgia and Abkhazia remain part of the USSR. But despite this, in your most recent statements you have claimed that the laws of the USSR have no force on the territory of Georgia. But we consider Abkhazia an integral part of the USSR, to which its jurisdiction does extend.

It is common knowledge that the USSR Supreme Soviet has passed a number of fundamental laws that significantly extend the powers of the autonomous republics. Moreover, in accordance with the recently published draft Union treaty, all republics—Union and autonomous—have equal rights in the new federation. Meanwhile, the parliament of the Republic of Georgia has passed legislative enactments that infringe even on today's constitutional rights of Abkhazia. Thus, your assurances of respect for the national and cultural rights of the Abkhaz people and our statehood again remain just words.

The meaning of the latest laws of the Republic of Georgia may be described as an unconcealed desire in fact to equate Abkhazia, which is today a state, with an ordinary administrative-territorial unit. One glaring example of this is the law: "On Local Government During the Transitional Period." According to the Constitution of the Abkhaz ASSR, any change in the political system is the exclusive prerogative of the autonomous republic in the person of its highest organs. And extension of the force of the above-mentioned law and its implementation in the form of appointing the prefect of the Gali region is the start of the elimination of the organs of Soviet power, which according to our Constitution, form the basis of the political system. The issue of the structure of the organs of state power can be decided only by its people and by no one else.

And it is probable that if we announce that we are trying to build a democratic society guided by the rule of law, it would be necessary to resolve the question of making the appropriate changes in the Constitution of Abkhazia, and then of introducing a new form of self-government in the cities and rayons.

Constitutional power in Abkhazia is exercised and will continue to be exercised through the soviets of people's deputies. And except for the highest organ of state power in the person of the Abkhaz ASSR Supreme Soviet, no one has been given the right to decided issues pertaining to their abolition. But even from the standpoint of elementary respect for the Constitution of Abkhazia, the appointment of prefects on its territory should be preceded by the adoption of a law of the autonomous republic establishing a new form of local self-government.

It should also be noted that the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium has also been in breach of the position with respect to that part of the law pertaining to mandatory agreement of each nomination for the post of prefect by the Abkhaz ASSR Council of Ministers and its submission to the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic. The so-called new "elucidation" of which you talk in your appeal in no way stems from the law: "On Local Self-Government During the Transitional Period" but is essentially a change in the law and an attempt to provide antedated justification for your own unlawful actions. In the future, evidently, we must expect the emergence of yet another new "elucidation" that will totally exclude the need for any kind of agreement with the highest organs of state power and management in Abkhazia in the matter of appointing prefects.

The appointment of a prefect for Galiyskiy Rayon cannot be understood in any other way except as failure by the highest organ of state power in the Republic of Georgia to observe the elementary legal ethic. Removing one of the regions of the autonomous republic from the jurisdiction of the Abkhaz ASSR Supreme Soviet is the first step on the road to elimination of the constitutional structures, and then the statehood of Abkhazia. And it is not necessary to be a great politician to understand from where the true threat to the state order in Abkhazia emanates, and who has today assumed the role of a "salvation committee." This is why your accusation against the "Union" bloc, united on voluntary initiatives by Abkhaz, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, and many others in their desire to preserve our state by transforming it from what is actually a unitary state into a federation of states, is both absurd and without foundation. Time alone will show the justice of their or your political convictions and the viability of the Soviet political system. The building of a democratic rule-of-law state on a multiparty basis, for which you counsel, means at a minimum equal rights and conditions for the activities of the various parties. The voice of each person and citizen and his political opinions should be considered and respected. And the communists, along with other parties, make up part of the political system, not only here but also in many countries of the world. Does it not seem to you that the constant search for agents and enemies of the people is reviving the sorry times of persecution of all who think differently, which culminates in the establishment of open dictatorship? We are

not looking for enemies in Abkhazia. Arrests and political anathema cannot serve as a basis for dialogue with opponents, or the search for ways for the people to flourish.

Under the conditions of gross diktat of political decisions and actions, which is kindling interethnic dissension in Abkhazia, we are taking all necessary steps to safeguard the interests of its multinational population, and we shall continue to do so.

The sermonizing tone of your appeals does not surprise us, but today it is hardly possible to frighten the people with threatening statements. Participation by the citizens of Abkhazia in resolving the question of the future of the Soviet Union is their inalienable right, guaranteed by the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is not difficult to see the direct link between your assessment of the all-Union referendum and the aggressive campaign to boycott it. People are threatened with physical reprisals and being fired from their jobs and the burning of their houses; it is that, not the participation of the population of Abkhazia in the referendum, that may again kindle the flame of interethnic conflict that was put out with so much difficulty. The attempt to influence people with such methods, and the reluctance to take any other opinion into account give grounds for doubting that true independence for Abkhazia will be achieved in an independent Georgia. It is not self-government as an administrative-territorial unit of Georgia, as you suggest, for which our people are striving. They are striving for preservation of the Union of Sovereign States in which Abkhazia will be one among equal and sovereign republics.

It has so happened that you and I have become the leaders of the republics, and our mutual relations will largely determine the fate of our peoples. And I think that it behooves us build our relationship in the spirit of tolerance and moderation in both word and deed.

[signed] V.G. Ardzinba, chairman of the Abkhaz ASSR Supreme Soviet.

Central Asia

Kazakh People's Deputy Scores Democrats, Explains 'Soyuz' Group

Petrushenko Interview, Correspondent's Commentary

91US0407A Alma-Ata LENINSKAYA SMENA
in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Colonel N.S. Petrushenko, people's deputy of the USSR, taped by A. Kratenko, correspondent of LENINSKAYA SMENA, in Ust-Kamenogorsk; date not given: "We Will Stand the Democrats on Their Heads"]

[Text] [Kratenko] Nikolay Semenovich, your forecast of the situation in the country in the immediate future? Do you know how to extricate the country from the economic crisis?

[Petrushenko] The main thing today is to preserve the state.

[Kratenko] As in the Baltic?

[Petrushenko] Let us call things by their proper names. Haven't you understood yet or don't you want to understand? If a person wishes to understand, he will see for himself that it was not the communists and not the military who were threatening Prunskiene. And it was not the communists who sentenced Nevzorov to capital punishment. In my opinion... the future is bleak. No economic reform is successful without elementary discipline. As for what to do next—others will think of something.

Why this aggravation in the country? Because a change of the constitutional system is under way. Some people want to preserve it, others, to overthrow it.

[Kratenko] On the one hand the communists and, with them, the Army....

[Petrushenko] So how would you have had it? To whom did the Army swear loyalty?

[Kratenko] Precisely.

[Petrushenko] So how would you have had it? Ah, you are on the other side of the barricades? In that case do not take offense, old boy.

[Kratenko] I am a journalist, I want to understand both sides.

[Petrushenko] No, from the very outset you opted for the other side of the barricades. Very well, go ahead. Force against force. Our side or yours will prevail. One of the two. You are strangling the current system. Does that mean that you may strangle us, but not we, you?

There are, I know, rogues both among the communists and among the democrats. There are, it would seem, far more of them percentage-wise among the democrats. Or do you disagree?

[Kratenko] I do not know.... I do not know, and I am altogether intimidated by your bellicose tone.

[Petrushenko] It is not just I today who speaks in this tone.

[Kratenko] Tanks are something else.

[Petrushenko] What do you mean, tanks? How many people have died from tanks? Not one. Or don't you wish to know this? I speak the truth as I see it. It is quite possible that I am wrong and that the truth lies somewhere mid-way between MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI

and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. When was the last time you looked at SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, incidentally?

[Kratenko] Quite some time ago.

[Petrushenko] That's wrong. That's wrong, old boy.... The devil only knows, I'm afraid civil war cannot be avoided.

[Kratenko] Is it really too late to seek a compromise?

[Petrushenko] What's the point? Some people are simply bargaining away the country, selling it for dollars. Can we reach consensus with them? The picture is clear. There are friends, and there are enemies.... And what about the people? The people need order, they need to work. I have just returned from Serebryansk and I met there virtually no one who was against my ideas. All were in favor. Except for two or three persons. So choose which side of the barricades you are on. God grant, of course, that it might all turn out all right, God grant....

[Kratenko] Are there many military men in the "Soyuz" group of deputies?

[Petrushenko] Not many. Of large caliber, though. General Makashov. Army General Varennikov, commander in chief of ground forces. Colonels Petrushenko and Alksnis. In a group of 550 USSR people's deputies.

[Kratenko] The immediate aims and tasks of the "Soyuz" group?

[Petrushenko] The referendum. This was our idea. I believe that the referendum is the mechanism with which the most controversial questions should be decided.

[Kratenko] And is the wording of the question in the referendum to your liking?

[Petrushenko] An arguable matter. The wording was inserted by the president. I do not like it either. But the main thing is something else—how it is being presented by the media. What is the official newspaper IZVESTIYA working for? The collapse of the USSR, not creation.... Immediate plans?

[Kratenko] Yes.

[Petrushenko] We will stand them on their heads. How? Representatives of our group have already set to work in Moscow. They have begun with meetings with the work force. They are telling the truth there about the fascism in the Baltic.

[Kratenko] What are you after?

[Petrushenko] Sooner or later the people will wake up and see who their friend is, and who, as a Moscow satirist joked, Gavril. The main task now is countering the disintegration of the statehood of the USSR. When, beneath the multiparty banner, the routine disruption of the state is occurring.

[Kratenko] Whom does this benefit?

[Petrushenko] Only by having disrupted the state may a coup be accomplished. War will break out, it is already happening where the question of property is being decided in haste. The 500 days program would be such a detonator, were it implemented.

[Kratenko] What do you perceive as the correlation of political forces in the country?

[Petrushenko] The initiative is today with the democrats, but with the "Soyuz" group is the truth. The democrats are seizing the initiative, they have acquired "pull" and learned the forms and methods of mass-meeting democracy. They are continually on the move, on the offensive. Their latest proposals: a political strike and war on the president. The media are on their side. The "Soyuz" group of deputies is only just starting to walk, unfortunately.

Anchor's Comment

The democratic press does not spare Colonel Petrushenko: Sometimes he is called a reactionary, sometimes, a "hawk." It would be strange to expect from him also loyalty to his opponents: He is a colonel, after all, not a missionary.

Nikolay Semenovitch impressed me by his complete candor. He gives, let us suppose, his autograph to an IZVESTIYA correspondent and adds a flourish to his signature. "What is that?" "A tank," he smiles. And, indeed: A month had not elapsed before tanks were headed toward the Vilnius television tower. And they still say that no man is a prophet in his own country.

We political scientists like to pigeon-hole everything: who is more to the left, who, more to the right. We can boldly stick on Nikolay Semenovitch the label "right," and he would calmly agree: "Yes, I am a right-winger. And there are guilty ones also."

Petrushenko's position could strike many people as a provocation, a kind of political "yellow jacket." Indeed, how can continued testing at the Semipalatinsk range be defended if THE PEOPLE are against this? How to "stand the democrats on their head" if freedom of speech and political self-expression are, perhaps, the sole real achievement of recent years? Without this the "new thinking" would have a hollow ring: We would not have acquired a human face in the eyes of Western civilization.

However, there shows through from behind the colonel's crude shock tactics not recklessness and not a desire to "play with fire" but a profound inner logic.

For the colonel is in himself not a politician but merely a consistent spokesman for the interests of the "state within a state"—the military-industrial complex—which lives and prospers (almost 100 billion rubles ((R)) from

the Union budget for the present year and, considering the hidden expenditure embedded in other items, up to R135 billion).

For this reason Nikolay Semenovitch, like his colleague Viktor Alksnis, fears no confrontations and aggravations and can allow himself to jokingly threaten and threateningly joke. Behind him is force, behind him is might and, consequently, real power, which have for four decades maintained order in the intensive-regime socialist camp.

The colonel's position is not to be wondered at. The basis there is purely economic interest: The "basis" is the colossal industrial potential built and developed under the conditions of supercentralized, directive administration. The market and conversion are severe trials for the military-industrial complex. The breakup of centralized economic relations and transition to horizontal, market relations are almost a knockout blow. "Prevent the disintegration of the state!" when translated into the language of economics reads: "Prevent the disintegration of the military-industrial complex, thanks to which we are today still considered a superpower."

The force behind the colonels may be judged by the resignation of one of the most popular and competent politicians in the country, and the world also—Eduard Shevardnadze. Mikhail Sergeyevich said that this step of the celebrated minister came as a surprise to him. But the celebrated colonels were not surprised in the least.

Many democrats have a quivering presentiment of dictatorship. Petrushenko and Alksnis are doggedly attempting to persuade us that there is no alternative: either chaos and civil war or a "state of emergency." Let us, however, not panic and not give in to cheap alarm. The situation in our republic confirms that there is a "golden mean" between the extremes of anarchy and authoritarianism, that there is a way toward a new economy, making its way along which will be not tank turrets but the free will of people who have made their choice.

Reaction to Interview

91US0407B Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 2

[TRUD correspondent O. Kvyatkovskiy report: "Colonel N. Petrushenko: 'Standing the Democrats on Their Heads!'"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—"We will stand the democrats on their heads," Colonel N. Petrushenko, people's deputy of the USSR, declared in an interview with a correspondent of a Kazakh youth paper.

The interview with the colonel-deputy published by LENINSKAYA SMENA has evoked an ambivalent reaction in the republic. The youth paper presented Colonel Petrushenko's speech unadorned, preserving the style, thrust, and "unbrushed nature" of the thoughts and feelings.

"Force against force," N. Petrushenko said, *inter alia*, "either our side or your side will prevail. One of the two. But you are strangling the current system. Does this mean that you may strangle us, but not we, you?"

He was reacting in such words to the suspicion born in the interviewee that the journalist was "on the other side of the barricades." For verification the colonel asked the journalist whether it had been a long time since he had last looked at SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. And learning that it had been "quite some time," made the following forecast:

"That's wrong, old boy.... The devil only knows, I'm afraid civil war cannot be avoided."

But coming in for it most from the colonel were, of course, the democrats, who "have acquired 'pull' and learned the forms and methods of mass-meeting democracy." For which reason the colonel answered like a shot a question concerning his immediate plans:

"We will stand the democrats on their heads. Sooner or later, the people will wake up and see who their friend is, and who, as a Moscow satirist joked, Gavril." "

LENINSKAYA SMENA provides the lethal interview with Petrushenko with a comment, which emphasizes that the way to a new economy is pointed, for all that, not by tank turrets but the free will of people who have made their choice. As far as Kazakhstan, where Petrushenko has his "nest," is concerned, this is precisely the case. President N. Nazarbayev, who enjoys the complete confidence of the citizens of the republic, and his "team" are steering the Kazakh ship along a "middle" channel between anarchy and autarky. N. Petrushenko's position will not harm this policy, of course. But, all the same, the interview in the youth paper has enabled people of Kazakhstan to get to know even better "who's who" in their corps of deputies....

Chairman Outlines Zheltoksan Party Program

91US0401A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 91 p 5

[Interview with Khasen Kozhakhmetov, chairman of the Zheltoksan National-Democratic Party, by Leo Vaydman under the rubric: "Alternative: December Should Not Necessarily Have Happened"]

[Text] [Following four paragraphs are enclosed in a box at the beginning of the article] "Perestroyka will win if the center gives up its obsolete colonial policy"—this is the point of view of the Zheltoksan Party.

KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA continues to publish materials about civil movements, public organizations, and political parties that have emerged in the republic during the last year-and-a-half or two as a result of the fast development of the processes of democratization in the republic and the principle of political tolerance

proclaimed by the 19th CPSU Conference, which are now affirmed by the constitution.

In one of the first articles under the "Alternative" rubric (13 Nov. 1990), the editors explained its purpose in detail: The readers have a right to know what the trends in the development of the republic's sociopolitical life are; what various civic movements, politicized associations, or political parties (or those that considers themselves such) are about; what is their ideological direction, their tactics for practical action, and their final goal. The information that is presented in the "Alternative" will always come directly from the leadership of these movements and associations. The editors only ask the questions on the topics the newspaper is interested in, without commenting on the answers or imposing the paper's own point of view on the reader; the newspaper's credo is the basic principle of political culture—to respect the opinion of others while standing by its own convictions. Following this logic, KAZAKHSTAN-SKAYA PRAVDA today publishes an interview with Khasen Kozhakhmetov, chairman of the Zheltoksan National-Democratic Party. His views of the republic's sociopolitical life are disputable, unexpected, and controversial; they may cause an acute rejection by opponents of the National-Democratic Party's views. Let us, however, "respect the opinion of others while standing by our own convictions" not only in words, but in deed.

This is the meaning of pluralism.[end box]

[Vaydman] Our political scientists cannot agree on this topic, so it is better to address this question to you since you know the subject matter from within. What are the reasons for the emergence of Zheltoksan? Some consider it a national-democratic movement, others a politicized association. Although it is not the definition that matters, of course, but the substance of things or phenomena.

[Kozhakhmetov] We can call it both democratization and glasnost, or we can attribute it to the drastically changed state of public consciousness that can no longer be dismissed. However, some of the participants in the December events have already had their terms reduced, although it is still not a rehabilitation and we—those who were arrested—had the "nationalist" label attached to us for years afterwards. I was released on 7 March, 1989. The former prisoners remained in a very difficult situation, though. Many administrators were afraid to hire them, dragging out the paperwork forever. At the same time, local precinct militia kept threatening: Unless the "Decembrists" found work soon, they would be punished, because the article under which they were convicted was an especially dangerous one ("Organization of and participation in mass disturbances"), and our lives were to be strictly controlled from there on.

This is the way we lived.

In May 1988 director K. Abenov of the Kazakhfilm [Kazakh State Film Studio] invited several people connected with the well-known events on Brezhnev Square:

He was going to make a feature movie and he needed a consultation. This is when an absolutely unexpected idea emerged: to unite in one organization so that we could defend our rights. The organization was called Zheltoksan, which means "December."

Our program was very short but clear: to demand the release and rehabilitation of the people unjustly convicted because of the December events; to present a fair political appraisal of the events—after all, we knew why we went to that square; and to punish those responsible for the repressions.

Thus Zheltoksan became the first national political organization in Kazakhstan. Then, in the summer of 1989, the emergence of Zheltoksan worried many high-level officials in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the KGB, and the Communist Party Central Committee. But soon, at the initiative of writer Safuan Shaymerdenov and other activists, a public commission was created under the auspices of the Kazakhstan Writers Union; later, through the efforts and persistence of poet M. Shakhnov, it was transformed into the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet commission charged with investigating the December events. We helped them—collecting facts and witness testimony, and statements from citizens. We held meetings and conducted our first rallies, so frightening for the partocracy. Our political actions always received active support; people were sympathetic towards the "Decembrists."

Since February 1990 the Zheltoksan organization has expanded and clarified its program. The issues initially brought up at our rallies were related to Kazakhstan's political sovereignty, the critical ecological situation, and other issues of public concern. At its founding congress on 20 May, 1990, Zheltoksan declared itself a national-democratic party. Now its political program includes the struggle against the legacy of colonialism, for an independent law-based democratic Kazakhstan state that permits multiple parties and the pluralism of opinions.

We intend to strive for the achievement of our goals in a democratic, nonviolent way. At the same time, our strategy and tactics will depend on the actions of the government currently in power, and the political regime. If the Communist Party decides to critically rethink its 70 years of "activities," becomes less conservative, gives up its monopoly on power and the communist dictatorship, and stops being an obstacle to the democratization and reform, the Zheltoksan National-Democratic Party—as well as, I think, other civic movements—will be implementing its program in a parliamentary, democratic way.

This was the situation in which the National-Democratic Party was born. But the causes lay deeper. The essence of this issue is the national self-consciousness and the dignity of the Kazakh people, the attitude towards its historic past, traditions, culture, and language, and towards its future. It is not just about that December.

There could be a May, or a September. Social life has also determined social consciousness. The occasion and the cause. This is the way I would answer your question.

The work of the commission headed by USSR People's Deputy Mukhtar Shakhmanov has brought to light a multitude of outrageous facts concerning violations of the law and elementary human rights by law enforcement organs during the December events and the mass repressions that followed. However, their political evaluation and their significance for Kazakhstan is still being hushed up. Political scientists, sociologists, and historians still have to face the job of interpreting the lessons of December 1986. And first and foremost, the causes of the acute national crisis and its consequences. That the underlying cause for the current opposition was the centuries-long colonial, plundering policy of tsarist Russia toward Kazakhstan, the genocide against the Kazakh people, and the policy of its total Russification which continued under Soviet power. That is why in the USSR the first political action against Moscow's diktat took place in long-suffering Kazakhstan.

December 1986 not only awakened the national self-consciousness of the Kazakh people, but also exerted a strong influence on the peoples of the Baltics, the Caucasus, and of Eastern Europe; it made Moscow stop, think, and revise its national policy—both external and internal. As a result, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan and the East European countries, which in turn led to a reduction in the stand-off between the military blocs and a reduction in the danger of a worldwide nuclear catastrophe.

[Vaydman] But there is another version that is different from yours and it is, by the way, very widespread. It says that the December events were a splash of long-festering nationalism which finally found a convenient excuse to come into the open. Therefore, there should be no democratization, no "flirting with the masses," and so on.

[Kozhakhmetov] Yes, that is true. We often hear from the supporters of the "iron hand" that the emergence of various "informals" and the aggravation of the national question was provoked by Gorbachev's perestroika. These people should know that in a country like the USSR the national question was always a matter of concern to those citizens who understood where the national policy was leading their people.

I will give you an example from my own life. In 1969 I was drafted into the Army, into the construction battalions. There I encountered the most hard-core racial and national discrimination. Most soldiers in our unit were from the RSFSR and had elementary school educations. Although by then I had graduated from high school and had three years of music school as well, they continuously tried to humiliate me by calling me all kinds of insulting names. And the officers just watched approvingly...

After this "university" I started to observe inter-ethnic relations more closely, to analyze them, to compare, and to search for a cause of the contradictions. Thus between 1972 and 1977 I wrote a series of articles, in which I discussed Moscow's ethnic policy, and the discrimination toward the smaller peoples. (These articles include: "A Union or a Colony," "Who Needs the Assimilation of the Peoples," "The Truth About Civic Freedoms in the USSR," and others). In a preliminary stage of creating the Zhas Kazak organization, I prepared its program, rules, and other documents. However, in April 1977 I was arrested and sentenced to two years in a labor camp for "different-mindedness." So, you see, the ethnic problem existed during the period of "stagnation;" it emerged long before President Gorbachev's reform activities.

The second time I was convicted for my participation in the December events, and sentenced to four years. During the trial we were called nationalists. But it was not we who went to torch the houses of people of other nationalities; we went to the Central Committee building with our political demands. The then leadership of the republic had set the workers against us, and by its own actions artificially created an inter-ethnic conflict.

After the trial, when I was already in prison, I again developed a plan to create an underground political organization immediately after my release. But perestroika has given us an opportunity to accomplish this not clandestinely, but in an open, democratic way. As you can see, we are not doing anything criminal or unconstitutional.

Now that popular fronts, civic movements and public organizations, and political parties are emerging in all the regions of the Soviet Union, it is impossible to isolate Kazakhstan from the republics and the country and to stop the democratic development. Especially considering that there are enough reasons to initiate civic actions in Kazakhstan: We have many unresolved problems in both inter-ethnic and social issues, while the government is in no hurry to resolve these accumulated problems or to implement democratic reforms.

[Vaydman] Why, of all the variations, did you decide to create a National-Democratic Party?

[Kozhakhmetov] We have been told for a long time that internationalism is good and nationalism is bad, if not outright criminal. The authorities deliberately intermixed the nationalities, turning them into a faceless mass of cosmopolitans with no sense of Motherland and no sacred notions except how to stay fed. It was easier for the authorities to rule such masses. Or, when they needed it, to set them off against each other, while they remained judge and juror. In a normal, sovereign state it is mostly the native people that takes responsibility for the country. For instance, in France it is the French, in Germany—the Germans. In Kazakhstan everybody is a master. But everybody means nobody. It has been that way for a long time, and now we see where it got us. Tens

of lakes and rivers are dead; even the Aral Sea has dried up; the soil is unusable because of chemicals. The environmental pollution continues. If we continue to run our economy this way, I do not know what our Kazakhstan will be like in 30 years. Everybody wants to be its master, but for some reason it is only the Kazakhs who participate in the work to save the Aral and the Balkhash, and in the rallies of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement. It is understandable. If an ecological catastrophe befalls us, other people will pick up their suitcases and go wherever they want; it is the Kazakhs who will be left holding the bag. They have no place to go from their homeland. In my opinion, it is the Kazakhs who should spearhead the ecological movements and initiate some others. They are responsible for Kazakhstan, and other people should support them and help them.

The resolution of the national issues in Kazakhstan is an especially acute problem. Moscow was not able to solve it in 73 years of Soviet power; on the contrary, it made it worse. I suspect that this is a deliberate policy which benefits it. But for us Kazakhs the republic is, first of all, our house. And we want everything to go well in this house. Unfortunately, though, we cannot make any decisions in our own house. Everything is decided by the center. It decides in ways that are good for it, and it has turned Kazakhstan into a laboratory for its experiments. It is not possible, however, to solve economic problems without a correct resolution of an ethnic issue.

Therefore representatives of all ethnic groups that live in Kazakhstan should support our idea for an independent Kazakhstan. Then nobody will stand in our way while we get our house in order and resolve both ethnic and social issues humanely and in the interests of all peoples.

Zheltoksan will accept as a member any citizen who sincerely understands the disastrous situation of the Kazakh people and who intends to work for the national rebirth—regardless of ethnic group; who, as a democrat and humanist, shares our dreams and wants to support us. He may bring up the problem of his people at our meetings and ask for our support. The Zheltoksan National-Democratic Party does not limit itself to the problems of the Kazakh People; it is concerned with the fate of all peoples who populate Kazakhstan.

We Kazakhs, who ourselves have experienced a centuries-long colonial yoke and merciless discrimination, want to build our national policy not on the basis of experimental assimilation, as the colonizing ethnic groups have done, but by helping every ethnic group, and especially the small peoples, retain their character. This is the meaning of the name of our party—national-democratic.

[Vaydman] In that case, where does Zheltoksan stand in regard to perestroika-originated changes? You are critical in your appraisal of many situations. But the National-Democratic Party does not take responsibility for the republic's economic condition. What are the prospects for your relations with the ruling party?

[Kozhakhmetov] National-democrats have, of course, a positive attitude towards the reforms taking place in our country. Although their "Kazakh version" leaves many people puzzled. Having proclaimed perestroika, Moscow still uses the methods of imperial diktat towards the sovereign republic: It sends its governor to Kazakhstan without the consent of its people; having denounced Stalinism, it then brutally cracks down on the participants in the December events. Our party supports glasnost, democratization, and the market economy. But the only way Moscow can avoid a crisis is by renouncing its obsolete colonial policy.

As to our relationship with the ruling party...

Although Article 6 of the constitution has been abolished, this is not felt here in Kazakhstan. The same "deserving and tested" cadres of the stagnation era are still at the helm of power. Only now they advocate perestroika; but they have no intention of changing their work methods. They possess an amazing capacity to stick to their chairs. Their favorite work style is wait and see. Although advocating perestroika in words, in deed the Communist Party does not at all want the republic to develop democracy, pluralism, and a multi-party environment. Using its monopoly on the mass media, the Communist Party criticizes public organizations in any way possible, while presenting itself as the only political force that cares about the people's well-being.

The government is also against public movements, and keeps coming up with antidemocratic laws, resolutions to ban rallies, assemblies, and so on. In this I think it has first place in the country.

As I have already said, I have been on trial twice for political activities, and I have been rehabilitated twice. But recently 50 rubles [R] were attached from my salary! It turned out that I. Oberemko, people's judge of Alma-Ata Sovetskiy Rayon, without sending me a summons or a notification, sentenced me in absentia to a R50 fine. This was for going to the Supreme Soviet building on 15 November and passing to session participants an appeal, signed by USSR and Kazakh SSR deputies, demanding that the decision of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on bringing charges against those responsible for the December events be carried out.

The Sovetskiy Rayon Court punished me again for going to the Supreme Soviet on 20 November, to receive a reply to our appeal. So much for perestroika and democracy! Truly, the "leader of all peoples" is still alive...

On listening to the authorities' representatives, you get the feeling that an ethnic issue is the furthest thing from their minds.

President Nazarbayev advocates a market economy (Zheltoksan supports it, too), and wants to attract foreign capital to "turn Kazakhstan into a flourishing republic." But he is in no hurry to pass the law on population migration. How can one regulate economic issues without controlling migration processes?

Both foreign plants and the Ridder family have already happened in the history of Kazakhstan. Over a hundred years has passed since then, but there are still only 10 to 15 percent of Kazakhs among the proletariat. Kazakhs do not want to go to work at plants and factories. Why should we then build them? To import workers from the outside again? The demographic situation of the Kazakhs in their native land is already catastrophic.

Thousands, or even tens of thousands of foreign-educated national cadres are not going to improve the lot of 7 million Kazakhs. To raise their standard of living, capital and development efforts should be invested in those branches of the industry where they will gladly go and earn a living. Which ones is a question for sociologists and scientists in general.

The recently adopted Declaration of Sovereignty is, in the view of the Zheltoksan party, a half-measure, as well as all other adopted laws. The situation of the Kazakh people is such that it cannot be improved by such laws. Of course, the government is trying to stabilize the inter-ethnic situation in this way. But it is time to understand that there will be no stability until the native people is happy with these laws. It will continue to demand, to fight for adopted decisions not to encroach on its legitimate historic rights in its own house, its own homeland. Therefore we need laws that are not liberal, but radical: laws that work. Then we will have stability in our life.

[Vaydman] What ethnic issues does your party make its priority?

[Kozhakhmetov] The Kazakh people have accumulated many problems during the years of the colonial yoke. Language and culture are on the brink of extinction. Without taking into account the interests of the native people, the center has inflicted enormous damage on Kazakhstan's ecology. The situation in the Aral area remains catastrophic. People in the vicinity of the nuclear testing site are dying from diseases, although the site has been shut down temporarily.

We have to deal with social issues as well. At the initiative of Zheltoksan and Azamat, the Shanyrak Society was created; it is involved in finding plots where homeless families can build homes. We are planning to continue our demands for the government to adopt a law on migration, on Kazakhstan citizenship, and on repatriation of Kazakhs who live outside the republic territory.

[Vaydman] Which of the republic's parliamentary deputies support the Zheltoksan Party's political program? Have they been elected from your party?

[Kozhakhmetov] I have already recited our program. Anybody who shares our views is with us. There were no deputies elected from our party. During the pre-election campaign we were busy with things related to the investigations of the December events. Finally, a week before the registration deadline, the National-Democratic Party

decided to put me on the ballot as a candidate for a republic deputy's seat. The students of the Women's Pedagogical Institute decided to nominate me. But when I went to the election precinct office to register, the dean and the instructors in the institute—having heard that I was an "informal"—locked the dormitory doors and would not let the students go to the meetings.

We have a good working relationship with USSR People's Deputy M. Shakhanov, who has done a great deal to restore the truth in regard to the December events, and is working to improve the ecological situation in the republic. We also maintain contact with USSR People's Deputy O. Suleymenov and Kazakh SSR People's Deputy B. Koyshibekov.

We all know, of course, how the elections were conducted—it was mostly the same people who were elected, time after time, during the stagnation era. Many deputies whom we approached during the session are cautious and passive people. We have all shown solidarity only once, when we demanded that the well-known resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on Kazakh nationalism be rescinded.

[Vaydman] How does the Zheltoksan Party intend to build, and how is it already building, its relations with other parties and movements?

[Kozhakhmetov] Our party is in solidarity with all political organizations and associations that are fighting for democratization, for equality among the peoples, who are sympathetic to the Kazakh people's problems, and who conduct their work in a civilized way, through concrete proposals aimed at Kazakhstan's well-being. (Of course, once in a while the Zheltoksan party has undertaken more radical actions, such as hunger strikes or unsanctioned meetings, but these were forced actions in response to the government's anti-democratic actions by the government, which through its conservatism and inability to think in modern categories was creating a conflict situation in its relationship with the people.)

We diverge from the chauvinist-minded neocolonialists who abuse Kazakhs' shyness, encroach on their national rights, and are engaged in nitpicking in regard to laws directed at the rebirth of the people's language, its culture, and statehood.

We diverge from the extremist-minded loud mouths who, while criticizing the CPSU, intend to use the same methods themselves, calling for a revolution "without white gloves." We have already had this in our history; some have already tried to use "black gloves," and then later these revolutionaries have exterminated their own comrades.

[Vaydman] What kind of administrative apparatus do you have?

[Kozhakhmetov] It consists of a chairman, executive secretary, treasurer, and a Central Political Council, which includes 11 people. We do not have salaried

people. Everybody does his work on a volunteer basis. The source of financing is monthly dues and contributions from citizens. As you can see, we have nothing in common with the ruling party. But we are, I think, a party of the future.

'Adolat' Leader Gives Own Account of Osh Tragedy

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[Interview with Rustam Mirakhmedov, by D. Yevlashkov, correspondent of the LENINSKIY PUT Osh Oblast newspaper, under rubric: "Frank Dialogue: 'I Dream of 4 June'"]

[Text] Rustam Mirakhmedov, a watchmaker at the Rembyttekhnik Plant in Osh, is a character who appeared on the political scene last spring. At first the leader of the "Adolat" Society did not want to have a conversation with a journalist: "My name has been dragged through the press so much," he said, "and also I am afraid, to put it frankly, of being prejudiced..."

Then Mirakhmedov agreed to be interviewed. His evaluations of the tragic events in Osh differ from the materials that were previously published on that subject in our newspaper. His opinion is quite subjective, although it reflects the point of view of a definite segment of the oblast's population.

[D. Yevlashkov] Rustam Akhmedovich, however painful it may be, we will have to plunge once again into the tragic summer of 1990. So let's begin with the history of "Adolat." How did it happen that a former secretary of a plant party organization became an ordinary watchsmith, and then a leader of an informal movement?

[R. Mirakhmedov] One thing does not have anything to do with the other. I do not want to mention here my motivations for quitting my job as party organizer. I shall say only that, as a Communist, I am ready to work in any assignment. But this is how "Adolat" was born.

During the past 70 years there had been no concern in Osh for the preservation of the historical and cultural heritage of the nations. At the end of the nineteenth century there were 154 mosques in the city, but by the mid-1960's there were only three remaining. And here is another example, that has already become classic. Babur—a ruler, military leader, poet, and artist of the East—erected a "khudzhra" on Markkukh summit, Mount Takht-i-Suleyman, slightly less than 500 years ago. Despite the entreaties of thousands of Muslims, one summer night in 1963 the mountain was surrounded by troops and the "khudzhra" was blown up.

In 1988 I learned from a radio broadcast that the authorities and the public in Osh had decided to restore a number of historic monuments: the Ravvat-Abdullakhan mosque, the Babur "khudzhra," the Alimbek medrese, and others. But how should they be

returned to their original form? I decided that my turn had come. I went to visit all my comrades who were enthusiastic about the rebirth. We succeeded in gathering together people who shared our views. They constituted the nucleus of the future "Adolat"—48 persons.

[D. Yevlashkov] Was "Adolat" homogeneous in national makeup?

[R. Mirakhmedov] Definitely not! The initiators included Uzbeks and Kirghiz, Russians and Ukrainians, Tatars and Jews.

[D. Yevlashkov] "Adolat" in Uzbek means...

[R. Mirakhmedov] Truth. We are all descended from Adam and Eve, and we do not differ in any way from one another. So everyone should actually be equal and should live in mutual understanding, friendship, love, and respect. And no one should have any privileges. Particularly on the basis of nationality. That was the principle that guided me when I created "Adolat." We had a few successes. You might recall the way in which people of different nationalities, occupations, and social status pitched in to build the Babur hut on Mount Suleyman. Five thousand people worked side by side for several days! That was in the summer of 1989, when the Fergana valley endured for the first time the heat of the interethnic conflict.

[D. Yevlashkov] So far as I know, "Adolat" was in favor not just of restoring the monuments of architecture.

[R. Mirakhmedov] Of course. At the first board session it was decided to create "Adolat" as an international organization, with the adoption—if such proved to be possible—of the status of an independent party. This is how we envisioned our program: the rebirth of the cultural heritage of every nation inhabiting our abundant land; the equality of nations, rights, and the individual's freedoms.

[D. Yevlashkov] Might it be fitting here to mention the names of several initiators of the movement?

[R. Mirakhmedov] At the present time, when the organization's activities have been temporarily stopped, I think that we ought not to do that. But so that you will not misunderstand me, I shall present two of my best assistants who share my views—Uktam Karimov, a teacher at the School imeni Tolstoy in Osh, and artist Khasanbay Saidov.

[D. Yevlashkov] Did intellectuals make up the bulk of that nucleus?

[R. Mirakhmedov] You could state it this way: people in the creative professions. But we also had working people, tradesmen, employees. Moreover, our first steps were, more than anything else, of an agitational nature. It was only with the beginning of the rebuilding of the Babur hut, when people saw the initiators of "Adolat" at work—as bricklayers and concrete workers—that people were drawn to us.

[D. Yelashkov] Why, then, did people begin calling your nationalists?

[R. Mirakhmedov] Let's examine how that happened. One of the points in the organization's program was: try to get the leadership of the city and the oblast to grant equal rights to the representatives of all nationalities, and, in particular, to eliminate the distortions in the personnel policy. It is no secret to anyone that in recent years in the south of the republic there had been a discernible bias in the distribution of managerial positions, and in the makeup of the law-enforcement agencies.

[D. Yelashkov] But what about the trade system? Eighty percent of the people there are Uzbeks...

[R. Mirakhmedov] I accept your counterargument. But I will say that my people have been capable traders and have loved to trade since ancient times, and that is why Uzbeks go into that sphere.

A negative role in creating the tension was played by the expenses in the accelerated implementation of the Law Governing the State Language. We Uzbeks were being forced to learn the Kirghiz language. Why? We understand it anyway. Both language have a common source, and we can make ourselves understood in Kirghiz.

I was alarmed—and I was not the only person to be alarmed—by yet another circumstance. Frequently, right up until those terrible June events, we persistently asked our leadership to open up Uzbek-language departments in our institutions of higher learning and our technical schools. I wrote to absolutely everyone, and even went to Moscow. But no, it was necessary to have human victims before that simple demand could be satisfied.

[D. Yevlashkov] What other demands were made by "Adolat"?

[R. Mirakhmedov] None other than those mentioned.

[D. Yevlashkov] Do you mean, then, that "Adolat" has nothing to do with the 17 points of the so-called "Uzbek ultimatum"?

[R. Mirakhmedov] That's right. The ultimatum is not our initiative, although we have been blamed for it.

[D. Yevlashkov] Who, then, was its author, or who were its authors?

[R. Mirakhmedov] A group of elders from Dzhalal-Abad, Suzakskiy and Bazar-Kurganskiy rayons—all of them retirees. They repeatedly asked the oblast and republic leadership for national Uzbek autonomy as part of the oblast. They had even developed a plan that was sent to Kulmatov and Masaliyev, addressed to the Supreme Soviets of the republic and the country.

[D. Yevlashkov] Do you mean, then, that the statement in the official versions, to the effect that "Adolat" had acted as the initiator of the creation of national Uzbek autonomy, is untrue?

[R. Mirakhmedov] Definitely. The "Adolat" program does not contain such an ultimatum. Although we did share certain requests made by the "askakals." For example, they were attempting to eliminate the distortions in national and personnel policy, and requesting the organizing of radio broadcasting in the native language for about 40 minutes a day. And there were other similar demands. In our opinion, they were all reasonable ones. But, I repeat, "Adolat" had nothing to do with that "Uzbek ultimatum," as you have called it.

[D. Yevlashkov] How did your relations with the other informal organizations develop? And, incidentally, did you attempt to register?

[R. Mirakhmedov] We made several attempts to legalize our activities. Even when Kulmatov was in charge. But he rejected us in the most categorical manner. To be completely just, I will remark that even "Osh Aymagy" was not registered. I had several meetings with the leader of "Osh Aymagy," Kambaraly Bektemirov. We talked about various things, and were in agreement about some of them, but our opinions differed about others.

[D. Yevlashkov] What were your relations with the official institutions of authority? With the Communist Party, the soviets, the KGB, the militia?

[R. Mirakhmedov] As the expression goes, we coexisted peacefully. Incidentally, I did feel a certain pressure upon me as the leader of "Adolat." Workers from the procuracy and the KGB would come to my home and asked who I was and what I wanted. The attitude toward other organization members who sympathized with us was worse: people were threatened with firings from their jobs, "strict warnings" were frequent. That's democracy for you.

[D. Yevlashkov] It was mentioned in the press that for a certain time, up until the well-known events, you and Bektemirov were released from your basic job and were provided all the conditions for informal activities.

[R. Mirakhmedov] I had been working in my own little booth, and I continued to work there constantly. Actually, however, Bektemirov did have an office and a city telephone. Incidentally, I read his interview in SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, in which he asserted that the "little RAF" [vehicle] that had been assigned to him was a figment of the journalists' imagination. No, it was no figment of the imagination: both a "little RAF" and a GAZ-24 were at his disposal. It is also untrue that Bektemirov had not interrogated Lieutenant Colonel Kh. Yashmatov, chief of the Osh militia. I state with complete responsibility that Bektemirov, in the presence of A. Sydykov, former first secretary of the party's city committee and currently chairman of the city soviet, called Kh. Tashmatov to his office and asked him

questions such as, "How did you become militia chief? Who helped you in this regard?"

[D. Yevlashkov] What is your version of the Osh events?

[R. Mirakhmedov] On 30 May we arrived by car on the field of discord. Kulmatov, Fattakhov, Chepelev, Davydov, Bekbolotov, and KGB representatives were already there. Kulmatov read aloud the 14 points of that ultimatum that you mentioned previously (later on, three more points were added to it). Then he proposed that each side name its parliamentarians for negotiations at a serious level. On the Uzbek side, 16 persons were named, of whom six were deputies to the city soviet, and one was Davran Sabirov, a republic-level people's deputy. I was also included among the parliamentarians. We were granted the necessary powers, and even identification documents. It was proposed that we arrive on the field on 4 [June], at 1800 hours. We were told that the leadership would announce which of the points in the "ultimatum" they agreed to fulfill, and which they did not agree to fulfill.

It was then, in my opinion, that the unforgivable mistake, a mistake that led to human sacrifices, was made. The holding of a meeting on that ill-starred field should have not have been authorized at all. A state of emergency and martial law should have been instituted ahead of time. And all kinds of negotiations should have been conducted only at the level of the parliamentarians. Kulmatov and Fattakhov had been too hasty.

[D. Yevlashkov] Well, at 1800 hours the rally began on the field of discord. What was your role in it?

[R. Mirakhmedov] Practically none. From the very beginning, the rally was uncontrollable. No one cared anything about me as the leader of "Adolat." I made a statement. I took the microphone, but no one listened to me.

[D. Yevlashkov] Could you have assumed that a collision would occur?

[R. Mirakhmedov] No, I could not even imagine such a nightmare. A day earlier, on 3 June, during the third round of negotiations, Kambaraly Bektemirov came to the Uzbek Drama Theater. He told me that the events were developing poorly and that he was greatly alarmed. On 2 June and 3 June I received several telephone calls at my apartment, warning me that trouble was brewing at the cotton-fabric association, and that certain people were arriving by car with long bundles. I telephoned Lieutenant Colonel Tashmatov and Colonel Tazhibayev, UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] chief. They attempted to calm me down, saying that maybe people were hauling potatoes... Well, it subsequently turned out that it was not potatoes that they were hauling.

[D. Yevlashkov] Nevertheless, Rustam Akhmedovich, I do not believe that you did not know that something was being prepared.

[R. Mirakhmedov] Yes, I guessed that something terrible was going to happen soon. Dozens of people told me about the crowds on the field who were drinking and roaming around, swinging metal bars and metal stakes, and about the inaction by the law-enforcement agencies. On the eve of the catastrophe I had a conversation, right on that field, with a certain KGB worker. He was all shaken up, and said, "Uh-oh! something's going to happen..." Moreover, everyone knew that Askar Mameyev, UKGB chief; Raimberdy Tazhibayev, UVD chief; and Khalil Tashmatov had made repeated attempts to warn the oblast committee about a possible calamity. And what happened? Well, as the expression goes, some of them aren't here any more, and those who are, are far away...

[D. Yevlashkov] Could the bloodshed have been avoided?

[R. Mirakhmedov] If the leadership had not attempted to make a deal by signing the ill-fated agreement to give kolkhoz land to any Kirghiz would wanted it. If the law-enforcement agencies had not taken a permissive attitude toward one side of the people participating in the rally. If the authorities had not used firearms, but instead had used water cannons, a "Cheremukha," or other nonfatal means in their arsenal for "suppressing democracy." If previously, on 1 June or 2 June, as Colonels Tazhibayev and Mameyev had asked, a state of emergency had been instituted—the bloodshed could have been avoided.

[D. Yevlashkov] Who do you think bears the blame for what happened?

[R. Mirakhmedov] I shall mention names with no attempt at concealment. The first person is Renat Kulmatov, who for nine years had been at the oblast helm and who had stubbornly "not seen anything." The second is Usen Sydykov. It was he who made the decision to give away the land. It was he who carried out the psychological support for the crowd that had gathered on the field, and who tasted, together with them, the blood of a sacrificed horse. Another guilty individual is former premier Apas Dzhumagulov, who signed the document concerning the issuance of the land. The others—Bakhadyr Fattakhov, Akylbek Sydykov, and others—are guilty to a lesser extent.

[D. Yevlashkov] Did you see people being shot? Who began firing?

[R. Mirakhmedov] At approximately 1830 hours, three motor buses with young Kirghiz drove up from Kenesh and Zhapalak. The buses stopped in the northern part of the field. The rumor spread: people had come from Andizhan to help the Uzbeks. About 30 young Uzbek men started running toward them. Their path was blocked by a chain of special-purpose troops who had militiamen standing behind them. The young men threw chunks of clay at the shields. The front rank—the special-purpose troops—began firing warning shots into the air from their semiautomatic weapons. From behind the

soldiers' back, members of OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] and the Osh militiamen fired at people with their pistols and semiautomatic weapons. Point-blank.

I jumped out onto the field and began running among the people being fired upon, attempting to get the militiamen to stop firing. I don't remember what I shouted. I still dream at night about that terrible evening...

[D. Yevlashkov] Does "Adolat" have any dealings with the so-called women's revolt, when for two days Uzbek women stormed the oblast committee? What caused that action? Was it organized?

[R. Mirakhmedov] I shall not conceal the fact that, marking the fortieth day after the mass riots, on 14 July certain extremists of Uzbek nationality attempted to get revenge. On the whole, however, our nation grieved in silence, and the only people who went out onto the street were ruffians and extremists. Yes, there were incidents of beatings and provocation, and mass fights. But the elders, the "askakals," the clergy, and the activists opposed that, and attempted to cool the young people down and make them act reasonably.

Once again, in individual instances, our militia reacted incorrectly. They began picking up everyone on the streets indiscriminately, whether or not they were guilty of anything. By the evening of 15 [July] there were about 300 detainees in the GOVD [Municipal Departments of Internal Affairs] basement. It was then that the women—mothers, wives, sisters—went out to the square and demanded the freeing of the persons who had been illegally detained and the punishment of the persons who were truly to blame for the interethnic conflict. "Adolat" does not have any dealings with the women's revolt.

[D. Yevlashkov] Why, then, did you not attempt to go to the square and get to the oblast committee and intervene?

[R. Mirakhmedov] I had an official warning from the procuracy to the effect that if I carried out any illegal actions I would be punished. You can understand that my arrival on the square would have been immediately viewed by the authorities as a provocation and I would have been re-arrested. Also, the soldiers were preventing any men from getting onto the square.

[D. Yevlashkov] You have said that you had been arrested. When and why?

[R. Mirakhmedov] On 31 June three people came to my home to get me. They had been sent to me by Major Sanuyev, UGRO [State Administration for Investigative Operations] chief. They put me in the car and then they took me to Sanuyev's office. Then they led me downstairs, to the KPZ [pretrial detention cell]. For four days and nights I sat in Cell No. 6 with a dope dealer, a rapist, and a person who had been detained for illegal possession of a weapon. Then I was freed, after paying a large monetary fine in lieu of incarceration.

[D. Yevlashkov] Why were you arrested?

[R. Mirakhmedov] I don't know.

[D. Yevlashkov] Will there ever be any final reconciliation between the two nations? Do you believe in this?

[R. Mirakhmedov] I want very much to believe that peace and prosperity will reign once again over our land. Believe me when I say that, for the most part, our nation wants that. The water is being muddied by individual extremists and criminals who, on the soil of the interethnic conflict, are carrying out their own dirty deeds.

So I believe that true justice will prevail, and that all the criminals, irrespective of their nationality or the positions that they hold, will be punished.

KGB Not Responsible for Explosive Found on Miners' Bus*PM0104091991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Nikolay Lisovenko report: "KGB Proves It Was Not Involved"]

[Text] Donetsk—During a routine miners' rally I. Miroschnichenko, a representative of the strike committee at the "Dobropolyeugol" Production Association's 21st CPSU Congress Pit, stated that an explosive device had been discovered in a miners' bus 23 March and that he was not ruling out KGB involvement in the incident.

This suspicion, expressed in such a complex sociopolitical situation, required immediate refutation. A special investigation group headed by the experienced officers V. Zverev and I. Kostin, was set up at the KGB Oblast Administration for Donetsk Oblast.

The very next day they established that the following was the case. Half a kilo of explosives and a detonator had been obtained from somewhere and were on the bus driven by P. Kononenko. They were hidden in the driver's seat pocket. It transpired that the explosives were placed there by Petr's relief driver—Grigoriy Zhurko, a driver with the "Dobropolyeuglestroy" Trust—and that he had been given this explosive at his own request by Gennadiy Kubinets, a worker at the drift-winning administration. Zhurko "justified" his request by stating that he was planning to use it to stun fish.

In violation of all instructions, G. Kubinets removed from the mine and gave the "fisherman" two cartridges of carbonite and ammonite, as well as an electric detonator.

Now both Zhurko, who left the explosives in the bus, and Kubinets, who gave him this strictly regulated material, have admitted all. They hope that their sincere contrition will reduce their punishment.

IZVESTIYA on Citizenship, Pardons in USSR*LD0204204991 Moscow TASS in English 1943 GMT
2 Apr 91*

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS—Last year, the Soviet president considered appeals to pardon 226 people sentenced to death. He decided to grant pardon to 18 people, taking into account their young age and other attenuating circumstances, Gennady Cheremnykh, head of the Department for Citizenship and Pardons at the USSR parliament's Secretariat, said in an interview with the IZVESTIYA newspaper.

This is more than during previous years, he said. The president turned down 208 appeals for clemency because of special gravity of the crimes they had committed and their heightened danger for society.

All of those people were sentenced to capital punishment for the pre-meditated murders, with most of them taking lives of more than one human being.

According to Cheremnykh, capital punishment will be retained in the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future.

"The public opinion, based on the realities of Soviet life favours it," he said. "But the limits for the application of the capital punishment must be narrowed considerably in legislation, and the court practice is already following this road".

Cheremnykh said that a total of 107 people were granted Soviet citizenship in 1990. "Citizenship was restored upon request to ten people who had been earlier stripped of it. In addition, the Soviet president annulled some decrees issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on stripping 22 people of their Soviet citizenship.

"Last year," Cheremnykh said, "6,668 people renounced their Soviet citizenship. Of these, 6,500 live in other countries, mainly Germans who had emigrated to Federal Germany (5,700 people). Another 619 married foreigners and left the Soviet Union, another 100 are children born in such families.

"But there is also another category of people: 239 people said in their application they wanted to renounce Soviet citizenship because they are displeased with the Soviet political system, living conditions and the lack of opportunities for their creative or religious pursuits. All those appeals were granted," Cheremnykh said.

Responses to Readers' Queries on Crime Situation*91UN1186A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 26 Mar 91 p 3*

[Responses to readers' questions compiled by Andrey Trushkin under the rubric: "Answers to Any Questions": "Where the Mafia Is Making Its Money"]

[Text] *Is it true that our militia has managed to eliminate the Moscow mafia? Why is there no information about this fact? I. Tatyana, Moscow.*

It is true that late last year the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Sixth Administration, assigned to fight organized crime, stated that it had detained in Moscow seven leaders of a Caucasus group. But it is still too early to talk about any complete defeat of the Moscow mafia.

According to certain data, there are 10 large organized crime groups now functioning in Moscow. A long time ago they split our capital into spheres of influence. Their criminal activity is directed mainly at racketeering of cooperatives and private enterprises. Some of them are also trying to gain control over joint ventures.

The groups practically control the so-called street sharpers and include runners, prostitutes, and speculators who resell various kinds of liquor, stereo equipment,

and furniture. Certain groups have divided the major farmer's markets of Moscow among themselves.

According to data provided by the USSR MVD Criminal Investigation Main Administration, a total of 243,371 crimes were committed by groups last year, which is an increase of eight percent. They exposed 1,383,552 people who participated in crimes; 412,176 of these were members of groups.

One out of every three crimes solved by criminal investigators was committed by a criminal group.

They say that imported goods never reach their addressees. They all get stolen while still in transit... N. Koncheva, Zhitomir.

In answer to this question the officials of the USSR MVD press center openly stated that, as of recently, imported goods have become the most desirable item "to be expropriated" from any kind of transportation, and primarily from railways.

Incidents of railroad theft increased last year by almost 80 percent. The officials of the Main Administration of Internal Affairs have uncovered 50 large organized crime groups which were responsible for major acts of theft, to the total sum of three million rubles [R].

More and more often transportation employees become thieves themselves. For their crimes, 1,800 transportation employees had criminal proceedings started against them. Among them were 67 militarized guards whose duty was to protect cargo. They stole goods totalling over R100,000.

I wonder, what is the cost of drugs on the "black market"? This very market has been in existence for a long time now but nobody talks about it... A. Orlov, Izhevsk

One of the leading experts on fighting the narcotics business, an administration head of the USSR MVD Criminal Investigation Main Administration, Aleksandr Sergeyev, said at a briefing:

"The drug mafia and drug trafficking business are gaining strength before our very eyes, literally. It is becoming harder and harder to fight them. So far, we have not gotten either a directed program for drug addiction prevention or a realistic, good-quality program to treat addiction..."

As for the drug "black market," it really exists. According to the latest criminological research, only 15 percent of addicts use drugs which they concoct themselves. The rest of the addicts buy them on the "black market." Last year 23 tons of narcotics were removed from circulation by our internal affairs organs.

Recently, as we have learned from unofficial sources, prices of drugs increased in Moscow, for instance, by 150 percent. A glass of hashish now costs R500, a kilo, R1,500.

According to the data of the USSR MVD main information center, the consumption level in the USSR is 41 per 100,000 people. Turkmenia is in the lead with an indicator of 140 per 100,000 people; it is 64 in Kazakhstan, and 57 in Uzbekistan.

The internal affairs organs have 118,000 drug addicts on record who present a certain social danger. However, the militiamen themselves tend to disregard this figure. By some estimates, there are close to three million drug addicts in our country. At least a million of them are teenagers.

Recently the All-Union Society for the Rescue of Children and Adolescents from Drugs was introduced. Its address: 10 Pushkinskaya Street, apt. 31, Moscow. Telephone: 921-57-90 (194-11-96, 582-09-50). Fax: 2002216 (0571).

Incidentally

According to Interpol, a standard 10 kilo pack of raw opium is sold for \$350 to \$400 by Turkish peasants who deal in raising "narcotic cultures." These 10 kilos yield approximately one kilo of pure heroin. Its approximate value on the "black markets" of France or Italy is \$3,000 to \$4,000. But this is not the final price either. As the heroin is transported to the United States, overhead expenses cause its value to rise geometrically. The same kilo of heroin can bring anywhere from \$420,000 to a million if sold in single doses (whether for sniffing or injecting) on the American continent.

You must know that an ordinary mortal cannot get tickets to the Bolshoi theater for anything! Only scalpers have them, and at fantastic prices at that... What are our militiamen thinking? N. Tikhonovich, Moscow.

Here are the latest data in this respect. We have learned from knowledgeable sources that officials of the USSR MVD Sixth Administration are now investigating the disappearance of tickets to the USSR State Academy Bolshoi theater.

They have already identified three main channels of ticket leaks. The first is "Intourist" interpreter/guides and bus drivers. Scalpers are the second. The theater administration is the third.

There is information that about 400 tickets end up in scalpers' hands daily. This is out of the daily sales figure of 2,150 tickets. The rest are sent to high officials, to "Intourist," to the theater management and artists, and to other organizations. The ticket offices end up with just few, and most of these are bought by scalpers.

Incidentally, the price of tickets to the Bolshoi theater fluctuates on the "black market" from 50 to 80 francs (one franc sells privately for about R15). So they are really not for ordinary mortals...

Prepared by S. Zhukov.

* * *

Recently we were visited by a tax inspector. He said he works his district alone and there are thousands of people in it. He cannot check on them all... I. Frolova, Lipetsk.

There is no need to check on everyone. In the United States, for instance, tax inspectors go to about two

percent of all enterprises. Their efficiency, however, is among the highest in the world. They use a simple system: If you fail to pay your taxes you will have to pay a big fine. So it is simply unprofitable to violate the law.

The tax service of Moscow employs at present over 1,500 people (1,300 of them being tax inspectors). But the workload of one employee in this office is four-and-a-half times that of a similar official in Paris and eight times bigger than in Brussels.

Incidentally, the control and auditing service brought an additional R203 million to our budget in 1990.

New Kiev News Agency to Focus on Economic News

LD0104171491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0700 GMT 1 Apr 91

[Summary] TASS reports from Kiev that an "alternative news center", UTSAI, has been set up there. It will concentrate on economic and business news. The service will be free, initially.

Kyrgyz Paper Changes Name

91P50147

[Editorial Report] Frunze SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA in Russian for 26 February 1991 announces on page 1 that the former SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA will henceforth be called SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA. The announcement emphasizes that the change of name does not indicate a change in the paper's basic position. The paper remains the organ of the Kyrgyz Communist Party Central Committee, and of the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet and Cabinet of Ministers. The paper is published in a print-run of 64,200 copies.

Cinematographers Press Conference Previewed

PM0204095791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by M. Murzina: "Cinematographers Decide Whether There Will Be Boycott of Television"]

[Text] A press conference devoted to the boycott of Central Television announced two months ago will be held 28 March in the USSR Cinematographers Union.

During this time the press, including IZVESTIYA, has written about the boycott, a relevant letter from the cinematographers has been published, and telegrams from some of them addressed to L. Kravchenko, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting—protests against the screening of movie programs and movie subjects—were read out on television. Nonetheless "Kinopanorama," "Illuzion," and "Kinoserpantin" were broadcast... And there is already a view (actually, it existed from the very start of the action) that the boycott is incorrect and naive, that it will in any case go no further than meetings and talk. So is there any point in continuing it?

There were also debates on this subject at the recent USSR Cinematographers Union plenum and at a special meeting in February and now there is a meeting of cinematographers again. Cinematographers from Leningrad and the republics and representatives of our own and foreign mass media have been invited to the forthcoming press conference, it is proposed to invite L. Kravchenko, and it is planned to adopt another statement. What is the aim and point of this meeting?

Producer Elem Klimov speaks:

"We realize that a boycott is a complex and in many respects two-sided matter. But in the present situation which has taken shape at Central Television thanks to its leadership the main thing in my opinion is for each person to avoid disgracing himself. A boycott is after all not a work stoppage, not a strike. For each cinematographer it is here a question of a moral choice, of an ethical, civic, and ultimately human position: Should he participate or not participate, and consequently also lodge a kind of protest? We hope that our viewers will understand us: I personally consider it immoral to appear on the screen in, for instance, an entertainment program showing cheerful scenes at Cheremushkinskiy market after the events in Lithuania. I sent telegrams to Kravchenko on the subject, and I was not alone. And what happened? The program nonetheless went out, my item was excised from another program, the interview with my colleague A. Smirnov is not there, and so on..."

I know that not all cinematographers support the idea of a boycott. The task of the forthcoming conference will be to find its position yet again on this score.

Editors' Roundtable Discusses Present Campaign Against Free Press

91UN1170A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 10, 10-17 Mar 91 pp 8-9

[Roundtable conference prepared by Tatyana Menshikova and Vladimir Shevelyov: "The Free Press Will Defend Itself"]

[Text] Taking Part in this discussion were first deputy editor of IZVESTIA Igor Golembiovsky, editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Vladislav Fronin, editor of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Vladislav Starkov, editor of OGONYOK Vitaly Korotich, editor of MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLET Pavel Gusev, editor of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Vitaly Tretyakov, editor of COMMERSANT Vladimir Yakovlev, editor of CHAS PIK Natalya Chaplina, executive manager of ROSSIYA Alexander Drozdov, director of the TV and Radio Company "Radio Rossii" Sergei Davydov, host of the TV programme "Do i Posle Polunochi" Vladimir Molchanov, Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for the Mass Media, and Relations with Public Organizations, Citizens' Mass Movements and Studies of Public Opinion, Viktor Yugin, and MN [MOSCOW NEWS] political analyst Len Karpinsky. The moderator was editor of MN Yegor Yakovlev.

Lately the above media have been under fierce attack. Ironically, these are the publications and broadcast programmes which have most resolutely been defending the ideas of perestroika and glasnost. This has made them very popular with the public, with their readers and audiences nationwide numbering many millions. The increased pressure on the free press and the blatant attempts to roll back democracy (with its opponents

increasingly referring to the "alleged democrats") has prompted the aforementioned editors to gather and discuss the following:

1. A paradoxical situation has arisen: while no one questions the principles of glasnost, there are many people who would like to end it. Could this happen? and under what circumstances?
2. Which methods are being used to discredit the democratic press?
3. How can the free press counter the onslaught from the right?

The participants give their opinions below.

The number of people who read or watch the media represented at the discussion.

Circulation:		
	ARGUMENTY I FAKTY	24,102,000
	KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA	18,304,000
	IZVESTIA	4,700,000
	MOSCOW NEWS	2,281,000
	OGONYOK	1,790,000
	MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS	1,559,000
TV Viewers:		
	"Do i Posle Poluno- chi" (Before and After Midnight)	c. 100,000,000
	"Pyatoye Koleso" (The Fifth Wheel)	c. 20,000,000
Total:	c. 170 million	

Yegor Yakovlev: The fuss kicked up by the President's suggestion to amend the Law on the Press has led nowhere, so far. Glasnost in its present form will disappear along with the reforms.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (The Independent Gazette) would be closed if the present Moscow City Council and its Chairman Popov were removed. CHAS PIK (Rush Hour) would cease to exist if the Leningrad City Council led by Sobchak were disbanded. Moscow News would also be eliminated if the Law on the Press is overturned. But glasnost itself can't be eliminated without a direct coup, which is hardly possible. So far the democratic press can make use of what possibilities it has to shore up its positions. It is of course clear that no favors can be expected any longer. The latest remarks by the President show that he has made his choice by saying that the democratic forces are in opposition to him.

[Pavel Gusev] The very term "glasnost" was introduced by Gorbachev and his team. But glasnost has since turned into freedom of expression, whether the authorities like it or not. And this is our main weapon. Glasnost

is a fine word to advertize Gorbachev's course in the West. Thus glasnost will be preserved, while freedom of expression will continue to receive hard knocks from various quarters.

[Boxed item: "Believe me, nowhere else in the world is there such an anti-communist, vicious press as the one brought out by our domestic 'democrats'. Moreover, they are so underhanded that they cry that they are themselves victims of propaganda violence and an information blockade." Ivan Polozkov's speech at the Dynamo Plant, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, February 4, 1991.]

[Igor Golembiovsky] You can't say that the buck stops with the President, that he has cooled toward the democratic press. There are wider implications than that. A new generation of party functionaries has emerged on the scene who realize that they are too late. The cake has been already carved up. Unlike the previous generation, they will act more vigorously and show more ingenuity. IZVESTIA, a rather moderate newspaper, is already under attack from several quarters. IZVESTIA, a rather moderate newspaper, is already under attack from several quarters. IZVESTIA's position in the soviet press is also unique. It still remains the only paper trying to bridge the chasm between the right-wing and left-wing press. If it moves to the right that would put many publications in jeopardy. And it's evident that we are being attacked from every quarter. Deputies of the current session of the Supreme Soviet have been given lists of "extremist" publications, one of which is IZVESTIA, I don't know why. There are suggestions that IZVESTIA be overhauled constructively. How constructively? By printing more speeches by people's deputies.

[Vladislav Fronin] Journalists at all publications have changed their attitudes radically in recent years. They have developed a taste for freedom of expression. Their readers have as well. For this reason, no return to non-glasnost is possible, despite all the attempts to turn things back.

[Vitaly Korotich] The newspapers PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA use the word "democrat" as if it meant "class enemy". The system is trying to connect in mass consciousness "democracy" and "economic hardships", "free press" and "anarchy". The system is setting the people against the very idea of reforms and scares lumpens with prospects of competition which would end their status as state dependents. What is happening is a dangerous fusion of the parasitic top echelons and members of the demoralized but obedient groups of people at the bottom. From their point of view, neither those on the top nor those at the bottom need information. Or better: the former get information, while the latter have never wanted it. They are satisfied with regurgitated information, like they are now getting from TV courtesy of Kravchenko.

[Alexander Drozdov] What puts me on guard is when I hear the word "pluralism" being used instead of "glasnost". It is patent that pluralism is impossible in one

newspaper, because a newspaper cannot be a mishmash of assorted views. Our opponents see "pluralism" first and foremost as a way to preserve party influence not only in their own newspapers but also on publications that have never had anything to do with the party.

[Vladimir Molchanov] The idea of smothering glasnost is supported by more than just the CPSU Central Committee. It is sadly shared by some of our colleagues. Of late at the Central Television, I've been constantly finding myself in an atmosphere where my professional duties are in conflict with my sense of morality. If the evening news programme Vremya coincides with your moral choice, what kind of professional duty is it that allows information to get so monstrously butchered. If you make another moral choice, your programme may be axed as was the Vzglyad programme. People whose moral choice coincides with Vremya are quite numerous. There is no official censorship on Central Television. All censorship is done by those who run the station or a particular programme.

When I first started to work for Vremya (I officially quit on January 14) we had no problems as to what news went on the air. Fifteen minutes before air time, Ligachev phoned to give his instructions, ten minutes before air time another high official phoned to give his own instructions. Then that stopped. Now the practice is coming back, and instructions from secretaries and other bigwigs in the CPSU Central Committee (who are also members of the Supreme Soviet) are becoming the usual practice.

[Vladislav Starkov] Unlike those who work for TV, I will not dramatize things. We have at long last entered a normal political struggle. We should have expected it. Fear of censorship? I don't think it does anybody any good, including Gorbachev. As soon as censorship returns, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, for example, would either go or we would have to have a commissar in our office to watch over every word we print. There would be an underground press again, and people would listen again to foreign radio. People won't remain uninformed.

A War Without Rules

[Yegor Yakovlev] We can make a list of the ways used to strangle the democratic press. One device is to constantly stress that whatever is done by the democratic press was allegedly been planned in advance. Then there is the use of imprecise or misleading facts. Let's say we write "the crime of a regime that wouldn't quit the stage". Clearly what is meant is the still lingering Stalin regime, the punitive regime, the regime that committed a crime in Vilnius. Our opponents give the phrase a little twist saying that the democratic press works against the Soviet system, against the constitutional regime, etc.

[Len Karpinsky] The opponents of the democratic press have vast experience in organization. If the President drops a word about possibly suspending the Law on the Press and then retreats then a there, it does not in the least mean that nothing is being done to suspend the

Law. I believe that party functionaries have been dispatched to the provinces to drum up support for the newspapers SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and against KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, MN, etc., and to persuade the workers to urge that the Supreme Soviet investigate the latter newspapers' activities. We are fighting for our existence honorably, while they are trying to destroy us through subterfuge.

[Vladimir Molchanov] As for discrediting the mass media, there could be no greater damage than that done by Central Television. It pains me to see some TV programmes becoming anonymous, like the one about Lithuania made by a studio referred to only as Absolyut. This is like the base propaganda of fifty years ago. Central Television discredits itself by making no attempt whatever to bring together the facts. It showed only one of the three recent public rallies held in Moscow. There were no attempts to discredit my programme Before and After Midnight until the January programme went on the air. Then things changed. While my programme is not interfered with directly, we are being made to toe the line in a variety of ways.

[Vitaly Korotich] Here are more examples. Marshal Yazov has declared that I was bribed by Western intelligence services. General Filatov has announced that I'm doubtful character, appointed editor of OGONYOK by the Americans. The "patriotic" rags like PULS TUSHINA and LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA denounce me as part of the Jewish Masonic conspiracy. MOLODAYA GVARDIYA at times becomes apologetic, even mentioning my name dozens of times in an issue. Their strategy is not to argue the issues, but to smear their opponent.

[Sergei Davydov] The recent incident with Radio Rossii is a graphic example of this method. The newspaper GLASNOST wrote on the fourth day after one of our broadcasts that we demanded that communists be hanged. The next day the story was circulated by TASS. The fact was that we interviewed the composer Alexandra PakhmUTOVA on the air and the programme host said: "Shall I tell you about a scary moment? I was really shaken by it: a reporter was asking young people at a concert questions. One of his questions was: 'If it came to hanging communists, would you kick the stool from under their feet?' And you know what, nearly the whole audience at the rock concert said yes."

After January 13, when Radio Rossii commented on what had happened in Lithuania, a flood of abuse was unleashed against our radio, alleging that it had called for the hanging of Russian communists, and stood up for Landsbergis. Facts were completely twisted and openly falsified.

[Vitaly Tretyakov] At first, when the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA first appeared, here and there other newspapers started to take issue with us. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA did so frequently. We protested on Central

Television about how biased and unjust our opponents were. Then my newspaper published a commentary trying to show that the inept criticism invariably raised our credibility and increased the number of our readers, that people tend to sympathize with the newspaper precisely because of the unjust criticism. The critics got wise and left us alone.

[Bella Kurkova] Many a plenum of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee has discussed the mass media. My programme The Fifth Wheel figured there as the main cause for all the country's troubles. The latest plenum also devoted much time to us, but they toned down their accusations and abuse, sticking to the published press reports. The obvious reason was: anyone persecuted in this country finds sympathy among the people.

Then the newspaper LENINGRADSKY RABOCHY carried a big theoretical article by the Regional Party Secretary Belov. There is a remarkable passage about intellectuals who must be looked after so they don't get run over by the Fifth Wheel. Comrade Belov followed this up by a series of meetings with workers, and every such meeting invariably had a speaker who asked: "How much longer do we have to put up with the Fifth Wheel? The answer was: the Fifth Wheel would stop turning soon.

New Pressures Replace Censorship

[Natalya Chaplina] An attack against our newspapers is proceeding right before our very eyes. Relatively not long ago LENINGRADSKY RABOCHY used to be a good newspaper with a democratic orientation and a handsome circulation. But when new papers were allowed to form, the journalists at LENINGRADSKY RABOCHY were unable to come together and nominate a competent editor. Like an overripe pear the paper fell into the hands of the Regional Party Committee. And now from a moderately liberal publication it has gone extremely rightist. A former party functionary was appointed as its editor, and all its decent journalists have left for other publications.

[Boxed item: "... these printed organs (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, OGONYOK and others—Ed.) have been both persistent and consistent in shaping a misguided idea about our reality and history among readers... Well, the purpose of such publications can also be seen quite clearly—to vulgarize domestic (primarily Soviet) history by fostering a 'new' mentality, to smear and trample upon the established traditions and moral values, and to denigrate the Armed Forces." VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1991.]

[Pavel Gusev] Whenever it is difficult to combat freedom of speech by means of ideological censorship, use is made of other methods of pressure: organizational and economic. First and foremost, there's the paper problem. I don't even rule out that there will be new attempts to block the production of larger supplies of

newsprint. And the distribution of newspapers is completely controlled by the Ministry of Communications. This monopoly can simply mow us down: after all, if a daily newspaper reaches readers three days late, the latter will drop all interest in it. MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS is experiencing blatant economic pressure. In effect, subscriptions to our paper have been closed: the printshop has refused to bring out the general printing. On the other hand, the Moskovskaya Pravda Publishing House is still soliciting orders from other newspapers. Beginning this year, the distribution of MK in other cities has been discontinued altogether.

[Vitaly Korotich] Freedom of information can be suppressed in many ways, specifically by raising the prices of paper and polygraphic services and deliberately disorganizing the Soyuzpechat distribution agency. There are numerous ways, and we are experiencing them (rather they are being tested on us). The liberal press is poorly protected in every respect. Just try and touch SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and you'll see what a hue and cry will be raised. Yet whatever they print has, on more than one occasion, insulted the good name of our Soviet land and the intentions of its leadership (as in the case of publications in support of Saddam Hussein and this war).

[Igor Golembiovsky] One shouldn't oversimplify the situation. Earlier than the other media, the press has found itself tied in on market relations. This process will continue to develop. And there is a need to think of what to undertake on that strategic plane. The real economy beckons its own. For instance, beginning with January the Izvestia Publishing House has been under pressure to stop publishing the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. But the publishing house has an objective stake in extracting profits from its capacities...

[Bella Kurkova] Radio and TV broadcasters have found themselves in a very horrendous situation. After all, we've not been protected even by the Law on the Press, for it's almost impossible to apply it to the electronic mass media. Gosteleradio, the Soviet agency in charge of Radio and TV, in league with members of the Supreme Soviet, has been working to prepare a Law on TV and Radio. A special law. The provision on the All-Union TV and Radio Broadcasting Company, secretly set up within the depths of Gosteleradio, tells us that a monstrous supermonopoly is in the making. This document contains points which will deprive everyone of the possibility of speaking differently than the CPSU. Here there is a need to have a clear view of the situation. The TV programme Vzglyad has already been silenced. Another one, Before and After Midnight, can also be silenced. Our staff passed a decision on the independent status for a Leningrad TV and Radio, whose founders could be the Leningrad, the Regional Soviet, the work collective and Russia's Ministry of the Press. However, three or four days after a presidential Decree appeared and all of our attempts were reduced to nil. It is not ruled out that tomorrow Leningrad TV will be controlled by the Central TV and Radio Broadcasting Company. All the more

so since we don't have many people who are prepared to work according to democratic principles. And it's easy to guess what will happen if both the broadcasting network and the programmes are dictated by Moscow.

[Sergei Davydov] An alternative radio network appeared at the close of last year, perhaps for the first time in our country. How can it be stifled? With technology alone. Because given the hard currently hunger experienced both by the country as a whole and all the more so by Russia, we are totally dependent on Gosteleradio's equipment. Thus they are free to do whatever they like to us.

Bracing for Resistance

[Igor Golembiovsky] We need to protect the character of our periodicals. And we can do this, primarily through the Law on the Press. Regrettably, our legislators don't understand this law very well. For that reason journalists have had to learn it by heart, and have had to fight for every letter in that law. We need to form a solid economic basis, without which we're done for—all of us. This can be achieved using our own incomes and not only them. Not long ago, the Filmmakers Union decided to set up a fund to protect glasnost. If this fund were to expand on a large scale, "we would have substantial means to support those periodicals, radio stations and television programmes which come under attack. Next, we have our absurd Journalists Union. I don't believe that the change in leadership will bring about any tangible results. Yet the Union Continues to receive a certain percentage of the periodicals' income. Why not transfer this money to the fund to protect glasnost? But in the future, we should work to create an independent journalists union.

[Boxed item: "There is a popular saying that the 'truth is the soul of morality'. Is there much of it in the so-called free press, say, in MOSCOW NEWS, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, KURANTY and so on? Regrettably, there isn't. What there is, and in plenty, is black paint thrown on the party in newspapers headed even by communists." V.V. Grigoryev, First Secretary, Vitebsk Regional Committee, Communist Party of Belorussia, PRAVDA, February 4, 1991.]

[Vladislav Fronin] I agree. The protection of the Law on the Press is a priority today. We should make sure that no destructive amendments are introduced into it. Say, if they adopt an item on protecting publishers' rights (publishers here are still monopolists, while independent periodicals are dependent on them, because they don't have their own printing facilities), then we'll have to say good-bye to freedom of speech.

[Boxed item: "In the opinion of citizens, the press has forgotten all about patriotic education, is distorting the truth, focusing attention on negative pages from the past, rubbing salt in our wounds, and engaging in downright denigration of our history... Criticism has been levelled at Central Television (Vzglyad programme), radio (Mayak and Radio Rossii), the newspapers MOSCOW NEWS,

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, IZVESTIA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and the magazine OGONYOK. From a summary of the Letters and Reception of Citizens Department of the USSR Supreme Soviet.]

[Natalya Chaplina] We need the fund to protect glasnost not only to support independent newspapers, but also official ones, which are having their arms twisted particularly roughly of late. They are stifled by their official founders who use entirely legal means. Whereas the periodicals can do nothing about it. For example, why can't KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA break off with its founder? Because it has neither paper nor printing facilities. Let me stress it again: we need a fund that can provide for paper and printing facilities.

[Alexander Drozdov] We'd rather think not about a fund, but a bank that would finance independent printing houses, radio and television. An independent journalists trade union backed by this kind of bank could serve as a firm basis for an independent democratic press. It would be good if something could be undertaken very soon, preferably before March 17.

[Vladislav Starkov] With Prime Minister Pavlov issuing more and more decrees every day, even our highly efficient ARGUMENTY I FAKTY can come to ruin. We've run out of time. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY is ready to make an immediate and substantial contribution to the fund in question. Besides, we also promise to take under our wing any periodical however small or television or radio stations that need assistance. We can help them get paper and money. One of our other concerns is that our periodicals should have a stable readership. Once there are readers then there is a stable economic basis. We don't have to coordinate our efforts from the point of view of the content of our periodicals. But we have to work together to cope with problems concerning publishing and distribution. We won't gain much if we act separately.

[Vitaly Tretyakov] I'm all for creating a bank and for a common trade union that unites the electronic press and newsmen. Perhaps there should be a common trade union for journalists and printers. Their interests may not coincide in full, but it's important that today they have a common trade union. Printers are on our side. In fact, they've always been in the vanguard of the Russian revolutionary movement, and we should be together with them.

[Viktor Yugin] To create a fund to protect glasnost, we can hold an international lottery. We've already held one before—it was a success. Part of the revenues from this lottery could be used to set up a bank to promote the mass media in Russia. The Unions of Leaseholders, Entrepreneurs and Co-op members could take part in that fund.

[Vladimir Yakovlev] We have two strong points: money and readers' respect. Money is what particularly counts, since we are a commercial structure. The question is, how to use it. To put it in the fund, in my view, is not

very promising. I can assume that in the long run there will emerge a person or even a whole group who will launch a business within the framework of the fund to take advantage of reduced taxes. There are two spheres in which, I think, we can and should direct our investments: publishing and distribution. Particularly the second one. There are so many publishers one can choose from. As for us, we don't have problems with our publishers, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Under contract, we pay bonuses to the workers there, and that suits them very well. Things are worse with distribution, since there is only one organization dealing with it. I think we have to encourage new distributors. Say, the distributing company Chelovek in Leningrad. Investing money in it, we could turn it into a nationwide distributor. As for creating banks, I don't see it as a worthwhile undertaking. It would be much more promising to form a joint-stock company involving democratic publications.

[Vitaly Korotich] We have to defend each other's ideas, and encourage enthusiasm among the reform-minded democratic forces. When I say "our ideas", I do not mean to say "back-scratching". I value too much the independence of every one of us, the independence of our positions. If someone defames principles that are close to you—you should stand up and defend them. We'd rather organize more "round tables" or anything like them. MOSCOW NEWS is setting a good example in this. Take the leaders of the non-aligned countries: they meet to form a very strong union, yet they don't lose any of their positions. The entire conservative Soviet press enjoys strong support from above. But there is nobody to back us, except our readers. So let's unite them and help ourselves.

[Boxed item: "... paper canards have been flying one after another from the pages of the so-called independent newspapers not the least among which is MOSCOW NEWS. Not just canards, but large-caliber shells have been fired. We should remember that experienced pilots a long time ago piloted the rocket of anti-communism into Soviet information space." SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, February 20, 1991.]

Summing Up the Results

1. The democratic press need not coordinate its efforts from the standpoint of content. Coordination is mainly needed financially.
2. No effort must be spared in defending the Law on the Press and making public every violation of its letter and spirit.
3. There is a need persistently to expose before readers the scheming, misinterpretations and distortions of our opponents who are out to discredit both the very concept of glasnost and its advocates.
4. A special fund or bank should be set up to help those organs of the democratic press which are financially strapped, or subjected to pressure for their convictions.

5. Roundtable meetings should be continued.

Problems in Gauging Newspapers' Popularity Viewed

PM0104115391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 91 p 1

[V. Prokopenko report: "Thrown-Out Newspapers"]

[Text] Ministry of Communications experts claim that it is simply impossible to gauge various newspapers' popularity rating on a single day. It is necessary to monitor the process of their distribution for many days or, better still, months or even years. And the mass of difficulties of every kind facing communications industry workers themselves must be taken into consideration in the process...

But what do the statistics say?

In January this year 1,393,900 copies of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reached the newsstands in Moscow (and we are only talking about Moscow!). Of these, 4,321 copies (0.3 percent) were not sold and were written off. Of 1,457,700 copies of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 23,616 (1.6 percent) remained unsold. Some 2,237,900 copies of PRAVDA were received. Some 79,802 copies remained unsold (a 3.6 percent write-off rate). The biggest failure in January was SEM S PLYUSOM [Seven Plus]—33.4 percent of retail supplies went "into the shredder."

Throughout the country last year 0.02 percent of copies of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA remained unsold. By way of comparison, the figure for PRAVDA was somewhat higher—0.26 percent.

Note one detail: Only PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA are available to the retail trade network in the quantities required. For some reason all the rest (including KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA) do not reach the customer in abundance. Why?

In principle every newspaper should have a sense of how it is performing. If an edition sells out, it means it is a good one. If it gets shredded, it means the guys have produced a dud.

But in our country the regulation of retail circulation is entrusted to a civil servant. Like a magpie feeding her chicks, he gives some to one, some to the next, and none to the next. And all on the basis of personal sympathies and political convictions.

Therefore the system under which Soyuzpechat reports daily sales does not work properly. For the "convenience" of the apparatus everything operates in an extreme state of apprehension. And it is becoming increasingly difficult to even obtain the write-off figures for unsold newspapers. As if this is a military secret. Maybe it is?

World Scholars on Lenin's Role in History

91US0420A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 91
Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Article by Natalya Morozova: "This Was a Real Dialogue: 'Lenin and the 20th Century'—an International Roundtable"]

[Text] The conference "Lenin and the 20th Century" organized by the Novosti Information Agency lasted three days. For three days, from 25 through 27 March, Soviet and foreign political scientists and Lenin scholars exchanged views on the role of our great compatriot in the history of the 20th century. It would take time to interpret and generalize all that was said at the roundtable. Today, while the news is still hot, I am offering notes, which are somewhat subjective but still "from the inside": I sat at the roundtable itself all three days.

An international roundtable... Even 10 years ago this would most likely have been the traditional set of papers on the leader of the world proletariat, the most read author, the most human human, the most, the most, the most... And the only ones sitting at the table would have been ourselves and social scientists from the fraternal socialist countries.

But today... The United States, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, India, and Mexico were written on the name plates. And behind each name plate was a person with his own opinion, with a view on Lenin and the country's history that was different from the others. (This is in response to the fact that Russian radio listeners were told that only communists had gathered at the roundtable.)

The most diverse opinions were expressed at the roundtable, although far from all of them were as polarized as those of the two scholars Richard Pipes and Vladlen Loginov. The essence of their polemics will be discussed somewhat later, but now about my main impression from the conference—it was undoubtedly a highly intellectual atmosphere. Even when one professor would ask a trick question of another professor, it was done extremely tactfully and even with humor. I saw for myself how nicely Loginov smiled when parrying one of Pipes' questions.

Which other speakers do I remember? Among the Soviet participants—A. Butenko, P. Volobuyev, Yu. Polyakov, G. Sobolev... Of the foreign ones—Robert Tucker (United States), Gilberto Lopez y Rivas (Mexico), Giuseppe Boffa (Italy) Wolfgang Leonhardt (FRG)...

Perhaps Professor Leonhardt's paper was the most meaningful to me. A scholar and historian, he spoke with such animation about his personal relations with Lenin! No, he did not know the living Vladimir Ilich, but he actually had a personal relationship with Lenin, that is, one that came from the heart. At first the scholar, like many of us, thought that Stalin was a great continuer of Lenin's work. But then he began to receive news about Stalin's terror during the thirties, and at that time

Leonhardt separated Stalin from Lenin in his mind. Then came a new stage in his world view: He began to recognize negative facts about Lenin himself. "And then," the scholar said, "I wanted to get to know Lenin himself. And I read all 55 volumes of his Complete Collected Works." As you can understand, this admission disposed me especially favorably toward Leonhardt, because I also came to Lenin through his 55 volumes. True, we received different results from this reading: After I had closed the last volume, I had fallen in love with Vladimir Ilich once and for all, while Leonhardt began to be more skeptical about him. But in the overall balance of his assessments of Lenin and Leninism the pluses outweigh the minuses.

Professor Robert Tucker spoke. An amazingly intelligent person! He expressed so many interesting thoughts and observations. While listening to him I again thought with bitterness: While we were over here singing songs about Ilich, he was there "on the other side" fairly seriously studying our history, our revolutions, and our Lenin.

Richard Pipes almost brought tears to my eyes. Yes, he is the same Pipes whose name for many years was mentioned in our press only with negative and sometimes abusive epithets. He is an anti-Soviet and an anticommunist and an apologist for bourgeois ideology. And here I was sitting next to someone like that. We spoke during the break and he poured me some mineral water... Oh, about 10 years ago if I had taken such liberties I would have been taken to the "proper place" for a reprimand! I decided to verify my impression and during the break I asked Pipes: "Did you ever think that you could sit at a roundtable in Moscow and openly express a negative opinion about Lenin?" "What do you mean, of course not! That would have been impossible even to imagine."

One must give Pipes his due: He did not waver at all and did not adjust his ideas to fit in with the overall atmosphere of the roundtable, which in general was respectful to Lenin. But you know what struck me? That even Pipes had to a certain degree come under the enchantment of our perestroika euphoria! His paper reminded me of our own speeches at rallies. In conclusion Pipes said: "If we remove the thick layer of polish from our ideas about Lenin, we will see that his legacy is not worth saving."

The Harvard University professor was not likely to have known our movie classics well, but I reminded him of the words of the princess from "An Ordinary Miracle": "I rushed for three days and three nights in order to tell you how indifferent I am to you!" Is this not the way it is with Pipes, who came halfway around the world to say that nobody needs Lenin today... Pipes' views are well known. He speaks clearly, in terse sentences: "Lenin laid the basis for illegality; the Stalinist terror was merely a continuation of the Leninist terror, the first attempt to impose collectivization by force was made by Lenin..."

Are you surprised, have you recognized something familiar? Well, yes, we read this all the time in our

"independent" press today, in books by Solzhenitsyn and Grossman, in articles by Selyunin, Afanasyev, and Soloukhin... We will not worry ourselves over what is original and what is plagiarism. We will state only the fact that at the conference Professor Pipes expressed an extreme viewpoint in the rejection of Lenin.

The antipode to Pipes, Vladen Loginov, insistently appealed to his colleagues to take a realistic view of history. Disturbed, he asked why some people want so much to picture Lenin as a maniacal supporter of Marxist doctrine? As though all he ever wanted to do was "hammer" this doctrine into Russia, no matter what the price. Yet that is not the way it was; Lenin was always in step with life. It is funny to hear that the first communes were created under the influence of Marxist doctrine. There has been much poverty in the country, which has not always been able to feed itself with one-man management: They did not have the necessary supplies or horses... They joined together in order to survive and not to gratify the heart of Ilich with their communist consciousness.

The idea of the realistic nature of Lenin's policy was supported by many scholars, including foreign ones. And there were almost no supporters of Pipes' extreme views. No, participants in the roundtable by no means envisioned Lenin as an innocent angel; they all had serious complaints against Lenin and against Bolshevism in general. But this was a discussion of scholars who study our history seriously and take a serious approach to evaluating the personality and activity of Lenin.

There was a paper by Robert Tucker, whom I have already mentioned. How calmly and easily he works with the facts of our history, quoting Trotsky in the same way that we once quoted Lenin. And yet for us Trotsky is still like some kind of foreign body in journalistic and also scholarly practice: We have done without him for so long, as we have, incidentally, done without other of our eminent figures as well. Shameful! We will have to re-educate ourselves for a long time in order to work that freely with the facts of history and the creative legacy of people who at one time were deleted from our history.

I might be reproached for excessive enthusiasm about the foreign participants in the roundtable discussion.

Does this mean that their knowledge of history and their knowledge of Lenin are irreproachable and they make no mistakes? Of course not. For Lenin's creative legacy is inexhaustible. To read it still does not mean to master it and understand everything. One can quote correctly and still deprive the original source of some important nuance. For example Neal Harding (Great Britain) presented his idea of Lenin's metaphysical (!) thinking and his opponents pointed out to him that he was working not with a Leninist but with a Stalinist interpretation of the concept of a "class approach."

We are writing here, they say, and we cannot shake off the stereotypes of the "Short Course" that have attached themselves to us! It turns out that this has gripped certain Western scholars as well.

At the end of the second day of the congress there was a presentation of the book of one of the participants—Giuseppe Boffa's "The History of the USSR." The author has an excellent knowledge of our country's history and Lenin's creative legacy. For the Italian scholar there is practically nothing new in the flood of information that has come down upon the Soviet people. But it was this scholar who uttered these words: "Here we have spoken about the need to create a political biography of Lenin. I would say that this is somewhat narrow—we need to create an intellectual biography of Lenin!"

We should listen to the words of the wise scholar and writer. Let us recall them when we encounter superficial insinuations about Lenin in today's press. Malicious detractors write boldly without burdening themselves with searches for arguments, casting accusation after accusation against Lenin, just like in backyard squabbles.

But these foreign scholars, people with the most diverse views, agree on one thing: This was a great man of the 20th century.

I shall conclude my essay on the roundtable with the words of Wolfgang Leonhardt: "I have never before had occasion to participate in such a serious and well-organized conference. Here we had complete freedom of expression and this was a real dialogue."

Indeed it was!

Pollution Control Bottlenecks Discussed

91UN1070A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
26 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Ain Lääne, lead scientist at the Water Protection Laboratory Technical University of Tallinn: "Bottlenecks in the Way of Pollution Tax"]

[Text] The transition to market economy has a direct impact on our daily lives through prices and taxes. In late January, two articles appeared (RAHVA HAAL—"Clouding the Waters" and POSTIMEES—"Using Nature To Reach Into the Pockets of People") that deal with the implementation of Estonian government's decree Number 237, dated November 20, 1990, regarding: "Procedures for Taxing the Use of Natural Resources."

The authors of the decree, among others, should have foreseen the possibility of such articles appearing. To keep down confusion, the issues could have been explained to the people beforehand, through the media. However, there have been some obvious omissions in this matter. Let us make an attempt, therefore, to arrive at some measure of clarity on some of the basic issues.

Who will pay for the expenses caused by polluting nature or efforts to reduce such pollution?

If, only a few years ago, you could read in the newspapers that the state will pay for all expenses related to environmental protection, subsidize agriculture, give free medical help and education to the people, then today this is no longer the case. Everybody knows that the state treasury is not a miracle chest from which you can draw, indefinitely. The state does not create wealth, but merely redistributes, according to need, the money it collects in the form of taxes from its population and its enterprises.

There is only one conclusion we can draw from this: The expenses resulting from polluting the environment and from reducing pollution, are actually borne by the individual—either directly in the form of taxes, or through the prices we pay for goods. This is the way it's done in all of the states. The only other way would be to leave these expenses for the future generations to pay. And so it is that we are paying today for what was left undone in Estonia over the years.

The only question is: Will it be done through taxes specifically earmarked for that purpose, or will other, indirect ways of raising the money be used. The old system of filling the state treasury, as practiced in the Soviet Union up until now, will obviously no longer suit us.

For the industry, there is a third option. Instead of the enterprise being taxed, it will be asked to solve its own environmental problems in accordance with state regulations, at its own expense. Naturally, such expenses would then be figured into the cost of production. The advantage of that is that the enterprise can decide for itself which is more profitable: To build purification equipment or to

replace the old production technology with one that is new and environment-friendly. The latter option is widely used in the economically developed countries.

Expenses for cleaning up pollution caused by the population will be paid by funds collected from the population. In most cases, these will go into the local budget, and the taxes can differ widely by the regions.

Hence, the final conclusion: If people want to protect their environment, they will have to forego a certain portion of their money either in taxes, or in some other manner, to clean up the pollution.

The idea of the pollution or contamination tax is not new. The problem has been studied in Finland and elsewhere, but no practical solutions have been found so far. Environmental protectors in Estonia took the bull by the horns, however, and decided to overcome the chronic lack of funds inhibiting this activity by imposing appropriate taxes for that purpose. The first steps were taken in the mid-80's and the final decree saw the light of day in November of 1990.

Who was the person who actually authored the idea of pollution and resource taxes in Estonia? This is a difficult question to answer, since the group of authors who came up with the decree has not been disclosed so far. I can say with confidence, however, that those who drafted the combined budget for the republic were not the authors of that idea.

It seems that the draft for this decree came to the budget makers as a gift they would have been foolish not to use. It also seems that they didn't take the trouble to weigh its material impact on environmental protection, the extent of funds actually collected, nor its effect on the prices of goods. Also underplayed was the importance of problems related to determining the quantities of pollutants released by individual enterprises into the environment through the sewage systems of the cities.

Since all ground pollution is channeled into the different bodies of water through pipelines and purification equipment belonging to the water and sewer production authority (VKTV), the burden of all future activity for collecting the pollution tax from its clients was left to be shouldered by the VKTV. VKTV acquired an additional, unpaid task of dividing the pollution tax total between the different enterprises. What compounds the confusion here is that only part of the pollution released into the environment is considered taxable. Trying to divide this tax total between the enterprises, while there is no way, and no necessary means of measuring the amounts of pollutants, represents a serious research challenge.

This does not mean that environmental protection officials have become the well-meaning hostages of money collecting budget makers. Actually, environmental protection officials have become the victims of their own erroneous idea, believing that it would be possible to build the

sewage purification equipment so necessary for the environment with the devaluating ruble that has no material backing. The responsibility assumed along with the collection of money is extremely great, and the failure of the operation could discredit the whole department. Strategically, it would have been more correct to forego the collection of money and to require that the enterprises spend these monetary resources on the implementation of environmental measures.

What was the objective of the resource and pollution tax?

The most general objective was to force both the enterprises and the population to develop a rational attitude about natural resources, to collect money for building the much-needed sewer facilities, and also for financing water studies.

As for the intention of using tax to force the population and the enterprises to develop a rational attitude toward the environment, it seems not to have succeeded for the time being. The taxes are simply incorporated into the price of the goods and, under conditions of a deficit economy, their saleability is determined by their availability, and not by their price. Not until we have competition in the marketplace, can the price mechanism kick in, and help us realize the positive effect of the resource and pollution tax. At the same time, we have to consider the competitiveness of our goods on the foreign market. We also have to keep in mind that **the pollution tax imposed by law will have a protective effect on the environment only as long as the expenditures made to remove pollutants are smaller than the tax total. A further increase in the effect of purification would result in losses to the enterprise.** This is obviously one of the main reasons why Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the FRG do not have fixed pollution fees for individual substances.

What are the practical options for taxing the population and the enterprises?

As a rule, taxes are based on quantities that are relatively easy to check such as the size of the land, value of the real estate, sales volume of the enterprise or the size of an individual's income. The veracity of the information submitted to the taxation office is the responsibility of the taxpayer. To disclose cheating, random checks will be made and violators fined.

In the case of pollution tax, it would stand to reason that the measurement of pollutant amounts be the responsibility of the enterprise.

But how should the pollutant amounts of the population be measured? In practice, it could be done only on the basis of some statistical average.

Pollution tax is based on the amounts of different pollutants discharged into the bodies of water. The basic problem, in determining these amounts, is the wide

variation in the flow rate and pollutant concentration of the effluent within an hour, a shift, a 24-hour period, a week, a month or a year.

To determine accurate amounts of pollutants, both the flow rates and pollutant concentrations of the effluent would have to be measured according to a certain program. Since we don't have automatic measuring devices for this purpose, special research would have to be conducted to determine the necessary frequency of measurements. All this can be done if the enterprise discharges its effluent directly into a body of water.

The situation becomes considerably more complicated, however, when we are dealing with Tallinn, for example. First, we will have to know the amounts of pollutants released into the city's sewer system by different enterprises. Secondly, we will have to know to what degree the city's purification equipment has reduced the amount of pollution for each of those enterprises. In practice, the latter amount would be impossible to determine. That leaves us with only one option of dividing the pollution tax not according to the actual amounts of pollution released into the sea, but proportionately, according to the pollution amounts released into the sewage system.

Thus we have indeed arrived at the universal average index, that satisfies the party demanding payment, but not the one doing the paying.

The only way for the enterprises to determine the pollutant amounts is to have studies done for that purpose, the results of which would have to include recommendations for reducing the pollutant amounts of the enterprise. One should be warned, however, that the problems of dividing the pollution tax cannot be solved by such a study, since the tax is based on the amounts of pollution released into the environment, and not on amounts released into the sewage.

With the population, the situation is considerably more complicated (simpler?). Research has established the average amounts of organic matter, phosphorus and nitrogen released into the sewage system over a 24-hour period. Deducting from that pollution amounts removed by the purification equipment, leaves a total of 30 rubles a year to be paid by each inhabitant of Tallinn for the amount of sewage dumped into the sea. Out of that amount 8.7 rubles are for organic pollution, 1.3 rubles for phosphorus, and 20 rubles for nitrogen. After the 1994 activation of the second stage purification facilities in Tallinn, the pollution tax would be reduced to 22 rubles, 20 rubles out of which would be for nitrogen. At the same time, however, fees for the sewer services will be going up. Assuming that there are half a million people using sewer services in Tallinn, the total tax to be collected for pollution in 1994 would be roughly 10 million rubles.

By way of comparison we can say that, according to the VKTV of Tallinn, they have managed to spend about four million rubles a year on building new sewer facilities. It was not money, but the lack of building capacity that caused the building of purification facilities to snag.

Money to be collected in the future could be used to expand the purification facilities so that nitrogen compounds could also be removed. Considering, however, the high cost of the purification process, the removal of nitrogen compounds has posed a serious problem to all developed countries on the Baltic Sea. To this day, the Helsinki Commission has not reached a consensus on the need to remove nitrogen, or on the minimum concentrations allowed.

Hence the question—do we have the right to tax the population for releasing nitrogen compounds into the environment as long as we do not have the technical or economic means of removing nitrogen compounds?

The experiences of Finland, Sweden, FRG, and Denmark show that after restoring their economies, beginning in 1965, the financing of environmental measures was off to a more serious start. Time has passed and this tactic is obviously no longer suitable for us. We have to resolve our environmental production problems simultaneously with the reorganization of industry. Our primary task is to establish technologies that are environment-friendly, and only then turn to the elimination of residual pollution.

The article deals with only some of the bottlenecks in the way of the pollution tax. Similar problems have also emerged in effecting taxes in other areas of our lives. **It seems that different branches of the economy are making isolated attempts to collect money for the completion of tasks in their own areas, without coordinating them with the general interests of the state. The government, however, is not capable of creating order during the transition period, while the Soviet law is supposedly no longer in effect, and the Estonian law has not taken effect yet.**

What really matters is that we learn from our mistakes, and that remarks made over time be considered when the pollution tax decree comes up for a review. The decree we have now, based on firm prices and rates of exchange, cannot be useful over a longer period of time.

If we want to become full-fledged members of the Baltic Sea Environmental Commission in the future, we should begin right now, while drafting our new laws, to take advantage of the applicable experiences of all the countries around the Baltic Sea.

Saiga Herds Seen Endangered by Government Policies, Export Efforts

91WN0342A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 28 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by A. Shamenov, leader of the advisory staff for ecology and the use of nature by the apparatus of the Kazakh SSR president: "The Flight of the Saiga"]

[Text] *I recall how, when I was a child, my father would take me with him to a remote shepherd camp in the Karakum. The biggest holiday there was when they said farewell to the saiga. How beautifully they raced off,*

raising clouds of dust! And if you were especially lucky, you could see them close up—swift and fleet of foot. You would sit somewhere in a sheltered place and turn the eyepieces of your old binoculars... I still remember the feeling of excitement with the extraordinary beauty of the hook-nosed steppe antelopes.

Sometimes we would buy saiga meat from the villagers. They would sell it for maybe 5-10 rubles [R] for a whole carcass, unprocessed, with horns. For some reason, at that time the head of the saiga was not valued—skulls with horns were lying everywhere around the village.

We children especially loved kuyrdak—a hot dish made of antelope meat. True, we did not often get a chance to taste it: The shepherds hunted only in season and they did not break the law...

Now I work with saiga as a part of my job. Almost every day I see on my desk despairing communications from hunting inspectors and notes from scientists and specialists. Your heart aches when you learn how the public wealth is being squandered...

But my own impressions can come later. I shall begin with a telegram bearing the stamp "governmental." It was sent to USSR Prime Minister V. Pavlov by the republic premier, U. Karamanov. What is this? It turns out that the deputy chairman of the Union Council of Ministers, S. Sitaryan, had given permission to an enterprise in the Transbaykal area to ship five tons of saiga horns to China. Of course, a sharp protest followed immediately. But we have not yet received a response, although it has been more than a month.

The conflict has a long history. But first a little geography and biology... The saiga is an exceptionally rare kind of animal. Kazakhstan is practically the only place on earth where it has survived. Incidentally, the animal is not most valuable for its meat but for its horns. Until recently the republic was the traditional supplier of this raw material for the countries of Southeast Asia. From it, for example, they "created" potions from Tibetan medicine.

Our republic not only managed to preserve this disappearing breed of animal, but also to restore its numbers to the commercial level. There are now more than a million saiga in Kazakhstan. As many as there were 25 years ago. And all because there was a specialized state service—commercial hunting farms. Licenses were issued in keeping with decisions of scientists. The hunting inspections checked to make sure everything was in order.

But now the "cooperative age" is upon us. And the saiga have become the victims of unbridled greed. Numerous cooperatives, "joint enterprisers," and "private enterprisers" are all trying to get their hands on hard currency. The first to break into the international market was the Alma-Ata cooperative Sinegorye. Hundreds of greedy people who did not care about anything except their own profit burst into this profitable "branch." In all-terrain

trucks equipped with the latest hunting weapons, sometimes even automatic ones, they conducted hellish chases across the steppe which ended with the mass slaughter of the animals.

During the past two years the "gentlemen of fortune" have killed more than 400,000 animals. The number of head of saiga has decreased five- to sixfold as compared to 1987. In the opinion of scientists, this could lead to their complete disappearance in the republic in the near future. This was "helped" not only by neighbors from Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation but also Baltic entrepreneurs who were working busily on the expanses of Kazakhstan. And all of them sent their booty outside the republic. And the licenses were issued by the USSR Council of Ministers without any consultation with the republic...

The result? The prices for the raw material dropped and the republic lost hundreds of thousands of dollars. The head of the republic, N. Nazarbayev, sent a special letter to the USSR Government. And finally the State Foreign Economics Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decision to set a quota on saiga horns—31 tons for 1990. And what happened? During 10 months of last year the Prodintorg association of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties, under agreements with the cooperatives, enterprises, and various organizations, delivered 25 tons of saiga horns to Singapore. Moreover, USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairmen V. Nikitin and S. Sitaryan permitted the Altay Kray Ispolkom [executive committee] to ship eight tons of saiga horns to China, and their colleague, L. Voronin, generously issued Soyuzzagranpostavka a license for another 150 tons. This is out-and-out robbery!

And many of the businessmen stored up the raw material for nothing. I will name two organizations: the cooperative of the Moscow Oblast consumers' union Podmoskovye and the agro-industrial association Novomoskovskoye. They are headed by well-known people: Yu. Marinichev and V. Starodubtsev. Both are USSR people's deputies...

The Novosibirsk Oblast consumers' union, the Altay Kray consumers' union, the Dalso-Pasifik joint enterprise of the All-Union Association for Exports and Imports of Food Products, and many others failed to return to us the raw material acquired in violation of the Kazakhstan Government decree.

Taking into account the situation that has developed and trying to prevent a real ecological catastrophe, the Kazakh group—USSR and Kazakh SSR people's deputies—appealed to the president of the Union. A regular government decree was adopted. And... again "bypassing" the republic, the export licenses were issued...

Recently I was visited by four chiefs of oblast state inspections for protection of the animal kingdom. And here is the alarming news they brought me: The price of a kilogram of this raw material, which is in short supply on the black market, has jumped to R500. Second-hand

dealers are offering the shepherds in exchange for the horns—tea, vodka, sugar, and spare parts for vehicles.

Where can the saiga run or gallop off to? Where can they escape total destruction?

Kiev Water Supply Dioxin Content Investigated

91WN0326A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 6

[Article by Valentin Smaga, KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA commentator, "host of the Green World club, telephone 441-86-51": "Dioxin in Kiev?"]

[Text] Scientists in Moscow charge \$3,000 for analyzing one sample of drinking water to determine the presence of a substance whose poisonous properties exceed those of potassium cyanide.

The saying is true: The less you know the better you sleep. At times, the daily routine in newspapers makes us look at a little stream of kitchen tap water as if it were a fuse tied to an air bomb. A drunken engineer smashed a tank car filled with phenol somewhere in the vicinity of Smolensk, and all of Kiev read the reports about this filth floating down the Dnepr as if they were communiqués from the front line. As soon as this blew over, there was another problem: They decided to combat ice jams on the Pripyat with aerial bombs. This stirred up all the radioactive silt on the bottom which had accumulated since the Chernobyl disaster...

A. Goncharuk, director of the Institute of Colloid Chemistry and Water Chemistry of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, served up still more "pleasant" news. Speaking at a regular meeting of the academy presidium, he communicated that... dioxin was found in running water in Kiev. Let me remind you what that is. Polychlorinated hydrocarbons (such is the scientific name of the substance) are extremely toxic. The presence of even small doses in drinking water causes people to be aggressive "for no reason" and destroys the liver. The Americans used dioxin as a toxic chemical agent during the Vietnam war. Children with deformities are still being born in Vietnam because of this. Pilots who sprayed dioxin over the jungles had to be sterilized...

The director did not cite specific data on the presence of dioxin in Kiev's drinking water, but he did refer to data for Moscow. Every resident of "the hope of the world and the heart of all Russia" takes in the following dose of dioxin: 10^{-9} grams per liter, which is 1,000 times more than the highest permissible concentration. The entire pathos of the speech by V. Goncharuk, corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, as I understood it, was reduced to the fact that American equipment should be purchased in order to urgently study this issue. Those Muscovites who have the equipment charge a lot of money for every test.

A very interesting hypothesis was also voiced. Dioxin has not been found in the Dnepr and Desna water-intake

facilities. However, it is present in the piped water supply. It is quite logical to assume that the poison is somehow generated in the process of the chlorination and ozone treatment of water at special stations...

This version appears quite convincing to me. We ourselves, rather than the infamous agents of an imperialist intelligence service, blew up Unit No. 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Why is it impossible for the delivery of a lethal poison to the kitchen of every housewife to be a man-made miracle? I am eager to believe in the good intentions of V. Goncharuk. However, the reserved statements by the director concerning the presence of dioxin in Kiev's water, which flashed on newspaper pages, led to nothing but rumors. Any change in the color and smell of water brings scores of telephone calls to various echelons. This convinces me personally of one thing only: Our system of ecological information is not capable of creating anything but panic. For example, the so-called "green telephone" of the Kiev City Committee for Environmental Protection has been extensively advertised. I dialed 417-81-20. It turned out that this was the phone of... the secretary of the committee chairman, whereas so-called "dispatchers," which were supposedly able to clarify the issue of the presence of dioxin in the water, were found at another phone number: 212-28-94. I tried for two days to contact anyone at all. I did not succeed. Anyone who so wishes may duplicate my attempt to call the "ecological ambulance."

In April 1986, Sweden's ecological services saved many of their fellow citizens from trouble by disseminating through the press recommendations on the simplest methods for combating radioactive contamination which, as you know, emanated from the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Unlike the Swedes, we were fooled for a long time. As we have found out, even now, five years after the catastrophe, it is by and large impossible to obtain reliable information from state organizations on how a person should behave in the event of radioactive, phenol, and dioxin (the list may be continued) contamination of water.

In the years of perestroika, public organizations have also been unable to resolve this elementary issue and establish an effective system for providing ecological information to the populace. Moreover, at present they are as disjointed as ever.

The public council of the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Ecology, of which I am honored to be a member, has turned into a hollow talkathon. The Ukrainian ecological association ZELENII SVIT, to which so many hopes were attached, has become excessively politicized. Unions and petty unions with the sinister word Chernobyl in their names are cropping up by the dozen. There are headquarters and committees to save the Dnepr, the Azov and Black Seas, public institutes of ecology, and even the Our Land association which unites gardener-land reclaimers who have brazenly built a dam in the Koncha-Zaspa natural area... If this continues

Ukrainian land may indeed become their land, it will become as salinated and devastated as the zone of the Danube-Dnestr canal built by the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources.

KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA is setting up a new Green World club, precisely for the purpose of helping environmental-protection organizations come down to earth from the heavens and learn how to really protect the people against ecological troubles. The people should not be left defenseless. Dioxin is already in the kitchen.

Academy of Sciences Official on Probability of Siberian River Diversion Project

91WN0327B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
9 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by S. Ziyadullayev, member of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council's Commission on Regional Problems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: "A Miser Pays Twice: There Is No Alternative to the Siberian River Diversion"]

[Text] According to scientists and specialists' calculations, the water resources of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers are almost completely exhausted. If the necessary measures for the preservation of the water resources are taken, and progressive irrigation methods are used in all branches of the national economy, the region's water resources will last at best until the year 2000.

How are we to live afterward? How to develop the economy, especially agriculture? How to provide for the fast-growing population's food needs in the environment of irrigation agriculture?

The overwhelming majority of scientists and specialists in water management have only one answer to these questions: What is needed is an interregional redistribution of the water resources, that is, diversion of part of the Siberian river flow into Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This issue was studied for 10 years; several Union resolutions were adopted; research and development work was done in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Water Problems, in the All-Union State Research and Design Institute for Waterways Management, and so on. These studies took into account economic, ecological, and other factors; specialists and scientists from Uzbekistan and other republics actively participated in them. They were discussed many times at scientific conferences, symposiums, etc. Very regrettably, however, the opponents of the diversion won, and all work was stopped by decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 16 August 1986. However, considering the shortage of water resources in our region, the same decision directed the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenina to "continue the

study of scientific problems related to the regional redistribution of the water resources on the basis of comprehensive ecological and economic research, the use of modern economic and mathematical methods and technical means, as well as thorough analysis of both domestic and foreign experience in this area." This offered some hope that the problem will finally be moved toward solution. Unfortunately, this part of the decision is not being carried out, although four years have passed since then.

As far as we know, this point of the decision is not reflected in any research or development plans of any Union institute.

The problem of water resources is most topical for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Not only the fate of the multimillion population of the region but the industry's supply of highly important raw materials and the population's food supply depend on the potential solution of this problem. Moreover, a decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 19 September 1983 suspended construction of large irrigation systems and utilization of new areas of irrigated land in the Aral Sea basin on the basis of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins' water resources starting 1991. This was decided because the water resources are already approaching exhaustion, and there have been more dry years lately, which inflicts considerable damage on the region's economy. Suffice it to say that during the previous decade 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 were dry years.

We are wasting valuable time on the resolution of the diversion problem. It will take 10 to 12 years to accomplish the project of a partial diversion of the Siberian river flow. Therefore, now is the time to start, and preparation work can be completed in the next few years.

Until this global solution is in place it is necessary to speed up the reconstruction of the entire irrigation system so that the remaining water resources can be used economically.

It is not possible to even somewhat increase the area of irrigated lands on existing water resources without reconstruction. There is now 0.21 hectares of irrigated land per capita in Uzbekistan; according to specialists, by the year 2005, given the stabilization of irrigated lands, this indicator will decrease by more than one-half, making it impossible to ensure the necessary level of agricultural production to satisfy the needs of the region's republics and fulfill the all-Union tasks.

The Union organs formulated the issue correctly—to continue scientific research aimed at solving the problem of the region's water resources. I heard with satisfaction the statements by Uzbek SSR President I.A. Karimov, who insists on the necessity of solving the problem of the Siberian river flow diversion into our region. By the way, it is a significant sign that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is also raising this issue again ("Water as a Cause of Fire," January 16 1991).

I totally agree with American scientist Professor F.I. Miklin in his opinion that the "Soviet government may have to return to the project of partial diversion of the Siberian river flow in the 1990's not only out of water management considerations but also out of political and social considerations."

The delay in solving the problems of the Aral Sea and the Aral area has led to an ecological catastrophe, although scientists of the Council for the Study of Productive Forces of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences were concerned with it 16 years ago. Now not only an all-Union government commission but even the United Nations is involved in resolving this problem.

Therefore we should not delay the solution of the problem of interregional water resource redistribution.

Despite all the current difficulties, one wants to believe that the country will soon enter the wide road of a market economy and an opportunity will arise to deal with the most serious and vitally important issues aimed at strengthening the economic sovereignty of the republics within the renewed all-Union federation. The important thing is not to waste time that is precious for the development of future productive forces.

Georgian Greens Council Chairman Outlines Program, Accomplishments

91WN0324A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
7 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Zurab Zhvaniya, chairman of the Greens Party Central Council and speaker of the Georgian Greens Party, by VESTNIK GRUZII correspondent Vakhtang Akhalaya; date and place not given: "We Will Save Life..."]

[Text] [Akhalaya] Zurab, on 3 March in Tbilisi, the Second Congress of the Georgian Greens completed its work. Why was it held behind closed doors?

[Zhvaniya] We actually did not invite guests, neither Greens from abroad, nor representatives of Georgian political organizations, with a slight exception. The fact is that this congress was of a purely working nature. We had to analyze the path we had traversed and determine tactics for operating under the new conditions that have evolved in Georgia.

[Akhalaya] The current "combination of posts," probably, reflects the process of the future politicization of the "Green" movement in the republic?

[Zhvaniya] On the contrary, inasmuch as I was elected chairman of the central council at the congress. But according to the new regulations, this position is combined with the duties of the speaker of the party. This means that political activity of the Greens will not predominate over environmental protection. The congress legitimized the position that the movement and the Greens Party of Georgia are organizationally combined.

The Georgian Greens today are an association of people which, realizing the complete criticality of the situation that has evolved, both on a global scale and in the republic, and sensing its own responsibility to future generations, is ready to act energetically.

[Akhalya] You have in mind, of course, not only the ecological situation...

[Zhvaniya] Of course, you see, fundamental changes in the sphere of the restoration and protection of the living environment in Georgia are impossible without the same kind of radical changes in the economy and in the system of the sociopolitical structure. But they are possible only with the achievement of the full state of independence of our republic.

Necessary Commentary

It seems that not very much time has passed since April of 1988, when the "Green" movement was started in Georgia—an ecological association has been created in the Pan-Georgian Society of Rustaveli. In December of 1989, the first congress of Georgian Greens was held—an announcement was made about the creation of the movement as an independent sociopolitical organization. In March 1990, the Georgian Greens Party arose in the midst of the movement as its most politicized nucleus. There are already a thousand people today in the ranks of the "Green" movement. This includes scientists, representatives of the creative intelligentsia, students, peasants, and workers united in 31 rayon, city, and kray organizations. The main principles: harmonious coexistence of society and the environment, ecological safety, democracy, and nonviolence. The methods of struggle: actions of protest, picketing, rallies, etc.

[Akhalya] The Greens today are in opposition—according to the results of elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, they did not receive even one seat in the parliament; however, as far as I know, they are taking part in the work of its commissions...

[Zhvaniya] Only individual representatives. While this participation is purely symbolic, we are preparing for more constructive cooperation. Just as soon as a Land Use and Ecology Commission was established in parliament, we submitted a list there of our representatives—specialists in this sphere. Unfortunately, they convened only once, at the end of November of last year.

[Akhalya] So, are they included on the commission staff?

[Zhvaniya] This question is not yet clear to us. I must note with chagrin that a draft on the arrangement of a state environmental protection system that we submitted was also ignored completely. It was not reflected at all in the concept of the creation of a Ministry of Ecology of the republic, which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet. Today, the activity of this ministry still does not indicate decisive steps in the matter of bettering the protection of

the environment and overcoming the crisis in the ecological situation. On the contrary, we sense certain negative trends.

[Akhalya] Exactly what alarms you?

[Zhvaniya] The renewal of large-scale construction of a whole series of ecologically dangerous installations, dropped through the combined efforts of the national movement of the republic, is becoming a real danger. Discussions are going on at the very highest level regarding the Khudoni GES [hydroelectric power station], which is based on incompetent findings.

[Akhalya] A final decision has not been made yet...

[Zhvaniya] Nevertheless, in the settlement of Dzhvarzen, where the Ingurstroy administration is located, intensive preparations are already being made.

[Akhalya] A severe power famine is present in the republic. However, it is unreasonable to satiate it at the expense of an artificial deepening of the abyss of ecological catastrophe...

[Zhvaniya] Moreover, none of the references to the criticality of the power problem are warranted. You see, such grandiose construction will drag on for not less than 10 years, requiring tremendous resources. In addition, the Khudoni GES is a peak-load power station, but there is no shortage of peak-load electric power in Georgia, which is presented in abundance by our rivers in the spring-summer period. But the existing deficit in elementary electric power, which is created artificially, basically owing to the incomplete delivery of fuel to the republic for thermoelectric power stations, cannot be covered in the winter, even if 10 Khudoni GES are built. But how justified is the decision of the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers concerning the renewal of the construction of the Lakbe Reservoir, the chief structure of the new land reclamation system in Kakheti. No important agro-economical basis exists to make its creation necessary. Not to speak of the destructive ecological consequences.

There is talk about the start of construction of a lithium plant, and I note—on imported material—in the village of Geguti, not far from Kutaisi, where the ecological situation is already strained. It was put off at one time as a result of actions of the Greens of Tskhaltubo. Thorough ecological expert analysis is needed in connection with the planned construction of circular furnaces for coking coal in Zestafoni...

[Akhalya] Since the opinion of the Greens is not being heeded in the leadership spheres, it will become necessary, very likely, to stand up for your principles?

[Zhvaniya] For the time being, we have refrained from our traditional protest actions. The situation in the republic is too tense even without this. We are all living through the events in Samachablo with aching hearts. But if our economy is not put on the "Green rails" of

ecological safety, and if a dialogue is not held at the summit, the Greens will not be silent, and they will not go for any compromises.

[Akhalaya] Are you confident that the population of the republic will support you?

[Zhvaniya] Our most important principle always was and remains total openness in protecting the interests of the health of the people, and of future generations, regardless of the political situation. And the people believe in us...

Necessary Commentary

Indeed, it is very sad that the anxious voice of the Greens is still not listened to very much at the apex of the pyramid of authority. For it resounds with sincere alarm over the health, life, and fate of each of us—of all of those who are at the base of this pyramid. Why not use the knowledge and energy of these honest, respectable, and competent people, good specialists, and real patriots of Georgia, who created a powerful environmental protection organization that enjoys the broad support of the population? The corresponding parliamentary commission and the new Ministry of Ecology of the republic have thousands of volunteer helpers who are dedicated to their cause. It simply does not make sense not to take them into account...

[Akhalaya] In connection with the deteriorating situation in Samachablo, and the unabating conflicts in the Transcaucasus, and in the Caucasus as a whole, how realistic today is your basic slogan "The Caucasus is our common home?"

[Zhvaniya] Our idea of an all-Caucasus home is not always understood accurately. It is just the exact opposite of the imperial policy of "Divide and rule!" which was always conducted with extreme cruelty and perfidy with respect to the people of the Caucasus. Today, this policy has as its aim to subject them to an abyss of interethnic and religious wars, and to prevent the attainment by our republics of state independence.

As for the bloody orgy of the Ossetian separatists in Samachablo, using our overall Caucasus relations, we are applying all efforts so that the people of the Caucasus receive true information about this. Moreover, at the second congress, we also decided to activate our international relations more energetically.

[Akhalaya] These relations are being broadened continuously. Are you able to use them in the interests of the republic, and, most of all, to ensure international recognition and integration in the all-European process?

[Zhvaniya] We are really actively cooperating with the Greens in various countries. For example, an agreement has been reached with the Black Sea and Danube area states about cooperation in the resolution of the ecological problems of the Black Sea. The next meeting of European Greens is to be held at the end of March, and

its agenda includes a change in the status of our organization as an observer. We will become a full-fledged member of the community of "Eurogreens."

[Akhalaya] What are your specific achievements?

[Zhvaniya] For example, specifically relating to the joint efforts of the Greens of Georgia and of Estonia, the "Eurogreens" became the first political force of Europe which as early as March of last year absolutely unequivocally declared full support for the struggle of the Baltic republics and Georgia to restore full state independence. We intend in the future as well to actively use our international relations in Georgia's interests.

Necessary Commentary

The "Eurogreens" today are one of the most influential, united, and well-coordinated political organizations in Europe and in the world. It has its factions just as in the European parliament, as well as in the parliaments of the 15 European states. Businessmen and politicians take it into consideration. The forthcoming entry into it of the Greens of Georgia is an important event in the life of our republic. This is practically the first step on the threshold of the all-European home. And for this reason it is so important for all of us, starting today, to do everything together, to support the Greens in their noble cause, and to heed the voice of reason and think not only about today, but also about that lot that we are preparing for future generations.

Mission of Uzbek Environmental Protection Committee Outlined

91WN0328A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
5 Feb 91 p 2

[Press release from Uzbek SSR State Committee on Environmental Protection Press Center: "With the Right To Ban"]

[Text] Last December the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet approved a statute on the Uzbek SSR State Committee on Environmental Protection, which gives it new status!

Today, Uzbek Goskompriroda [State Committee on Environmental Protection] is directly subordinate to the republic Supreme Soviet; that is, to the people's deputies, and it is guided by its decisions and laws and by the republic Constitution. Therefore, the committee's decrees, orders and instructions are binding on ministries and agencies, and state and other enterprises on the territory of the republic, for execution. At the very same time, UzSSR Goskompriroda does not supplant the ministries, agencies, institutions and organizations in their actions on protection and rational use of natural resources. They are only obliged to coordinate their activities with UzSSR Goskompriroda.

The republic Supreme Soviet has given UzSSR Goskompriroda the following basic tasks: restoration of the health of the ecological situation in the republic, along

with preservation and rational use of natural resources—the land, sub-surface and surface water, the ambient atmosphere, and the plant and animal worlds. The state committee exercises comprehensive control of environmental protection activities, develops and approves republic, industrial branch, and departmental ecological normatives, rules and standards on protection and rational use of natural resources; monitors environmental pollution; and formulates and manages their funds. In addition, the committee conducts independent state expert ecological analyses of the general plans for development and siting of industrial forces and branches of the national economy, and territorial plans for environmental protection; and, it is a voting member of the commission for acceptance and operational start-up of new or rebuilt projects, which have an effect on the environment.

UzSSR Goskompriroda has been given the right to attend hearings before the collegium during testimony by the ministerial leadership on their environmental protection activities, and the right to uninhibited inspection of any national-economic projects in the republic at any time of day or night. UzSSR Goskompriroda has the right to impose bans on planning and construction, reconstruction or expansion of industrial or other projects, conducted in violation of environmental protection legislation; it also has the right to stop the activity of industrial and other enterprises, enterprises and organizations which are in violation of the norms and rules of environmental protection.

In short, the Uzbek SSR State Committee on Environmental Protection has received a mandate from the Supreme Soviet, which permitted significant expansion of its rights.

Official Responds to Criticism of 'Aral' Consortium

91WN0327A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 91
Second Edition p 6

[Interview with B. Tursumbayev, chairman of the Aral Consortium council and state adviser to the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers, by V. Zaytsev; place and date not given; followed by commentary by A. Tsigankov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Commission on Emergencies: "Aral: The Second Attempt"]

[Text] *Lately the problems of the Aral have once again attracted the attention of the organs of authority and administration and of the public. For this year alone 2,605 million rubles have been allocated for capital investments.*

Journalist V. Zaytsev interviewed B. Tursumbayev, chairman of the Aral Consortium council and state adviser to the Kazakh SSR Cabinet of Ministers.

[Zaytsev] Baltash Moldabayevich, why did it become necessary to create this consortium, and what is the history of this problem?

[Tursumbayev] As is known, the problems of the Aral Sea were actively discussed in the 1960-1970's; however, the problem emerged in its most acute form in the 1980's, when the negative ecological and socioeconomic effect of the decreased sea level on the adjacent regions became clear.

[Zaytsev] What are the main tasks of the new entity?

[Tursumbayev] The consortium's main tasks are to work out and implement a Union-republic program of improving the ecological situation and social conditions of the population living in the Aral area, as well as actions directed at the recovery of the Aral Sea.

Aral combines capital investment and material and technical resources of the Union, republic, and local organs of state administration; it is financed as a Union-republic organization with money from the USSR, republic, and local budgets.

[Zaytsev] Will the consortium not become just another bureaucratic structure?

[Tursumbayev] It is our firm belief that it will not. We saw new opportunities behind a seemingly structural reorganization. First of all it is an opportunity to combine the research and development potential, organizational experience, and production capacities of the Union ministries and departments and USSR and republic Academies of Sciences and their institutes with the potential of construction and waterways organizations and construction industry enterprises on both the republic and the local level.

Second, the consortium will have a flexible structure and be open to new members, including foreign ones, which in turn gives us room to maneuver, to get enterprises and organizations based on any form of property involved in solving the tasks on the basis of competitive bidding and contract work.

[Zaytsev] It is known that the consortium's activities are governed by the special resolution of the USSR government. Since the consortium is a Union-republic entity, would it not dictate its will to the republics?

[Tursumbayev] The democratic foundation and equality are inherent in both the agreement on the creation of the consortium and in its rules. These basic documents stipulate that the consortium's highest governing organ is the council, which consists of two representatives from each founding organization, from the USSR Academy of Sciences, and from the USSR State Commission on Emergencies, which is charged with the coordination of and control over the solutions to Aral problems. The council conducts its activities on the basis of equality and—as the two first meetings showed—fully takes into account the interests of all founders.

Commentary by A. Tsigankov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Commission on Emergencies:

"I would like to emphasize that earlier emphasis was on the adoption of all-encompassing resolutions of the directive organs, which stipulated in detail the tasks and executors involved in resolving the problem.

"Taking into account today's realities, this method does not meet the demands of today's situation. In our approach to the Aral problem we assume that it is necessary to take into account not only the economic but also the social and national peculiarities of each of the republics.

"Under these conditions, a correct determination of the direction of the consortium's activities—a determination that will take into account the interests of all who live in the Aral area—becomes a priority. Therefore, after careful consultations with the governments of the republics, scientists, and specialists on potential forms of organization for this task, the idea of creating a Union-republic Aral consortium was proposed. I want to note that during the developmental stage of this idea none of the republics put the issue in the light of a "we do not need the center" attitude. In my opinion, this is an example of a carefully weighted political approach to administrative-economic issues."

Chairman Outlines Tasks of Kazakhstan's Ecology Committee

91WN0328B Alma Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
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[Interview with Ecology Committee Chairman Marash Mukhamedievich Nurtazin, by A. Omarova: "The Ability To Keep One's Own House in Order"]

[Text] Marash Mukhamedievich Nurtazin is chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of the Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources. In his pre-election program, the chairman of the oblast strike committee, a recognized authority among the miners of Karaganda, emphasized questions on the ecology. And today the deputies have entrusted him and other members of parliament with that extremely complex sector of work. How shall we improve the quality of our lives? What can the Ecology Committee do and what is it doing now? How can we overcome the state of crisis in the use of natural resources in the republic? These were the topics of our conversation with M. M. Nurtazin.

[Omarova] What sort of guidance does the committee receive in its work, and how was it formed? Many deputies, even those whose campaign promises to the voters included the ecology, did not want to serve on the committee (There is no end of work, and it is a completely new matter). It is as if only the enthusiasts are willing to try...

[Nurtazin] Considering the new functions and the peculiarities of the work it faces, the committee was formed on the principle of voluntarism. This approach turned

out to be the correct one—directors of major enterprises, gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] chairmen, academicians and workers have joined the committee. We understand one another extremely well.

Academician Sh. Yesenov took upon himself a great deal of work. Any member of the Supreme Soviet may consult with him on the widest range of questions. One can say that he is rendering great assistance in establishing us as specialists: people who previously did not know, in essence, just what ecology is, but who are now learning its fundamentals.

[Omarova] And so what we have is a melding of science and production, theory and practice?

[Nurtazin] It is only the beginning of in-depth mastery of the problems, and a search for new approaches and solutions.

[Omarova] Exactly what have you contributed to the basic work of the committee from your pre-election program?

[Nurtazin] Well, that is not comparable; it is like the relationship of the parts to the whole. When the committee was formed, we thoroughly analyzed the entire mass of problems, and carefully considered all the situations which have come to pass in the republic and its environs in recent years. And we have come to the conclusion that the existing environmental protection system, and unified state control in the form of Goskompriroda [State Environmental Protection Committee], are clearly in conflict with the practice of the use of natural resources. The agencies and ministries have given local Goskompriroda committees only insignificant monitoring functions, and have kept the rest for themselves. And therefore, as before, they dictate the conditions and still do. Contrary to all logic and biospheric concepts, the nation's living natural resources have been divided into parts. For many years, one agency was responsible for the animal world, for example; another was concerned with forestry; and a third kept track of fishery development. None of them was accountable to the other. It is also paradoxical that the present-day Goskompriroda structure is situated within that very same structure of executive power which is, as before, the ruin of our ecology, and which this Goskompriroda is supposed to monitor. At the present time departmental interests have taken the high ground.

[Omarova] As long as such subordination is preserved, departmental independence will remain. What is needed in order for all these organizations to act together, and direct their efforts toward preserving the republic's ecological resources?

[Nurtazin] In our proposals to the Council of Ministers and during the just-completed sessions, we presented justification for the necessity of placing Goskompriroda directly under the Supreme Soviet, rather than the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the President of the republic himself, in one of his speeches, spoke of the fact

that the monitoring functions of the ministries would be taken away and transferred to Goskompriroda. I hope that the promises will be fulfilled, for our future depends on it. Otherwise all the committee's monitoring functions will become useless. Our proposal has not yet found the support of the deputies, but we believe that sooner or later it will be adopted, since it is dictated by life itself. We must act in time...

(Incidentally, this proposal is supported by Academician V. Sokolov, academician-secretary of the General Biology Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Soviet Committee under the UNESCO Committee "Man and the Biosphere"—A.O.)

[Omarova] Marash Mukhamedievich, what are the priority directions in the committee's work?

[Nurtazin] But of course—the major ecological problems in the republic: prohibiting nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk Test Range, and restoring the health of the Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash areas. But the most important, taken as a whole, is eliminating the consequences of the activities of the military-industrial complex on our territories, and in-depth conversion of its enterprises as a whole. We laid the foundation in Article XI of the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Republic, on which we can now rely as a legislative act when drawing up resolutions and decrees.

[Omarova] Article XI was adopted, thanks to the steadfastness of the members of your committee...

[Nurtazin] As committee chairman, I introduced the basic features of the article, but the entire committee worked on it. And I would note that it was not steadfastness, but the fact that every deputy understood the significance of the ecological problems that "saved" the article.

[Omarova] To what degree does the corps of deputies comprehend these concerns and understand the fact that the ecology is not simply a most important sphere of activity, but also the basis for solving the republic's social and economic programs?

[Nurtazin] I would not say that at the present time the entire corps of deputies has delved deeply into the economic concerns, because the first attempt to subordinate Goskompriroda with all its functions to the Supreme Soviet went down in defeat; although I would say that the prestige of the President of the republic played a certain role here, for he was able to prove that it is still too early to speak about this. But I stand firm upon my own opinion: the ecological situation in the republic demands this. They still relate the ecology to a type of housekeeping function. That is in principle incorrect. The stereotypes of natural resource usage must be overcome.

[Omarova] We began to speak about banning nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk Test Range; nevertheless, nuclear detonations continue, as evidenced by the latest—at Novaya Zemlya last year. Does the idea of demilitarization not lie at the basis of the work of the Committee on the Ecology? It is no secret that the military-industrial complex occupies a vast amount of territory in Kazakhstan; and, the military has no intention of giving up their positions. What is the committee doing to resolve this problem?

[Nurtazin] We act only by means of legislation. On the basis of Article XI of the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Republic we may adopt any legislative acts whatsoever with respect to the VPK [Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kompleks (Military-Industrial Complex)]. A resolution was adopted on prohibiting detonations on the Semipalatinsk Test Range and on the entire territory of the republic as well. This resolution was published in the press. I think that with respect to the military-industrial complex, we will also introduce a resolution declaring that the acts on transferring our land to the use of the VPK are void. We must conclude agreements on conditions which are advantageous to the people. Those 20 million hectares which are now reserved for the VPK are causing too much damage to the republic's ecological resources and to its economy.

[Omarova] Marash Mukhamedievich, but are there documents which legally reserve these lands for the use of the VPK?

[Nurtazin] The fact of the matter is, that we have not yet found any documents whatsoever supporting this. Even for Semipalatinsk. On the whole, all this was done illegally and carefully hidden from the people who live here.

[Omarova] And as a result, the public suffers...

[Nurtazin] Not only the people, but also the republic's ecology and economy. They say that the law has no retroactive power. At one time these lands were given to the VPK gratis. But I think that, after consulting the legal experts, we will find the means to make recompense for the economic damage. For example, the city of Kurchatov-21, with its industrial potential and developed infrastructure must be transferred to Semipalatinsk Oblast; to the oblast, because it used to be a restricted zone, and has suffered the most economically.

Personally, I ask myself: why must we take payment only for leasing the land? I am thinking about Baykonur. After all, foreign monies are invested in every launch. Obviously the Union ought to transfer a share of the profits to the republic budget for resolving the ecological problems. In order to make this possible, it is necessary to adopt a number of resolutions, and we are working on them now.

[Omarova] One of the most acute problems urgently confronting you is the Aral Sea. How can the sea be

resurrected, and returned to life? The Aral Sea is the ecological cradle of the Kazakhs; the roots of their culture are here.

[Nurtazin] The problem of the Aral sea has moved off dead center for the first time, this year. This year 700,000,000 rubles were received from the state budget for the Aral region, and were backed up by material resources as well. This is the first victory. And the fact that the question was brought up for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet and that they have agreed at all levels of national and world leadership that this is a worldwide, global problem, provides the basis to presume that some success has been achieved. The problem of the Aral Sea must be resolved at the state level. One can, of course, divide it into three parts: the first—to save Man; the second—to save the ecology, both the environment and the lives of the people in the Aral basin; and the third, the restoration of the Aral itself as a living organism. The Aral Program is a long-term, very costly program. But we did not support the program proposed by the Government of the USSR, since in this program, the restoration of the Aral extends to the year 2062. I believe that we are obliged to restore the Aral over a period of 20-25 years, or else everything else loses its meaning. Apparently we should also chide our scientists, who to this day have not proposed a clear-cut concept for saving the Aral. It is proposed to announce a worldwide competition for the best plan for saving the Aral Sea, under the aegis of UNESCO.

If you want to speak about Lake Balkhash, the most important thing here is not to allow it to be poisoned—which is what we are working on.

The work of the committee is directed toward, starting in 1991, not allowing a single new enterprise to be put into operation on the territory of Kazakhstan without ecologically-sound technological policies, no matter how much it costs.

[Omarova] Marash Mukhamedievich, are you not afraid that with the return to market relationships, the ecology will be left without assets?

[Nurtazin] I am. I have raised this question more than once at Supreme Soviet sessions and meetings. Therefore, I insist that Goskompriroda be removed from subordination to the Council of Ministers. After all, none of the economic programs envisage allocating monetary assets for the ecology. And under market conditions, enterprises and plants, institutions and organizations, having received complete independence, might begin such "activities," that it would take a long time to correct the mistakes.

[Omarova] Unquestionably, things will be complicated under the market. I think that many of us have forgotten the age-old meaning of the word "ecology," that in translation from the Greek it means—the ability to keep one's own house in order; to manage it. This meaning also defines the concept of—the economy; they have the same root: the eco-natural milieu of the lives of the people and the state...

[Nurtazin] Everyone understands all this in words, but in practice—alas... The most basic concept about which we must think as legislators is: What shall we leave for our descendants? Our parliament must create the legislative-legal basis for preserving the milieu of life for the populace. Unfortunately, the "system" has imbued an entire generation of people with stereotypical thinking, which prevents them from properly appreciating the ecological situation. We need total ecological glasnost. Without that one cannot change a person. But when man himself changes, his attitude toward nature will change too.

[Omarova] We have come to the question of the role of the mass information media in the ecological education of the public. The republic EKO CURIER [Ecology Courier] is already established. Marash Mukhamedievich, are there any plans to publish a popular-scientific magazine which could become a rostrum for scientists and enthusiasts?

[Nurtazin] Yes, a newspaper will soon come to the readers. In time, a magazine will be founded also. Right now I cannot talk about that—there are no funds. We hope that the newspaper will to a certain extent help eliminate the information deficit, and bring about universal education. And here more active assistance from journalists is required.

[Omarova] How in general are the mass information media, radio and television illuminating the economic problems?

[Nurtazin] If I may speak frankly, our journalists more often than not approach it one-sidedly. Some of them, trying to earn a political reputation for themselves, seize upon the fashionable problems of ecology and foist off their own viewpoints, and not scientifically-based proposals. They ought to be more careful, and remember their responsibility. Who else can help us like the journalists can? After all, they are precisely the ones who possess the splendid opportunity, by propagandizing (Forgive me for using such a word with respect to the ecology) ecological knowledge and inculcating ecological culture among the people, thereby raising ecological consciousness. From hence it is not far to action. The press, television and radio are the forces on which the deputies must rely, in directing the ecological movement in the republic.

USSR Health Officials on State Medical Care System Restructuring

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[Interview with I.N. Denisov, USSR minister of public health, and A.I. Pavlyutkin, head of the ministry's main economic administration, by M. Chernyshov, in response to letter from B. Mekhanov, physician at the oncological outpatient facility in Penza; place and date not given: "Health Insurance Policy"]

[Text] Esteemed editors! The situation in our medicine today, as in the economy, is catastrophic. Sometimes the treatment process in hospitals is halted because of a lack of medications. Electrocardiographs, artificial breathing equipment, and other instruments, having been patched up again and again, are seeing their last days. There is simply no equipment left to use to detect heart attacks, to operate, or to save patients' lives. Deliveries of reagents and detergents for disinfecting instruments are coming to a halt. Strange as it may sound, ideal conditions are being created in the hospitals for AIDS epidemics.

And under these conditions the Union and republic public health ministries, beginning in January 1991, literally forced a "new economic mechanism" into medical practice—a kind of autonomous financing in medicine. In essence it means that physicians must "earn" money from one another. The situation is simply absurd.

All the money previously allotted for maintaining treatment institutions is now turned over to the polyclinic. It pays the hospital for the treatment of the hospitalized patient, the diagnostic services—for the examination, and "first aid"—for each house call. If the polyclinic saves on the funds allotted to it, they are used for incentives for polyclinic workers. So the less the "first aid" that goes to patients in their homes and the fewer the patients sent to the hospital for treatment, the greater the advantage for the polyclinic.

In a word, the patient's interests have absolutely been forgotten. Nobody will need him. The only advantage is planned for the medical workers. So is this medicine...for the sake of medicine?

The creators of the flawed system assure us that expert commissions will check on the quality of the treatment as the final result of the work of the physicians. But, as a rule, these commissions are formed from physicians of the same institutions where the patients are also being treated. Can the "experts" be objective?

By filling the hungry mouth of medicine with the pacifier of contrived "autonomous financing," the ministries are generating a new system for padding and covering up expenses which will be fatal to public health. This has been fully confirmed by an experiment conducted by the USSR Ministry of Public Health in Leningrad, Kemerovo, and Samara. In Leningrad thousands of beds

were left empty and the patients died at home because the polyclinic workers did not send them to the hospital, thus saving money. And it is a great shame that all these innovations go under the banner of perestroika.

[Signed] B. Mekhanov, physician at the oncological outpatient facility in Penza

[Chernyshov] And so we are speaking about the principles of the operation of our public health institutions, wages for medical workers, and elements of autonomous financing in medicine. Today we are discussing this with USSR Public Health Minister I.N. Denisov and the deputy chief of the ministry's main economics administration, A.I. Pavlyutkin.

[Denisov] The question of wages for medical workers has been crucial for a long time. Can it be normal that for many years they have received only a little more than 70 percent of the average wage in the country? Now certain republics have unilaterally increased their wages. In Moldova, for example, they doubled; in the Baltic republics they increased 1.8-fold; in the Ukraine and Belorussia, by 65 percent; and the RSFSR, by 40 percent. As a result we have an extremely varied wage picture in the country.

Yet the USSR Ministry of Public Health has developed what, in my view, is a fairly well constructed and flexible system of incentives for medical workers. It is based on a standardized, state-guaranteed minimum wage, and no medical worker should receive less than this.

But this sum is only the first and fundamental element in the payment system.

Beyond that... Beyond that the wage ceiling is removed altogether for all categories of medical workers. Wages will more or less consist of three parts. The first is that same guaranteed minimum. The second is the so-called guaranteed increments. Let us say that a physician works in a rural area—there is an increment for that. The same thing is true for performing administrative functions: Department chiefs everywhere, for example, will receive an increment of 60 rubles [R]. Guaranteed increments are also paid for the title of honored or people's physician and for a candidate or doctoral degree.

And, finally, the third part is the variable part of the wage. Let us say that a person working as a physician is on call. He could be on call once a month or he could be on call five times a month. This third part of the additional payments is determined by additional agreements concluded between the workers and the administrations of the treatment institutions.

So this is the three-layer pie, although they probably do not get to the bottom layer as quickly as they do to the first two...

[Chernyshov] Have any other republics managed to do this?

[Denisov] They, unfortunately, have simply effected a mechanical increase, which is not likely to bring about any significant improvement in medical service. After all, our medicine has already experienced four such wage increases. Experience shows that if these actions are not invested with ideas directed toward improving the qualitative indicators of the work, things will not get off the ground. The new approach, you see, means that wages are made directly dependent on the qualifications of the physician and the quality of his work.

There are about 1.3 million medical workers in our country today. About a million of them are employed directly in public health. But of this million only 270,000 have certified categories. That is, we seem to have many people with diplomas, but as far as certified specialists are concerned... We are faced with the task of conducting a thorough recertification.

Thus, if you prove that you are a good, say, physician-specialist, your rate immediately increases from R140 to R290. A physician of the highest category will receive R380. A surgeon of the highest category will receive R460. Add to this the guaranteed increments for being in charge of a department or for work in rural areas, which have already been discussed...

[Chernyshov] And what about instructors in medical educational institutions and workers of scientific research institutes? After all, it is no secret that there is an outflow from these categories into practical public health because the wages are considerably higher there...

[Denisov] Unless good personnel are trained, medicine has no future. It is planned to increase the wages of these categories of workers considerably. While now a professor who is a department head receives, say, R500, his guaranteed minimum will increase to R700.

The main difficulty with the realization of this concept of payment is the organization of rapid and high-quality recertification throughout the country. One does not want this to turn into simply another campaign. All institutes and faculties for improving physicians' qualifications should engage in this work as early as May of this year. After certification, the question of attaining one category or another will be decided by the commissions of the oblast health departments.

Up to the present day, medical workers, including, say, physicians, have attached no importance to their category since the differences in payment among the categories were not great. Now a physician with a great deal of experience can raise the question of acquiring, say, a higher category. In this case it is first suggested that he take a test. If he does not pass the test, it is recommended that he be certified for a lower category or take additional training. In any case, recertification must be conducted throughout the entire country according to standard requirements. Differences are not permitted here.

[Chernyshov] Well, what is the essence of the "new economic mechanism" that is discussed with such hostility in B. Mekhanov's letter?

This question was answered by the deputy chief of the Main Economics Administration of the USSR Ministry of Public Health, A.I. Pavlyutkin:

[Pavlyutkin] How were funds previously divided among public health institutions? Very simply: As a basis they used calculations from the so-called base, that is, the number of beds in a given institution and the number of people it was supposed to have served, and from this they allotted the financial funds. Nobody was interested in how the clinic actually operated or how many patients it served. It was thought, for example, that if 30,000 people lived on your territory, all of them would be served by medical institutions of this rayon. All this, understandably, is far from reality.

The new economic mechanism presupposes allotting funds for a concrete, precisely calculated number of patients who are served by the institution. If for some reason it does not receive the patients it does not receive all the funds. In keeping with the new provisions, the clinics will receive an advance for a half quarter and the final account will be settled at the end of the quarter. If there are no patients there will be no money.

[Chernyshov] But the overall sum of budget funds allotted for medicine is not increasing. As everyone recognizes, this sum is clearly inadequate...

[Pavlyutkin] It is possible to acquire additional funds, for example because the medical institutions will now have the right to conclude agreements with enterprises for certain individual kinds of paid medical services. The enterprises will allot these funds from the funds for social development.

The new economic mechanism under discussion was developed recently in an experiment in individual regions and cities, particularly Kemerovo, Samara, and Leningrad...

In Samara and Kemerovo, for example, they are creating territorial medical associations that regulate the admission of patients to hospitals. The result? Previously it was impossible to get into a hospital and now there are empty beds. People who can receive treatment at the level of the outpatient polyclinic are no longer sent to the inpatient facilities just to be on the safe side. The polyclinics carry out the process of selection. Of course, this work requires adequately trained, skilled personnel. In many cases it is possible to treat a patient at home or in a polyclinic just as well as in an inpatient facility. If, of course, it is organized properly.

The experiment has been going on for two years. It has shown that the problem of further increasing allocations

for public health still exists. The new economic mechanism makes it possible to make more efficient use of only 10-15 percent of the allotted budget funds, although that in itself is not bad.

The real solution to the problem is medical insurance. Only then will each kind of medical aid have its true price which, as we know, is formed from production cost and profit. By receiving profit the medical institutions will be able to form not conventional but real funds for economic incentives and social development. From these they will take funds for the acquisition of equipment, repair of buildings, and other needs, and also for material incentives for the workers.

But that is in the future. For now the only possible source of additional financing, as was already said, is from agreements with enterprises. The new economic mechanism is like a transition period to insurance medicine. It is getting people used to the new economic relations.

An experiment directed toward the introduction of the new economic mechanism is being conducted in several large institutes of the city of Moscow as well. There are already elements of medical insurance in these experiments.

It is clear from B. Mekhanov's letter that the Penza medical institutions have been frightened by discussions about the introduction of the new economic mechanism. Organs for administration of public health here apparently did not do the preparatory work and did not explain the essence of the matter to the people.

Penza is not the only place where such things happen. When we began the economic experiment in Noginsk near Moscow, they were also categorically against it at first. But not that the institutions have started to work under the new conditions, the majority of medical workers approve of the innovation. That is, the process of introducing something new is not a simple matter; there is a psychological change here and—let us be frank—a blow to certain administrative levels. For surplus apparatus is eliminated. In Noginskiy Rayon, for example, more than ten head physicians were discharged as a result of the reorganization.

[Chernyshov] How do you envision the budget mechanism for the future insurance medicine?

[Pavlyutkin] Very simple and very efficient. All enterprises and all institutions will transfer certain sums for their workers to the medical insurance policy. Budget revenues will also be accumulated here. If a worker falls ill, he receives the necessary funds for treatment; this insurance is private and so the patient has the right to choose the hospital he wishes—in any rayon and in any region.

Here will be real competition among institutions and among physicians. Those who work well will receive money at rates established by the insurance company. The bill for the treatment will go to the insurance

company and the insurance company must pay it. But it also monitors the cost of treatment and its quality. Competition among insurance companies will eliminate the possibility of forming corrupt groupings among the physicians and their choosing hospitals that are "advantageous" for them.

[Chernyshov] In light of all these transformations, how do you see the prospects for privatization of medicine, the appearance of private hospitals and clinics, and so forth?

[Pavlyutkin] I am categorically against that. It would immediately cause prices to rise and medical aid would become inaccessible to many.

We frequently refer to the experience of the West. And in Western countries, in general, an extremely small number of medical institutions are private. In general, medical aid is paid for from public funds and the state.

Academician Updates AIDS Measures

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[Article by V. Pokrovskiy, academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences: "AIDS Without Utter Panic"]

[Text] As of today in the USSR there are 1,200 reported cases of HIV infection. The disease afflicts mainly people who are at the most productive time of their lives and it lasts for several years. Immense amounts of money are being spent on medical and social assistance.

In 1987, the USSR developed a state program for fighting HIV infection. In 1990 research on the AIDS problem within the framework of this program was conducted by 61 institutions of the country on 201 topics. Certain positive results have been achieved. General principles for the organization of AIDS prevention publicity among the country's population have been developed and introduced, and there are also programs oriented toward individual regions.

An automated system for keeping track of data from the investigation of the population has been introduced and is in operation. This made it possible to discover the center of the epidemic in Elista.

The law: "On AIDS Prevention" has been in effect in the country since January of this year. It outlines the procedure for medical certification and measures directed toward social protection of AIDS patients. In particular, it is now illegal to fire or refuse to hire a person simply on the basis of his being infected with the AIDS virus. If the infection occurred in a medical institution, a pension is assigned.

A state program has been approved for fighting AIDS for 1991-2005. Among other measures, it is recognized as expedient to create in the USSR an AIDS scientific

research institute. One might think that AIDS has finally been recognized as a state problem in our country.

According to the mathematical model developed by our scholars, by 1991 they expected 1,600 Soviet citizens to be infected with the HIV virus. The actual number turned out to be one-third of that. Consequently, the work conducted in the country is producing results, but it is too early to rest on our laurels. AIDS has come to our country and is infecting more and more new victims. And this means that we must continue to fight against it.

Ivashko, CPSU Secretariat on Women's Issues

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[From the Press Center of the CPSU Central Committee under the rubric "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow: The Party and Women's Problems—from a Meeting of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A regular meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat was held under the chairmanship of V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The CPSU Central Committee commission on issues of women and families submitted a proposal concerning the main directions for the work of the party with women and the women's movement. Substantiating the need to revitalize this work, G.V. Semenova, chairman of the commission and a CPSU Central Committee secretary, noted that the position of women is being affected in a very unfavorable way by the crisis in the economy, heightened social and national tensions, and intensified ideological and political antagonisms.

Under conditions of the development of market relations, many new problems are being added to the old unresolved problems—the low level of qualifications and salaries, high employment in heavy work, and unhealthy work conditions. Among the new problems, women are particularly disturbed by the growing shortages in the consumer market, the increase in prices, and the drop in real income. The breakdown in economic relations, the closing of unprofitable enterprises, privatization in the service sphere, and a reduction in the managerial apparatus primarily entail discharging women, especially mothers, because they are the least qualified workers. In addition, using their labor involves the need to adhere to specific work privileges and social protection measures, and payment of special allowances. Therefore, women fall into the category of workers who are "unsuitable" for production.

Are they affected by interethnic conflicts, the increase in violence and crime, and the erosion of spiritual and ethical values? Unquestionably. These and other negative phenomena, that have recently become intensified, aggravate the demographic situation, worsen the health of mothers, children, and juveniles, and contribute to the spread of fatherlessness. For today more than 75 million

persons live outside their national cultures, and 18 percent of marriages are mixed.

Complex processes are also transpiring in the women's movement itself. Previously homogeneous, it is breaking down into numerous associations and unions under the conditions of political pluralism. Efforts are being observed to transform the women's issue into a "separate" policy. There are efforts by certain forces opposed to the CPSU in the campaign for the women's vote to manipulate the activeness of the new women's associations, profiting from everyday living difficulties.

Members of the CPSU Central Committee who were invited to the meeting of the secretariat—A.V. Fedulova, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Women; Ye.I. Kalinina, secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee; N.P. Silkova, a secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee; and V. Rakhimova, a secretary of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee—noted that under current conditions, the lack of understanding of the seriousness of women's problems on the part of party committees is especially intolerable. In the meantime, many of them, including the CPSU Central Committee, for a long time have paid practically no attention to examining these issues. There are no scientific subdivisions in higher educational institutions that systematically do research on women's problems. There is a sense of a critical deficiency of fundamental research on the role of women in a renewing society and a lack of generalizing the experience of the activity of foreign parties and organizations in women's movements.

The prestige and influence of the CPSU in many ways is determined by its ability to influence the specific situation of various social groups, to adequately reflect and defend their interests in their policy, and to work in public organizations and in mass movements. In her speech, G.G. Sillaste, professor of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized that this places new tasks before the party, and it requires a search for modern approaches and a definition of priority principles of policy in the women's movement. She came out for a deeper study and regard for women's public opinion.

P.I. Mayeva, supervisor of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers department, talked about the necessity to develop special programs for the socio-economic protection of women at regional and local levels, broad public control over the implementation of planned state programs for improving the position of women, and protection of the family, motherhood, and childhood. V.I. Fedotova, the editor-in-chief of the journal SOVETSKAYA ZHENSCHINA, devoted her speech to the problem of developing a periodical press for women, and the survival of women's journals under conditions of the transition to a market economy.

The reports of prominent figures in the women's movement of the country at the meeting of the CPSU Central

Committee Secretariat substantially broadened our concepts of the social feeling of this category of the population, said V.A. Kuptsov, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In his opinion, the CPSU Central Committee commission on issues of women and the family prepared constructive proposals, which will have to be given the status of recommendations for local party committees. In many ways, the stabilization of the political situation and the achievement of civic peace and national harmony in the country depend on the position of women who today constitute 53 percent of the country's population.

Intensification of the work of party committees with women is one of the conditions for the functioning of a humane and democratic socialism, emphasized A.S. Dzasokhov, a CPSU Central Committee secretary who took part in the discussion of this issue. He noted the importance of the propositions contained in the recommendations of the Central Committee concerning the fact that freedom to choose a way of life and suitable forms of combining motherhood and professional and public work are advanced as the basis of the CPSU policy on work with women. This is a fundamentally new approach, and it requires unconventional organizational and scientific-information support.

V.M. Falin, a CPSU Central Committee secretary, called women the most unfortunate part of the population after the peasantry. The slogans about emancipation that were proclaimed for many years were in fact subordinated to the tasks of implementing specific economic programs. The Soviet woman, like no other, needs social protection. That is why it is important for party committees to be the initiators and coordinators of work both in defending the rights and material interests of women and in including them in the new modern forms of business activity and enterprise.

O.S. Shenin, a CPSU Central Committee secretary, emphasized the need for party committees to establish work positions for women and to cooperate with new structures on employment problems. Women must be convinced that party committees and organizations will take their interests into account in the creation of a system of training for a new profession and preparation for work under market economy conditions. It is necessary to achieve undeviating compliance with the norms of labor legislation associated with granting benefits to women in hiring and firing, taking care of little children, implementing the right to work part-time, and improving labor conditions and routines. This particularly concerns women who will work in privatized enterprises, in cooperatives, and in farming organizations.

V.A. Ivashko summarized the findings of the discussions on this issue. It was decided to forward the submitted proposals as recommendations of the CPSU Central Committee to local party committees for the organization of practical work in a radical perestroika of the activity of the party regarding the interests of women and the women's movements.

CPSU's Semenova Attends Ivanovo Women's Conference

*PM0204134391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS report under the "Official Reports" rubric: "Calling for Agreement"]

[Text] Delegates to the oblast women's conference in Ivanovo city have expressed deep concern and anxiety at the aggravation of the socioeconomic situation in the country and the worsening position of women in society. They discussed and adopted an action program aimed at giving social protection and economic support to working women, mothers, and families. An oblast information center for the vocational retraining of working women is being created on social principles. A system for providing help to businesswomen has been elaborated.

The conference announced the creation of an oblast women's union.

The conference participants adopted a letter to the extraordinary Third Congress of RSFSR people's deputies with an appeal to protect S.P. Goryacheva, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, from undemocratic attacks made for voicing criticism. Delegates asked striking miners to go back to work and hold talks on a constructive basis on the problems troubling them so as to reach agreement for the sake of the whole country's interests.

G.V. Semenova, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in and addressed the conference.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Goryacheva on Women's Role in Politics

*91US0347A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
8 Mar 91 p 1*

[Interview with Svetlana Petrovna Goryacheva by V. Raskin, date and place not specified: "Svetlana Goryacheva: 'I Believe That a Warm Summer Is Coming'"; first two paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text]

A Woman and Politics

Svetlana Petrovna Goryacheva requested a total of only eight minutes for a political statement on behalf of herself and her colleagues. But these minutes literally shook the parliament and then later the country. This statement became the center of a glaring conflict of opinions. Some deputies expressed approval and said they admired the courage of the woman, who, as one of the deputy chairmen of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, dared to utter such serious words about the way that B.Y. Yeltsin with his policies was ignoring the clearly expressed will of the 22d Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and was pulling apart not only the Union but

also the Russian Federation. This judgment provoked criticism, direct insults at times, and even threats from people with differing opinions.

Taking the situation into account, I formulated my first question for Svetlana Petrovna in the following way:

[Raskin] You have been engaged in politics as a parliamentarian for about a year now. Probably the men do not take to this too easily; what is it like for a woman in politics?

[Goryacheva] To be candid, I must say that when I agreed to be a candidate in the elections for people's deputy of Russia, I knew that it would not be easy. As things turned out in the election campaign, there were 10 people on the ballot in the Leninist territorial okrug in Vladivostok. My "competition" consisted of nine men. Two of us were left in the second round. It was interesting that both my "opponent" and I had worked for the public prosecutor's office. In the end I was the successful candidate. During those days I was genuinely happy. My electors, as well as my family and friends, shared this joy with me. And then there was another round of elections—to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. And then finally there was the position which I now occupy. At first it was good and very easy to work with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. No one gave any consideration to time—our only desire was to do as much as possible for Russia. I never thought that the February days of 1991 could ever come about. Now I can answer your question this way: it is very difficult for a woman to be a politician.

[Raskin] Svetlana Petrovna, at times women have taken on difficult roles at certain stages in the development of our state. We recall the history textbooks. We all know the fate of Princess Olga. One could cite the example of Yekaterina Dashkova. Russia always had its own Joan of Arc's and Mariya Volkonskaya's, its intelligent empresses and its Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) representatives, who were willing to sacrifice themselves. This list could go on and on. Did you feel that you had a unique role to play as a woman savior when you spoke out on behalf of six members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium?

[Goryacheva] In no way would I want to be thought of as a person who decided to sacrifice herself. The fact that it was I who spoke out was dictated by my conscience. In the first place, I am a deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. In the second place, I do not belong to any of the political factions in parliament. And that also played its role. And I state categorically that there was no "prompting" from anybody's side when we made the decision about the political statement. And let us not return to this question any more today. And as for our great Russian daughters, then a deep bow to them for their extraordinary deeds and for their ability to be wise when that was what the Motherland needed.

[Raskin] Maybe now—on the threshold of the 8th of March holiday—you would expand a bit on the the wisdom of women. At present the country is preparing to

hold a referendum on the Union question. In their polemics the opposing sides sometimes lose what we call their sense of measure. It is possible that our women will be the ones who are able to approach the problem of preserving our renewed Union more wisely. What does the woman's heart suggest to them?

[Goryacheva] It is a women's destiny to give life to a new human being. This is a wonderful gift of nature. And, clearly, nature makes us women somewhat wiser than men in some things. Let them not take offense, but if we exclude some specific times during a woman's life when emotions fill her heart, we, as a rule, are more restrained and reasonable. And with regard to the referendum of 17 March, which will reveal the will of the people, the wives, mothers, sisters and daughters in every home and in every family will suggest to their men what they should do at the polling place. And they themselves will set a wise example.

[Raskin] Svetlana Petrovna, your biography is not well known either to us journalists or to many readers of our newspaper. We know that you are from Vladivostok, that you worked as a prosecutor in the Primorskaya Inter-Rayon Environmental Protection Public Prosecutor's Office, we know that you are a member of the CPSU. You will agree that this is not very much. What facts could you add to this account of your life, what examples can you cite which would show that you are a person of action?

[Goryacheva] I was born and raised in the countryside. I am very familiar with peasant labor; then there were my studies in the law faculty. I now have a wonderful family. Unfortunately, I am away from my husband and son for many months at a time. But the members of my household have agreed to put up with everything to give me an opportunity to concern myself in a serious way with the fate of Russia. When I worked as a prosecutor, I concentrated on ecological problems. I stopped loose log drifting on our very valuable small rivers. We prosecutors are the guardians of legislation. How much paper work I had to break through in the struggle against the old administrative system! And I can honestly admit: I never betrayed my convictions. More than once and more than twice they threatened that I would lose my party card. But all of the decisions that I made to the benefit of various agencies were in accordance with the law. I think that the electors knew about this when they gave me preference in the elections.

[Raskin] If we asked you to draw a portrait of people's deputy Svetlana Goryacheva, what character traits would you give her, what qualities does she lack?

[Goryacheva] That is a difficult question. Now that I hear many threats either on the telephone or on the street, I understand how important are firmness, adherence to principles, the ability to compose oneself and the ability to believe that friends and colleagues are those reliable islands of life, on which one can survive both storms and adversity. Of course, some character traits I

developed through my profession. It is more difficult to specify those qualities which I do not have. From a self-critical viewpoint, I would say that I wish I had greater knowledge and broader vision. Yes, and feminine tact; at times I have felt that is something which I lack. And I envy those women who are able to do everything with ease, with a smile and with good humor. My emotions are more the captive of my mind than of my feelings.

[Raskin] We would like to to publish this interview with you in the month of March. Many of our readers are women who live in rural areas. They work on farms and in greenhouses. They do the most varied peasant labor. What has the Russian parliament done for rural women workers during the time you have been in it?

[Goryacheva] Of course, a women's lot in the countryside is much more difficult than in the city. The readers of SELSKAYA ZHIZN know this much better than I do. Undoubtedly the phrase of the day is appropriate: the parliament is greatly indebted to the women of the fields and farms. I cannot name very many laws which help to ease of their labor, but I would single out the RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution "Concerning Urgent Measures to Improve the Status of Women, Family and the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in Rural Areas." In accordance with this normative act the amount of basic annual leave has been increased to no less than 28 calendar days beginning this year. Additional benefits have been introduced for female poultry-house workers, for female vegetable growers who work with covered soil and for women who work in fishing and fish processing. The 36-hour week has been introduced for women workers in rural areas; leave for pregnancy and childbirth has been increased. The one-time grant made at the birth of each child now amounts to no less than 240 rubles. The wages of women who work split shifts (with a break of more than two hours) have been increased by 30 percent. Many other benefits are planned.

[Raskin] Here is a slightly provocative question. Does gallantry exist in parliament? Are there real gentlemen there, knights of our time?

[Goryacheva] I will not go into a lot of detail in my answer. The question, of course, is a delicate one. There are gentlemen and people of high integrity in parliament. I became convinced of this after my speech when I received several notes. But, unfortunately, there are also men who shake my hand and express sympathy only when there is no one else around in order that they would not be considered, God forbid, as members of the Goryacheva camp. I can understand that, but I find it but unpleasant.

[Raskin] At present the stores have, to put it mildly, virtually no presents at accessible prices. What will the men do on 8 March? And, after all, they do want to make it nice for their wives, sisters and mothers. What kind of present would you like to receive on this holiday?

[Goryacheva] My favorite flowers and attention from those whom I love. Believe me, that is quite a bit. During the months that I have lived alone in Moscow I have come to understand well what a great joy it is for a woman to be able to care for those close to her—to cook dinner for them and to maintain a home for them. And to feel that they need you. And if anyone is presently trying to decide the question of whether to be a family or to break up, let them think again and again about whether it is necessary to do that. The best present is to have work you love, a beloved husband and a favorite cause for which you would quietly give your life. Dear women, be happy and beloved. And do not give up hope that this cold, uncomfortable time will give way, I believe, to the warm summer of a new life.

'Ukrainianization' Said To Depend on Independence

91UN1200A Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 21 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by A. Mokrenko, deputy chairman of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian language society Prosvita and USSR people's artist: "Language Is Our Religion"]

[Text] We all suffer from the atmosphere of amorality in which we presently live: Amoral politics, amoral economics—both ignore the person and both still serve the stillborn, purely speculative concepts which were quite recently cultivated by the totalitarian system and which still dominate in civil society. The level of amorality results in a corresponding level of culture, and in our country it is very low. The official principle of allocating only leftover money for culture is a quite exhaustive proof of the state's official attitude toward culture and the level of spirituality and, as a result, of the morality of state officials to whom we have appealed for so long and so unsuccessfully. The voice of Ukrainian spirituality via the People's Council [Narodnaya Rada] in the parliament and via the latest public movements still does not have the necessary force to bring the present situation in culture to an end. The imperial pressure continues, Russification operates—and the murder of the nation continues. Culture, or spirituality, can generally be defined as a means of forming and nurturing humane ideals, but in our country this is regulated for the most part by two factors: The aforementioned Russification and Marxist-Leninist dogmatism. Under such conditions it is impossible to form an independent personality capable of thinking and feeling freely. We underrate, specifically, the status of our philosophy, which has been destroyed and replaced with the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism. The same with our world view, a fundamental component of culture which gives form to all other aspects. Our philosophy has become a servant of ideology, and the servant only fulfills the orders of the state apparatus.

Ukrainian culture has innumerable specific illnesses, but they are difficult to cure when the immune system has been undermined. As a result, no matter what else

happens, our culture can only be healed by taking the path of national sovereignty and democratization of our life in all spheres, that is, through fundamental change. By this I wish to emphasize that it is impossible to contemplate our cultural aspiration apart from political aspirations and, moreover, apart from the immediacy of other aspirations. National culture is impossible without a national language, and a national language is impossible without the status of a state. It seems that such status both exists and does not exist, because it is automatically eliminated by another status—the official status of the Russian language: Empires have been and will be the murderers of nations—of their languages, their national consciousness, and their spiritual life, that is to say the national culture or their feeling of their own National Immortality. For the present we cannot take seriously either the Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty—it is a more or less inspirational piece of paper—or the Law on the State Status of the Ukrainian Language. “Who Is Defending the ‘Law on Languages?’” A recent article in the Sumy newspaper *LENINSKA PRAVDA* was published under this headline. Does not the name of the newspaper itself include a question and an ironic answer immediately afterward? One could stop right here. But a question has been put. Considering the issue, we see that the Law on Languages is consistently defended only by us, that is to say by the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society “Prosvita.” From whom are we defending it? From the state and the Communist Party inasmuch as they are one and the same: Both of them deliberately put obstacles on the path of the return of an ethnically wronged people to itself and to its conscience, its history, and its roots. Ukrainian history has been falsified for 350 years so that it has become an insult to our children and an ancient violence against the spirit of the Ukrainian down to our days and, especially during Soviet times, the slavish psychology of a loyal subject, which is now so difficult to cast off, has been too consistently nurtured.

The sinister syndrome of self-negation, self-forgetfulness, and self-degradation, especially in the eastern and southern Ukraine, has become too widespread. The aggressiveness of Russian chauvinism in the masses of the Ukraine has correspondingly intensified in the form of a refusal to let the native population simply be a people. And the Russian minority (not all of them, of course), together with home grown traitors, do this with regard to a Ukrainian majority which over centuries has become accustomed to underrating itself. The Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR, unfortunately, stimulates and whips on Russian chauvinism, which in turn the main foe of Ukrainian (and not only Ukrainian) national renewal. The law exists, but it does not exist. Without factual sovereignty we will never produce a national school system, and without renewal of a national school system any discussion of the renewal of national culture will be nothing more than an illusion. We should make efforts in the sphere of culture—undoubtedly we must make them!—but without a stable

legal system of national education let us not pin vain hopes on the prosperity of Ukrainian spirituality.

Our language is our mother. When we repudiate our mother, we repudiate ourselves. The aristocrats and knights of the Ukrainian spirit have been almost completely destroyed, and those that remained are under heavy moral (and not only moral) pressure from the state and the communist partocracy. Our “native” bureaucracy is almost continuously Russified and morally deformed. Its marionette-like dependence on the center in Moscow both was and remains indisputable. We are fighting it. I believe that precisely our unquestionable status as defender of the state law, even if it is to defend it from the state itself however paradoxical that may be, gives the Ukrainian Language Society the right not only to ask but even to demand subsidies for our activities from the current government. None of us has any doubt that the government pretends to act rather than acts on issues of the renewal of Ukrainian culture, so let it pay a little more (until better times!) for its inactivity.

The wide wheels of the cultural workers are paralyzed by this inactivity of the government and have taken a waiting position—again, until better times. There are few true fighters. The most important figures have stayed silent, fearing to prejudice the realization of their talent and not having the time for firm convictions but instead having the organizational habit of deferring to the administration, being completely dependent on it: This is called proper procedure.

Thus, sovereignty and the school! This is where the future of our culture lies. European experience and the status of the school ensure the right not to the parents of the youngest citizens but to the youngest citizens themselves (completely without rights in our country!) to make use of their right to study in a national school. It is the right of the children! The right of the older generation to choose does no one any good. Let the older generation choose their other subjects. In a Ukrainian school everyone should simply have the opportunity to study his own language as well, as they do in the West, where children study up to four languages in school. This will also bring us closer to the “European home.” Today’s Law on Languages in the Ukraine protects only the Russian minority and not the native majority or other minorities. This is a slavish, colonial law that will not disappear as long as we are oriented toward the Union treaty, that is to say toward an empire with a Russian center and with vertical Union structures and toward a single central leadership of peoples with different histories and different cultures, which in and of itself is already violence.

Disregard for the Ukrainian in the Ukraine, the struggle against the Ukraine within the Ukraine, forced, aggressive Russification (take even the proportion of the ethnic composition of the population versus national schools, especially in the eastern and southern Ukraine) foster the inferiority complex of the Ukrainian and trample the intellectual and cultural potential of an entire great

people, ensuring the degradation of its politics, science, economics, and its purely physical renewal.

That which is antinational is always amoral because it bears the idea of violence against a concrete person and against a concrete people. National dignity that has been trampled is a tragedy both for an individual person and for an entire people. The solution is state and ethnic independence. Like Finland, like Poland! The solution is both difficult and simple. There lies the future of the Ukraine. And the mother language will become the lady of its own home and it will give legitimate birth to its own children. This very faith, which our Society is also called upon to support with its fire, has to be our salvation in the present mass disillusionment.

From the editorial board: The basis of the article of A. Mokrenko, deputy chairman of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian language society Prosvita and USSR people's artist, consists of the proposed text of a speech at a joint plenum of the board of the SPU [Ukrainian Writer's Union] and the Central Board of the Ukrainian Language Society.

Orthodox Diocese in Far East Divided

LD0304122191 Moscow TASS in English 0955 GMT
3 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Vitrishchak]

[Text] Khabarovsk April 3 TASS—The Khabarovsk and the Vladivostok Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Far East has been divided into three independent diocesan administrations. The bishop of Irkutsk and Chita Vadim will be head of the diocese with its centre in Khabarovsk, while Bishop Nikolay, who previously worked in Canada will hold the diocese in Vladivostok. Who will head the Magadan and Sakhalin region parishes has not yet been decided.

"The Khabarovsk and the Vladivostok diocese, which comprises practically all the territory of the Soviet Far East with an area of over 4 million square kilometres, was formed two and a half years ago. It was actively seeking to revive the Orthodox religion in the area", Viktor Nikulnikov, chairman of the Council for Liaison with Religious Organisations of the Khabarovsk Territory Executive Committee, told TASS.

"Over 20 new churches have started to function in the Khabarovsk territory alone over that period. One of the causes behind the division was conflict between the bishopric board and the dean of one of the Maritime Territory churches, who wished his parish to be subordinated to a foreign Russian Orthodox Church with its centre in New York, but not to the Moscow Patriarchy," he said.

New Approach to Social Sciences in Tajik SSR Examined

91US0394A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 2

[Tajik Telegraph Agency report: "Social Sciences and Perestroyka"]

[Text] *The socialist idea of the value of socialism is in need of protection today. We communists are deeply convinced of the future of the socialist idea, which is a constituent part of general human values, and we link the future of our republic to it.*

A republic conference of social scientists was held on 16 February in Dushanbe on the subject: "Tasks of Social Scientists Under the Conditions of Perestroyka." It was organized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan in conjunction with the republic Ministry of Public Education.

Attending the conference were secretaries of oblast committees, city committees, and rayon committees in charge of questions of ideology, secretaries of party committees of higher educational institutions, directors of secondary educational institutions, heads of social science departments, leading specialists and social scientists of the republic, leaders of ministries and departments, administration chiefs, and inspectors and methodologists of public education departments.

The introduction was given by Sh.D. Shabdolov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan.

Our society is experiencing an extremely contradictory and difficult stage in its development, he said. The declaration of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the social crisis in the country has reached the danger point beyond which destructive social upheavals are possible: "Never before has the need for new practical actions to implement the reforms been so insistent or has the internal decomposition in society been so threatening. Herein lies the uniqueness of the moment."

This assessment of the current moment corresponds to the sociopolitical situation in our republic as well.

For the first time in many decades the republic is encountering a situation in which disruptions and crises in the national economy aggravate the already tense situation in the social and spiritual spheres. Vitally important problems have not been solved in either the cities or the rural areas. All this is reflected in various ways in people's attitudes.

Of course, the Communist Party of Tajikistan as the ruling one must, on the basis of the needs for the development of the society, thoroughly think through and work out its political course. It is our conviction that the Communist Party of Tajikistan will be able to accomplish this task with the direct participation of the republic's social scientists.

The peculiarities of the social development and also the lengthy period of time when Tajikistan has been in the position of the country's raw material supplier have more than just economic consequences. The situation has had a negative effect on the public consciousness as well. In spite of the existing potential of science, public education, and technology, on the whole people's awareness is still poorly oriented toward a transition from an agrarian civilization to a scientific and technical one.

Herein lies one of the causes of the contradictory situation in which, while we have a chronic shortage of skilled personnel in industry, construction, and the scientific and technical sphere, we have a surplus of more than 150,000 unskilled workers and unemployed people who do not have the necessary qualifications.

The Communist Party considers the most important social order for leaders in science and education of Tajikistan to be the formation of a new cultural and historical orientation of our people toward an industrial and scientific and technical development.

In other words, this is a problem which can be solved through the joint efforts of economists, philologists, philosophers, historians, psychologists, specialists in cultural studies, ethnographers, sociologists, natural scientists, and scholars in state and party organs.

We are aware of the immense role of public education in the development of the human being, in the formation of his awareness, psychology, and value orientation.

In this regard I would like to focus the attention of participants in the conference on the idea of the need to develop a concept of a national school in the broad sense of the word. The pivotal point in this concept, in our view, is the organic link between a profound mastery of the wealth of the cultural and historical past and the reversal of the alienation of culture, psychology, and lifestyle of the younger generation from the achievements of universal human culture and scientific and technical progress.

The transition to a market economy in our country and the republic places this task in the foreground.

Perestroika has pushed down the walls that separated us from the outside world and from ourselves. Under the conditions of our new political status—the republic's sovereignty—we are beginning to feel as never before that we are a part of the world civilization and need to organically grow into the world economy, politics, and spiritual and cultural life. This presents us with another important task of the concept of the national school.

Our unchanging values are the great moral traditions of our people, which go deep into history and are embodied in works of literature and the sociophilosophical thought of the peoples of the Middle East. But can we say that our school has assimilated them and is passing them on in full to the younger generation? For this national soil

could nourish the ethics of international relations, the ethic of mutual understanding of members of different social organizations.

The natural scientific, philosophical, and literary works of the great thinkers of the Middle East were advanced knowledge in their contemporary civilizations. When turning to the past we must not forget this. The restoration of the attraction to the most advanced knowledge of the present day would mean a correct perception of our historical past. At the same time it would guarantee that we would not fall into the trap of being ethnically closed off.

Today our sovereignty makes it possible for social scientists to independently develop training programs and aids for the national schools and VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. At the same time this places special responsibility on the social scientists of the republic and increases the demands placed on their professional level. But one is struck by the fact that up to this point, in spite of the elimination of obstacles, in Tajikistan we have not yet published a social sciences textbook in the Tajik language which meets modern requirements. This depends partially on the creative activity of the social scientists themselves, but not only on them.

For example, how can we justify the fact that the Russian-Tajik dictionary "Economics Terminology," which is so necessary for the VUZ's, has been lying around unpublished in the Irfon publishing house for 10 years? A new textbook of political economics translated into the Tajik language has been lying around the Maorif publishing house for two years now.

The development and realization of the concept of the national school are not just a matter for public education. Here we need a clearcut state policy and program, whose development has already been started on instructions from the president.

Under the conditions of the growing politicization, two currents are becoming more and more distinct in sociopolitical thought. There is an ever sharper polarization of the political positions of proponents of the socialist option, on the one hand, and on the other, champions of anticommunist ideas. This is why communists must not be indifferent to attempts to depoliticize, de-ideologize, and de-party-ize various spheres of social life, including social sciences and public education.

The sociopolitical schools that call for this are actually concealing their own aspirations to "re-ideologize" and "re-party-ize" these spheres, establish a monopoly of anticommunist ideology, weaken communists' influence in scientific and educational institutions, and deprive young citizens of the right to free expression of their views.

But, on the other hand, it is inadmissible to transform educational and scholarly institutions into a field of political passions that impede the accomplishment of

scholarly and educational tasks and the development of real citizens who have profound knowledge and high moral standards.

But how do we make sure that educational classes and scholarly discussions are not transformed into a field and a means of punishment for nonconformity? We need a high level of political culture under the conditions of a multiparty democratic society. It will be necessary to answer many questions. For example, how and through the development of which sociopolitical institutions can we arrive at an elementary mutual tolerance of parties and their members?

It seems that there is an immense amount of serious work for everyone here, including the social sciences.

Depoliticization of social sciences is significant only in the sense of denying them their previous functions as an agitation and propaganda instrument which justifies various political decisions. Today we must reach a point where the party takes its basis from the results of social sciences. This is a very important point.

On the other hand, we must not fail to pay attention to a serious danger. Under the pretext of pluralism, de-ideologization, and depoliticization we must not reject everything valuable that has been gained in the past.

The fact is that ideology, in spite of certain elements of utopianism of which we are aware, has pervaded the living tissue of society. When we justifiably destroy these elements, whether we intend to or not, we sometimes cut to the quick.

There are many examples of this. We are speaking about the socialist idea, and about the federative structure of the country, and about internationalism, and about the construction of a rule-of-law state, and about many other things. These ideas require deep development and renewal. But in no case may we forget that they have their own bearers, that is, individuals and entire peoples, large and small, who are linked by economic, spiritual, cultural, and political interests.

All this makes it necessary for social scientists to have a high sense of civic duty, morality, and scholarly responsibility—so that, while eliminating that which has outlived its usefulness, they will not destroy the living tissue of the social organism. For in the republic we know of cases of a superficial, unscholarly approach to the legacy of Marx and Lenin, which, unfortunately, is not being properly refuted by social scientists, especially communists.

I would like to say a couple of words about social science personnel.

In the past the rigid system of the ideological flow "from above to below" without feedback made serious free scientific and practical creativity more difficult. Social sciences personnel, as a rule, were selected under the conditions of the predominance of uniformity. This is

shown, for example, by the position of many who are waiting in the hope that someone will solve many of their problems for them.

New approaches are needed in theory and methods today. I am convinced that we can carry out these tasks since we have people capable of creativity. I have in mind our scholars and educators who assimilate moral, human values and pass them on to the younger generations.

The works of our social scientists, economists, philosophers, sociologists, historians, orientologists, literary scholars, and students of culture are widely known both in the Union and abroad. We have many excellent educators—true masters of the living word who combine this work with scholarly research.

But we must speak about phenomena that impede renewal. For example, in the VUZ's it is difficult to get anywhere with the question of the growth of the scholarly cadres. Suffice it to say that only 4.5 percent of all the instructors in the social sciences are doctors of sciences while 63 percent are candidates of sciences. Clearly, this is not an absolute indicator of scholarly output, but still it tells of the difficulties of the growth of the number of scholars.

Or take these figures: 10.4 percent of the VUZ instructors are under 30 years of age and 14.6 percent are over 60. Even the most superficial glance at these figures will tell us that the social scientists in the VUZ's of the republic are not getting any younger.

This has an effect on their activity as well. But to say this is not to tell the whole truth. The fact is that there are clear signs of splits among social scientists along political lines.

There have been more frequent cases of social scientists' withdrawing or being expelled from the party. There were six such cases in 1990 alone. Some of them joined the ranks of other sociopolitical movements. Apparently this was a sign of the influence of the outmoded system of selection for the CPSU, in which the criterion was not only ideological conviction but also selfish careerist considerations.

The new CPSU Rules expand the rights and opportunities for communists to defend their views and political positions. This has had a positive effect on the influx of social scientists into the party in the current strained situation. For example, in the VUZ's and the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, 25 social scientists have been accepted as members in the CPSU. The overall intake of scholarly personnel of the VUZ's and secondary educational institutions and school teachers amounted to 1,296 people. This is a five-fold increase over 1989.

I would like to mention one more peculiarity of social scientists. They are among the main protectors and

bearers of the historical consciousness, and this means a particular attitude toward society—its history, its present, and its future.

We know that historical science has been distorted to a certain degree, and today attempts are being made to fill in the "blank spots." Opposing positions and views sometimes come into conflict here too. But the most dangerous thing in the process of the renewal of historical knowledge is the desire to abolish historical truth altogether, replacing it with surrogates that suit anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Unfortunately, even here in Tajikistan we see attempts to defame all Soviet history.

One need not look far for examples. Just take the last issue of the newspaper ADOLAT, which contains a poem by Khikmat Rakhmat, "My USSR Homeland." It cannot be called anything but slander since there is nothing to it but a complete defamation of the USSR and Soviet history.

The verses contain not a word about the fact that it was thanks to the Great October Revolution and the union of friendly peoples that the Tajik people after a thousand years acquired its statehood and created its own cultural, intellectual, and economic potential.

In this same issue of the newspaper ADOLAT there are excerpts from the Sh. Yusupov's speech at the congress of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, where he asserts that the October Revolution supposedly impeded the transition to the market economy and human civilization. All this sounds strange, to say the least, as though there had never been a New Economic Policy (NEP), the USSR had never been transformed into a mighty industrial power, and the cultural and economic advancement of the national regions were not a historical fact.

At the same time attempts are made to whitewash and rehabilitate everything pre-Soviet and anti-Soviet, for example, the prerevolutionary state formations on the territory of Central Asia or the Basmati movement [basmachestvo], without giving a thought to the contradictory aspects of this movement, which on the whole was antidemocratic. People forget that it was essentially the rule of the emirate that protected the anti-Soviet organization in Central Asia. Attempts to defame Soviet history while at the same time whitewashing everything pre-Soviet and anti-Soviet—such are the characteristics of anticommunism.

Therefore there is no more important task for social scientists than to preserve socialist values and everything positive in our history. We must do everything possible not to allow the people's historical memory to be destroyed. This is especially important on the threshold of the referendum and the conclusion of the new Union treaty.

There is criticism of communists and communism and then there is anticommunism. And it is necessary to distinguish between the two. Anticommunism does not recognize rational, constructive debate or discussion. It

is directed toward destroying the foundations of our state. To speak out against anticommunism is the most important task of social scientists.

No self-respecting state in the world will allow overt destructive activity directed toward destruction of its foundations. And one of the foundations of the Soviet state is the people's understanding of the value of our Union. It is toward a destruction of this awareness that our homegrown anticommunism is directed. The most active of the anticommunists are those who have been expelled or have withdrawn from the CPSU and are now working on political platforms of other parties. And also those who would like to take advantage of religion and populist ideas for political purposes. These ideas are becoming more and more dangerous in the country and they are putting down roots in our republic.

During the period of the ferocious outbreak of anticommunism one can only regret the silence of social scientists and in general representatives of the intelligentsia who hold positions of the socialist option.

Along with this, I would like to mention the prospects of the social sciences in the schools and VUZ's. It would seem that their renewal would be a guarantee of teaching more humanities in the schools and VUZ's. By reinforcing ties between social scientists and the Communist Party of Tajikistan and implementing through communists a policy of general human and national values in the area of the development of social sciences and public education, we will be able to contribute to increasing the influence of the humanities in social relations in the new system of political phenomena and views.

We must not think that someone sends policy down from above. Moreover, the policy of the Communist Party of Tajikistan can and should be developed with active assistance from social scientists. In this connection I would like to express the hope that our conference will answer many questions.

We will have an opportunity to hear leading specialists and express our ideas about their views. The result of the conference will be recommendations pertaining to the future of social sciences in the republic.

"The role of social sciences is increasing now as never before, for the formation of public opinion and public thinking depends primarily on the level of development of social sciences and on the position and activity of social science scholars," said Academician Kh.M. Sidmuradiv, vice president of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, in his speech at the congress. The restructuring of all the spheres of the vital activity of our society is in critical need of a deep and comprehensive development of the concept of the modern state of the socioeconomic, cultural, and political development of our society, including a modern concept of socialism. Social sciences are called upon to provide for self-awareness and effective utilization of the entire progressive, collective, experience of the masses.

Yet, the speaker went on to say, the condition of our social sciences and the forms of its connection to social practice, which were formed during the previous period of our history, do not correspond to the nature of the revolutionary-transformational tasks facing society and require decisive and immediate changes.

The academician went on to discuss in detail questions of philosophical science, interethnic relations, national culture, the religious situation in the republic, sociology and psychology, political sciences and jurisprudence, and a number of other problems.

The most important form of intensive development of social science and generalization of its results, Kh.M. Saidmuradov said in conclusion, are the comprehensive target programs. It is within the framework of these programs that scholarly collectives are formed, which unite representatives of various branches of social knowledge and realize direct scholarly ties.

One of the main tasks of social sciences is improvement of the quality of education, said Tajik SSR Education Minister I.D. Davlatov in his speech. The concept of education that exists today is clearly outdated. Social sciences must produce a person who is developed in all ways, who is capable of solving problems independently.

What kind of general youth culture can there be if even the cultural level of our intelligentsia is very low, the speaker went on to say. He touched upon problems of the interaction between theory and culture.

There is a great difference between theory and practice, he said. Frequently practice forges ahead of theory, which is absolutely inadmissible. Just take the market economy. It already exists, but our social scientists have not yet developed the concept of the market economy. Our ministry has many developments to solve these problems. We need a comprehensive social science program and we must educate a new generation of social scientists. For now 48 percent of the active scholars in this area are preparing to go on a pension. And until we start working on the problem of enlisting youth in the social sciences, the work of social sciences in the republic will not get off the ground.

The speech of Kh.U. Umarov, department chief of the Institute of Economics, was agitated.

Economic science has turned out to be unprepared for the market economy, he said. I do not know of any significant works that discuss market relations. And economists are not to blame for this; in general, ideologists are to blame. So many economists were "broken" in their day because of developing the theory and idea of market relations.

We have never had a theory of political economy of socialism—this was one departure from reality. All one has to do is talk about the socialist market and the capitalist market and we become totally confused. There is one market, the civilized market, and we must change

over to it. We must study the ideologists of socialism—Bulgakov, Bernshteyn, Bebel, Plekhanov, and other classical theoreticians with whom we are absolutely unfamiliar. Only then will we at least see some way out of the situation that has been created.

Problems of modern teaching of political economics in VUZ's of the republic, historical-political science under the conditions of perestroika, new approaches to elucidating the history of the Tajik people during the period of democratization and glasnost, the formation of a rule-of-law culture, and literature and democratization of the society were discussed in the speeches by: M.M. Mamadnazarbekov, department head of Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin; Sh.M. Sultanov, director of the Institute of Party History under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan; R.M. Mason, director of the Institute of History, Archaeology, and Ethnography imeni Akhmad Donish, corresponding member of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences; F.T. Takhirov, rector of Tajik State University; and A.M. Maniyazov, director of the Institute of Tajik Language and Literature imeni A. Rudaka

How and what should one teach social sciences and general philosophical disciplines, particularly philosophy?—this question was asked by S.N. Navruzov, head of the philosophy department of Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin.

The teaching of philosophy sometimes evokes in students a process of jointly experiencing its truths. The realities of our day demand that we turn the teaching of philosophy, like the entire cycle of social sciences disciplines, in the direction of the complicated, contradictory, and extremely crucial problems of social development. Aggressiveness and vitality in teaching these disciplines must be applied not only to general philosophical problems but also to the peculiarities and interests of the student audience. Only then will this teaching be properly effective and directed toward student youth.

The speech of department head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan T.B. Karimov was devoted to the subject: "Society and History: Problems and Interpretation."

The social sciences, he said, encompassing the entire practice of our life and reflecting it through the prism of the culture of society, occupy the most important place among the sciences in the formation of social awareness and, through it, the awareness of each individual.

Under the conditions of the growth of national self-awareness, one of the tasks of social sciences should be to appeal to the treasure trove of our history, from which they must glean spiritual food, sort it out and reject everything that is incompatible with human values—the speaker said, having discussed what is being done in this area.

Speaking of ideology, T.B. Karimov noted that social sciences cannot exist without ideology as the recognized

goal in the system of social connections and activity. That public education and social sciences are beyond politics is a myth generated by the play of political forces. Social sciences have an objective need for ideology, he asserted.

The role of sociology in the social sciences and raising it to meet modern requirements was discussed by Sh.Sh. Shoismatullayev, department head of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

Many social scientists and instructors at higher and secondary educational institutions of the republic also participated in the discussions.

The work resulted in the adoption of the recommendations: "Tasks of Social Sciences Under the Conditions of Perestroyka."

Participants in the conference unanimously adopted an appeal to workers of the republic, which will be published in the press.

Ye.I. Turgunov, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, and V.Kh. Khodzhiyev, first secretary of the Dushanbe city party committee, participated in the work of the republic conference.